Before joining BI in 1982, I served on the faculty of the Norwegian School of Economics. I spent one year as visiting faculty at the University of Washington, one year at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and several shorter periods at the Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid, and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I have worked with a consulting firm in corporate strategy, with an investment bank, and as an expert witness. Over the period 2004-2009, I held the Stein Erik Hagen chair in private ownership. I held a 50% position at BI since September 1, 2016, retired in August 2019, and I have been professor emeritus since then.
Research areas
My primary academic interests are corporate finance. The major research efforts have been in capital budgeting, valuation effects of taxation, equity offerings, dividend policy, board composition, shareholder conflicts, ownerless firms, and the governance of family firms. My research is published in outlets like the Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Decision Sciences, Journal of Business Ethics, European Financial Management, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Journal of Economic Psychology, and Energy Economics. Currently, my research focus is on corporate governance. Most of my ongoing projects are linked to the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR), where I served as a founding director until I retired in 2019.
Teaching areas
I usually teach corporate finance, corporate governance, and valuation at the graduate and executive program levels. I find it challenging and rewarding to present my research to regulators and the business community. I have written two textbooks in corporate finance (current editions are from 2017 and 2024, respectively) and one textbook in corporate governance (2012).
Vi bruker kvantitativ livsløpsanalyse (vugge-til-grav) og finner at solceller på private boligtak har stor, positiv effekt på klima og økonomi når de lages med ren, billig strøm og erstatter skitten, dyr strøm. Beliggenhet er derfor den grunnleggende forklaringen på solcellers verdiskaping. Selv om et solcelleanlegg på 60 m2 av et norsk boligtak produserer mye strøm, reduserer det likevel ikke klimautslippet med mer enn utslippet i Kina øker når anlegget lages. Derfor skapes det ingen global klimagevinst under våre forutsetninger. Brukes derimot anlegget i land der alternativ strøm er skitten, reduseres årlig CO2-utslipp med mer enn EUs samlede årsutslipp pr. innbygger. I Norge, hvor alternativ strøm både er ren og forholdsvis billig, finner vi at solstrøm er ulønnsomt samfunnsøkonomisk og ofte også privatøkonomisk. Norge er trolig blant de få land der både klimaeffekten og økonomieffekten av solceller på boligtak er negativ. Bedre solcelleteknologi, mer elektrifisering, høyere strømpris og mer strømeksport kan lett forbedre denne situasjonen.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Gjærum, Per Ivar & Hasle, Torkel (2021)
Solstrøm fra boligtak er ofte godt for både klima og økonomi, men ikke i dagens Norge
Vi bruker kvantitativ livsløpsanalyse (vugge-til-grav) og finner at solceller på private boligtak har stor, positiv effekt på klima og økonomi når de lages med ren, billig strøm og erstatter skitten, dyr strøm. Beliggenhet er derfor den grunnleggende forklaringen på solcellers verdiskaping. Selv om et solcelleanlegg på 60 m2 av et norsk boligtak produserer mye strøm, reduserer det likevel ikke klimautslippet med mer enn utslippet i Kina øker når anlegget lages. Derfor skapes det ingen global klimagevinst under våre forutsetninger. Brukes derimot anlegget i land der alternativ strøm er skitten, reduseres årlig CO2-utslipp med mer enn EUs samlede årsutslipp pr. innbygger. I Norge, hvor alternativ strøm både er ren og forholdsvis billig, finner vi at solstrøm er ulønnsomt samfunnsøkonomisk og ofte også privatøkonomisk. Norge er trolig blant de få land der både klimaeffekten og økonomieffekten av solceller på boligtak er negativ. Bedre solcelleteknologi, mer elektrifisering, høyere strømpris og mer strømeksport kan lett forbedre denne situasjonen.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Gjærum, Per Ivar & Hasle, Torkel (2021)
Solstrøm fra boligtak er ofte godt for både klima og økonomi, men ikke i dagens Norge
Vi bruker kvantitativ livsløpsanalyse (vugge-til-grav) og finner at solceller på private boligtak har stor, positiv effekt på klima og økonomi når de lages med ren, billig strøm og erstatter skitten, dyr strøm. Beliggenhet er derfor den grunnleggende forklaringen på solcellers verdiskaping. Selv om et solcelleanlegg på 60 m2 av et norsk boligtak produserer mye strøm, reduserer det likevel ikke klimautslippet med mer enn utslippet i Kina øker når anlegget lages. Derfor skapes det ingen global klimagevinst under våre forutsetninger. Brukes derimot anlegget i land der alternativ strøm er skitten, reduseres årlig CO2-utslipp med mer enn EUs samlede årsutslipp pr. innbygger. I Norge, hvor alternativ strøm både er ren og forholdsvis billig, finner vi at solstrøm er ulønnsomt samfunnsøkonomisk og ofte også privatøkonomisk. Norge er trolig blant de få land der både klimaeffekten og økonomieffekten av solceller på boligtak er negativ. Bedre solcelleteknologi, mer elektrifisering, høyere strømpris og mer strømeksport kan lett forbedre denne situasjonen.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2020)
Innlegg: Overselger studie om formuesskatt
Dagens næringsliv,
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2020)
Innlegg: Overselger studie om formuesskatt
Dagens næringsliv,
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2020)
Innlegg: Overselger studie om formuesskatt
Dagens næringsliv,
Bøhren, Øyvind; Stacescu, Bogdan, Almli, Line & Søndergaard, Kathrine (2019)
We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.
We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by dividend payout. We study a large and clean regulatory shock in Norway that increases the dividend tax rate for all individuals from 0% to 28%. We find that dividends drop less the higher the potential shareholder conflict, suggesting that dividend policy trades off tax and agency considerations. The average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points when the conflict potential is low, but by only 18 points when it is high. These lower dividends cannot be explained by higher salaries to shareholders or diverse liquidity needs. We also observe a strong increase in indirect ownership of high-conflict firms through tax-exempt holding companies and suggest policy implications for intercorporate dividend taxation.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Stacescu, Bogdan, Almli, Line & Søndergaard, Kathrine (2019)
We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.
We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by dividend payout. We study a large and clean regulatory shock in Norway that increases the dividend tax rate for all individuals from 0% to 28%. We find that dividends drop less the higher the potential shareholder conflict, suggesting that dividend policy trades off tax and agency considerations. The average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points when the conflict potential is low, but by only 18 points when it is high. These lower dividends cannot be explained by higher salaries to shareholders or diverse liquidity needs. We also observe a strong increase in indirect ownership of high-conflict firms through tax-exempt holding companies and suggest policy implications for intercorporate dividend taxation.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Stacescu, Bogdan, Almli, Line & Søndergaard, Kathrine (2019)
We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.
We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by dividend payout. We study a large and clean regulatory shock in Norway that increases the dividend tax rate for all individuals from 0% to 28%. We find that dividends drop less the higher the potential shareholder conflict, suggesting that dividend policy trades off tax and agency considerations. The average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points when the conflict potential is low, but by only 18 points when it is high. These lower dividends cannot be explained by higher salaries to shareholders or diverse liquidity needs. We also observe a strong increase in indirect ownership of high-conflict firms through tax-exempt holding companies and suggest policy implications for intercorporate dividend taxation.
We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential). Such minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority shareholder investment. These results suggest that controlling shareholders voluntarily use dividends to reduce agency conflicts and build trust, rather than opportunistically preferring private benefits to dividends. We show that our results are unlikely to arise from liquidity or signaling motives.
Berg, Magnus; Bøhren, Øyvind & Vassnes, Erik (2018)
Modeling the response to exogenous shocks: The capital uplift rate in petroleum taxation
We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5% of field value. This evidence suggests that large behavioral effects of a shock do not necessarily imply large value effects, making it less important to always account for the taxpayers' response. The valuation error in such cases may be moderate if one instead uses the simplifying and widespread assumption of unresponsive taxpayers.
We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential). Such minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority shareholder investment. These results suggest that controlling shareholders voluntarily use dividends to reduce agency conflicts and build trust, rather than opportunistically preferring private benefits to dividends. We show that our results are unlikely to arise from liquidity or signaling motives.
Berg, Magnus; Bøhren, Øyvind & Vassnes, Erik (2018)
Modeling the response to exogenous shocks: The capital uplift rate in petroleum taxation
We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5% of field value. This evidence suggests that large behavioral effects of a shock do not necessarily imply large value effects, making it less important to always account for the taxpayers' response. The valuation error in such cases may be moderate if one instead uses the simplifying and widespread assumption of unresponsive taxpayers.
We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential). Such minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority shareholder investment. These results suggest that controlling shareholders voluntarily use dividends to reduce agency conflicts and build trust, rather than opportunistically preferring private benefits to dividends. We show that our results are unlikely to arise from liquidity or signaling motives.
Berg, Magnus; Bøhren, Øyvind & Vassnes, Erik (2018)
Modeling the response to exogenous shocks: The capital uplift rate in petroleum taxation
We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5% of field value. This evidence suggests that large behavioral effects of a shock do not necessarily imply large value effects, making it less important to always account for the taxpayers' response. The valuation error in such cases may be moderate if one instead uses the simplifying and widespread assumption of unresponsive taxpayers.
Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Hoseth, Fredrik & Remøy, Håvard (2014)
Lønnsomhet i næringsklynger
Samfunnsøkonomen, (3) , s. 14-23.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Økonomiske særtrekk ved stiftelser
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Selskabsret, (3) , s. 1-14.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Staubo, Siv Jønland (2014)
Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval
Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Hoseth, Fredrik & Remøy, Håvard (2014)
Lønnsomhet i næringsklynger
Samfunnsøkonomen, (3) , s. 14-23.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2014)
Økonomiske særtrekk ved stiftelser
Nordisk Tidsskrift for Selskabsret, (3) , s. 1-14.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Staubo, Siv Jønland (2014)
Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval
Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2013)
Stakeholder rights and economic performance: The profitability of nonprofits
This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by comparing the performance of stockholder-owned firms with the much less analyzed nonprofit firms. No stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by customers, employees, and community citizens. Accounting for differences in size and risk and comparing only firms in the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned firms do not outperform nonprofit firms. This result is consistent with the notin that the monitoring function of stockholders may be successfully replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence that product market competition may play this role as a substitute monitoring mechanism.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2013)
The economics of minority freezeouts: Evidence from the courtroom
We analyze minority freezeout offers in a legal environment where minority stockholders can reject the offer and ask the court to value their nontendered stock. This regulatory setting allows us to observe the disciplining effect of legal enforcement on stockholder behavior. We find that minority stockholders reject about one out of ten freezeout offers, and that rejection is more likely when the bidder has controlled the firm for quite some time before the offer. Rejected offers take on average around three years to be settled in court, and litigation costs are almost never paid by minority stockholders. The court mostly prices rejected offers above the offer price, particularly when the firm is private, when the bidder has controlled the firm for an extensive period before the offer, and when the case is large. These findings suggest that minority stockholders consider most freezeout offers commensurate with the level of legal stockholder protection as enforced by the courts. The majority stockholder tends to underestimate the legal protection of minority rights in settings where these rights are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Nevertheless, minority stockholders who take their case to court often face years of waiting, and for a highly unpredictable litigation return.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2013)
Norske familiebedrifter - Omfang, eierstyring og lønnsomhet
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 29(3) , s. 57-75.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2013)
Stakeholder rights and economic performance: The profitability of nonprofits
This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by comparing the performance of stockholder-owned firms with the much less analyzed nonprofit firms. No stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by customers, employees, and community citizens. Accounting for differences in size and risk and comparing only firms in the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned firms do not outperform nonprofit firms. This result is consistent with the notin that the monitoring function of stockholders may be successfully replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence that product market competition may play this role as a substitute monitoring mechanism.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2013)
The economics of minority freezeouts: Evidence from the courtroom
We analyze minority freezeout offers in a legal environment where minority stockholders can reject the offer and ask the court to value their nontendered stock. This regulatory setting allows us to observe the disciplining effect of legal enforcement on stockholder behavior. We find that minority stockholders reject about one out of ten freezeout offers, and that rejection is more likely when the bidder has controlled the firm for quite some time before the offer. Rejected offers take on average around three years to be settled in court, and litigation costs are almost never paid by minority stockholders. The court mostly prices rejected offers above the offer price, particularly when the firm is private, when the bidder has controlled the firm for an extensive period before the offer, and when the case is large. These findings suggest that minority stockholders consider most freezeout offers commensurate with the level of legal stockholder protection as enforced by the courts. The majority stockholder tends to underestimate the legal protection of minority rights in settings where these rights are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Nevertheless, minority stockholders who take their case to court often face years of waiting, and for a highly unpredictable litigation return.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2013)
Norske familiebedrifter - Omfang, eierstyring og lønnsomhet
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 29(3) , s. 57-75.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2013)
Stakeholder rights and economic performance: The profitability of nonprofits
This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by comparing the performance of stockholder-owned firms with the much less analyzed nonprofit firms. No stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by customers, employees, and community citizens. Accounting for differences in size and risk and comparing only firms in the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned firms do not outperform nonprofit firms. This result is consistent with the notin that the monitoring function of stockholders may be successfully replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence that product market competition may play this role as a substitute monitoring mechanism.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2013)
The economics of minority freezeouts: Evidence from the courtroom
We analyze minority freezeout offers in a legal environment where minority stockholders can reject the offer and ask the court to value their nontendered stock. This regulatory setting allows us to observe the disciplining effect of legal enforcement on stockholder behavior. We find that minority stockholders reject about one out of ten freezeout offers, and that rejection is more likely when the bidder has controlled the firm for quite some time before the offer. Rejected offers take on average around three years to be settled in court, and litigation costs are almost never paid by minority stockholders. The court mostly prices rejected offers above the offer price, particularly when the firm is private, when the bidder has controlled the firm for an extensive period before the offer, and when the case is large. These findings suggest that minority stockholders consider most freezeout offers commensurate with the level of legal stockholder protection as enforced by the courts. The majority stockholder tends to underestimate the legal protection of minority rights in settings where these rights are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Nevertheless, minority stockholders who take their case to court often face years of waiting, and for a highly unpredictable litigation return.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2013)
Norske familiebedrifter - Omfang, eierstyring og lønnsomhet
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 29(3) , s. 57-75.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Josefsen, Morten & Steen, Pål Erik (2012)
This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.
Denne artikkelen bruker et konkret pedagogisk prosjekt i finans til å vise hvordan ønsket om undervisning med relevans og mangfold kan avleire seg i et læreverk. Vår nøkkel er å utvikle bok og nettside i tidsmessig parallell snarere enn i sekvens, ha klar arbeidsdeling og sømløs overgang mellom de to komponentene, og å gjøre nettsiden spesielt bred og dyp. I artikkelen konsentrerer vi oss om nettsiden og beskriver hvordan hensynet til relevans og mangfold ivaretas gjennom aktiv bruk av medieoppslag, skreddersydde regneark, integrert stikkordliste, spillbaserte øvingsoppgaver, kalkulator- og regnearkhjelp, lydfiler for MP3-spiller og tilbud om forelesermateriale. Vår erfaring tyder på at integrerte læreverk er krevende å utvikle og på kort sikt ulønnsomme for både forfatter og forlag. I et lengre perspektiv tror vi teknologidrevet konkurransepress vil favorisere dem som utnytter at teknologi med høyt pedagogisk potensial nå er lett tilgjengelig for forfatter, forlag, foreleser og student. Uansett står produsenter og brukere av læremidler overfor store utfordringer.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Josefsen, Morten & Steen, Pål Erik (2012)
This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.
Denne artikkelen bruker et konkret pedagogisk prosjekt i finans til å vise hvordan ønsket om undervisning med relevans og mangfold kan avleire seg i et læreverk. Vår nøkkel er å utvikle bok og nettside i tidsmessig parallell snarere enn i sekvens, ha klar arbeidsdeling og sømløs overgang mellom de to komponentene, og å gjøre nettsiden spesielt bred og dyp. I artikkelen konsentrerer vi oss om nettsiden og beskriver hvordan hensynet til relevans og mangfold ivaretas gjennom aktiv bruk av medieoppslag, skreddersydde regneark, integrert stikkordliste, spillbaserte øvingsoppgaver, kalkulator- og regnearkhjelp, lydfiler for MP3-spiller og tilbud om forelesermateriale. Vår erfaring tyder på at integrerte læreverk er krevende å utvikle og på kort sikt ulønnsomme for både forfatter og forlag. I et lengre perspektiv tror vi teknologidrevet konkurransepress vil favorisere dem som utnytter at teknologi med høyt pedagogisk potensial nå er lett tilgjengelig for forfatter, forlag, foreleser og student. Uansett står produsenter og brukere av læremidler overfor store utfordringer.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Josefsen, Morten & Steen, Pål Erik (2012)
This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.
Denne artikkelen bruker et konkret pedagogisk prosjekt i finans til å vise hvordan ønsket om undervisning med relevans og mangfold kan avleire seg i et læreverk. Vår nøkkel er å utvikle bok og nettside i tidsmessig parallell snarere enn i sekvens, ha klar arbeidsdeling og sømløs overgang mellom de to komponentene, og å gjøre nettsiden spesielt bred og dyp. I artikkelen konsentrerer vi oss om nettsiden og beskriver hvordan hensynet til relevans og mangfold ivaretas gjennom aktiv bruk av medieoppslag, skreddersydde regneark, integrert stikkordliste, spillbaserte øvingsoppgaver, kalkulator- og regnearkhjelp, lydfiler for MP3-spiller og tilbud om forelesermateriale. Vår erfaring tyder på at integrerte læreverk er krevende å utvikle og på kort sikt ulønnsomme for både forfatter og forlag. I et lengre perspektiv tror vi teknologidrevet konkurransepress vil favorisere dem som utnytter at teknologi med høyt pedagogisk potensial nå er lett tilgjengelig for forfatter, forlag, foreleser og student. Uansett står produsenter og brukere av læremidler overfor store utfordringer.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2011)
Kompakt og intens. Erfaringer fra en skriveprosess
Prosa - tidsskrift for skribenter, 17(3) , s. 63-72.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2011)
Eierne, styret og ledelsen: Corporate governance i Norge
Fagbokforlaget
Bøhren, Øyvind (2011)
Kompakt og intens. Erfaringer fra en skriveprosess
Prosa - tidsskrift for skribenter, 17(3) , s. 63-72.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2011)
Eierne, styret og ledelsen: Corporate governance i Norge
Fagbokforlaget
Bøhren, Øyvind (2011)
Kompakt og intens. Erfaringer fra en skriveprosess
Prosa - tidsskrift for skribenter, 17(3) , s. 63-72.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2011)
Eierne, styret og ledelsen: Corporate governance i Norge
Fagbokforlaget
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, R. Øystein (2010)
Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room
This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, R. Øystein (2010)
Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room
This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, R. Øystein (2010)
Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room
This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 8(2) , s. 65-75.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, (2) , s. 65-75.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 8(2) , s. 65-75.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, (2) , s. 65-75.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Berzins, Janis (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 8(2) , s. 65-75.
Berzins, Janis & Bøhren, Øyvind (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Praktisk økonomi & finans, (2) , s. 65-75.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
Governance and performance revisited
International Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley, Paul Ali and Greg Gregoriou (ed), , s. 27-64.
We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
Governance and performance revisited
International Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley, Paul Ali and Greg Gregoriou (ed), , s. 27-64.
We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
Governance and performance revisited
International Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley, Paul Ali and Greg Gregoriou (ed), , s. 27-64.
We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2005)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
Økonomisk forum, 59(5) , s. 4-14.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2005)
Tvangsinnløsning av minoritetseiere: Rettsøkonomien i norske skjønnssaker gjennom 25 år" (Minority buyouts: Law and economics in Norwegian courts over 25 years)
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 118(1-2) , s. 122-152.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2005)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
Økonomisk forum, 59(5) , s. 4-14.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2005)
Tvangsinnløsning av minoritetseiere: Rettsøkonomien i norske skjønnssaker gjennom 25 år" (Minority buyouts: Law and economics in Norwegian courts over 25 years)
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 118(1-2) , s. 122-152.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2005)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
Økonomisk forum, 59(5) , s. 4-14.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Krosvik, Nils Erik (2005)
Tvangsinnløsning av minoritetseiere: Rettsøkonomien i norske skjønnssaker gjennom 25 år" (Minority buyouts: Law and economics in Norwegian courts over 25 years)
Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap, 118(1-2) , s. 122-152.
We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20–50% intercorporate investment is accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fraction of equity held, its recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.
We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20–50% intercorporate investment is accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fraction of equity held, its recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.
We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20–50% intercorporate investment is accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fraction of equity held, its recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2003)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 20, s. 3-17.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2003)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 20, s. 3-17.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2003)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Praktisk økonomi & finans, 20, s. 3-17.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2002)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Næringspolitikk for en ny økonomi, , s. 91-110.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2002)
Finansparadigmet
Essays on Uncertainty - Festskrift til Steinar Ekerns 60-årsdag, , s. 157-176.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2002)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Næringspolitikk for en ny økonomi, , s. 91-110.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2002)
Finansparadigmet
Essays on Uncertainty - Festskrift til Steinar Ekerns 60-årsdag, , s. 157-176.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2002)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Næringspolitikk for en ny økonomi, , s. 91-110.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2002)
Finansparadigmet
Essays on Uncertainty - Festskrift til Steinar Ekerns 60-årsdag, , s. 157-176.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Patterns of corporate ownership: insights from a unique data set
Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC), 27, s. 55-86.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Patterns of corporate ownership: insights from a unique data set
Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC), 27, s. 55-86.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Patterns of corporate ownership: insights from a unique data set
Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC), 27, s. 55-86.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1998)
The agent's ethics in the principal-agent model
Journal of Business Ethics, 17, s. 745-755.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1998)
The agent's ethics in the principal-agent model
Journal of Business Ethics, 17, s. 745-755.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1998)
The agent's ethics in the principal-agent model
Journal of Business Ethics, 17, s. 745-755.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Norli, Øyvind (1997)
Determinants of intercorporate shareholdings
European Finance Review, 1, s. 265-287.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1997)
Prosjektanalyse
Skarvet Forlag
Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Risk components and the market model: A pedagogical note
Applied Financial Economics, 7, s. 307-310.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Why underwrite rights offerings? Some new evidence
Journal of Financial Economics, 46, s. 223-261.
Gjærum, Per Ivar & Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring. 3.utgave (Project analysis. 3rd ed.)
Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Norli, Øyvind (1997)
Determinants of intercorporate shareholdings
European Finance Review, 1, s. 265-287.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1997)
Prosjektanalyse
Skarvet Forlag
Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Risk components and the market model: A pedagogical note
Applied Financial Economics, 7, s. 307-310.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Why underwrite rights offerings? Some new evidence
Journal of Financial Economics, 46, s. 223-261.
Gjærum, Per Ivar & Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring. 3.utgave (Project analysis. 3rd ed.)
Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Norli, Øyvind (1997)
Determinants of intercorporate shareholdings
European Finance Review, 1, s. 265-287.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1997)
Prosjektanalyse
Skarvet Forlag
Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Risk components and the market model: A pedagogical note
Applied Financial Economics, 7, s. 307-310.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Why underwrite rights offerings? Some new evidence
Journal of Financial Economics, 46, s. 223-261.
Gjærum, Per Ivar & Bøhren, Øyvind (1997)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring. 3.utgave (Project analysis. 3rd ed.)
Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind; Thorsland, Arne & Tollefsen, Pål (1996)
Gjeldsstrukturen i norske aksjeselskaper
Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 12(2) , s. 51-60.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1996)
Norske aksjeemisjoner
Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 12(4) , s. 47-57.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Thorsland, Arne & Tollefsen, Pål (1996)
Gjeldsstrukturen i norske aksjeselskaper
Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 12(2) , s. 51-60.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1996)
Norske aksjeemisjoner
Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 12(4) , s. 47-57.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Thorsland, Arne & Tollefsen, Pål (1996)
Gjeldsstrukturen i norske aksjeselskaper
Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 12(2) , s. 51-60.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Espen B. & Michalsen, Dag (1996)
Norske aksjeemisjoner
Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 12(4) , s. 47-57.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Corporate cross-ownership and market aggregates: Oslo Stock Exchange 1980-1990
Journal of Banking & Finance, 18, s. 687-704.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Corporate cross-ownership and market aggregates: Oslo Stock Exchange 1980-1990
Journal of Banking & Finance, 18, s. 687-704.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Corporate cross-ownership and market aggregates: Oslo Stock Exchange 1980-1990
Journal of Banking & Finance, 18, s. 687-704.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1993)
På leting etter god pristeori: Historien om kapitalverdimodellen
Sosialøkonomen, 47(2) , s. 20-24.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1993)
På leting etter god pristeori: Historien om kapitalverdimodellen
Sosialøkonomen, 47(2) , s. 20-24.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1993)
På leting etter god pristeori: Historien om kapitalverdimodellen
Sosialøkonomen, 47(2) , s. 20-24.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Larsen, Knut, Michalsen, Dag & Schwencke, Hans Robert (1991)
Egenkapitalrentabilitet og skatt: En kritisk analyse
Beta, 5(1) , s. 54-63.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Larsen, Knut, Michalsen, Dag & Schwencke, Hans Robert (1991)
Egenkapitalrentabilitet og skatt: En kritisk analyse
Beta, 5(1) , s. 54-63.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Larsen, Knut, Michalsen, Dag & Schwencke, Hans Robert (1991)
Egenkapitalrentabilitet og skatt: En kritisk analyse
Beta, 5(1) , s. 54-63.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Merton Miller, norsk beskatning og finansiell verdiskapning
Sosialøkonomen, 44(11) , s. 13-15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1990)
Theory development processes in the social sciences: The case of stochastic choice theory
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11(1) , s. 1-34.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Skattebaserte finansieringsinsentiver i norske aksjeselskaper fra 1970 til 1990
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 104(4) , s. 303-336.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Merton Miller, norsk beskatning og finansiell verdiskapning
Sosialøkonomen, 44(11) , s. 13-15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1990)
Theory development processes in the social sciences: The case of stochastic choice theory
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11(1) , s. 1-34.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Skattebaserte finansieringsinsentiver i norske aksjeselskaper fra 1970 til 1990
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 104(4) , s. 303-336.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Merton Miller, norsk beskatning og finansiell verdiskapning
Sosialøkonomen, 44(11) , s. 13-15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1990)
Theory development processes in the social sciences: The case of stochastic choice theory
Journal of Economic Psychology, 11(1) , s. 1-34.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1990)
Skattebaserte finansieringsinsentiver i norske aksjeselskaper fra 1970 til 1990
Norsk Økonomisk Tidsskrift, 104(4) , s. 303-336.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
Beta, 1(1) , s. 23-30.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter
Sosialøkonomen, 40(9) , s. 19-23.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
PC-integrert undervisning i bedriftsøkonomi: Pedagogiske hensyn
Beta, 1(4) , s. 101-106.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
Beta, 1(1) , s. 23-30.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter
Sosialøkonomen, 40(9) , s. 19-23.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
PC-integrert undervisning i bedriftsøkonomi: Pedagogiske hensyn
Beta, 1(4) , s. 101-106.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
Beta, 1(1) , s. 23-30.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter
Sosialøkonomen, 40(9) , s. 19-23.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
PC-integrert undervisning i bedriftsøkonomi: Pedagogiske hensyn
Beta, 1(4) , s. 101-106.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1984)
The validity of conventional valuation models under multiperiod uncertainty
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 11(2) , s. 199-211.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1984)
The validity of conventional valuation models under multiperiod uncertainty
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 11(2) , s. 199-211.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1984)
The validity of conventional valuation models under multiperiod uncertainty
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 11(2) , s. 199-211.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Sparing med skattefradrag: en privatøkonomisk analyse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 45(10) , s. 532-537.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Skattefradrag for realrenter
Sosialøkonomen, 37(9) , s. 12-16.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Bounding certainty equivalent factors and risk-adjusted discount rates
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 10(1) , s. 139-146.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Sparing med skattefradrag: en privatøkonomisk analyse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 45(10) , s. 532-537.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Skattefradrag for realrenter
Sosialøkonomen, 37(9) , s. 12-16.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Bounding certainty equivalent factors and risk-adjusted discount rates
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 10(1) , s. 139-146.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Sparing med skattefradrag: en privatøkonomisk analyse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 45(10) , s. 532-537.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Skattefradrag for realrenter
Sosialøkonomen, 37(9) , s. 12-16.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1983)
Bounding certainty equivalent factors and risk-adjusted discount rates
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 10(1) , s. 139-146.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Effektiv rente på boliglån: en empirisk undersøkelse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355-360.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Norsk oljepolitikk i beslutningsanalytisk perspektiv
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44(2) , s. 128-135.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Å løse investeringsproblemer
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355-360.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Effektiv rente på boliglån: en empirisk undersøkelse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355-360.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Norsk oljepolitikk i beslutningsanalytisk perspektiv
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44(2) , s. 128-135.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Å løse investeringsproblemer
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355-360.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Effektiv rente på boliglån: en empirisk undersøkelse
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355-360.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Norsk oljepolitikk i beslutningsanalytisk perspektiv
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44(2) , s. 128-135.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1982)
Å løse investeringsproblemer
Bedriftsøkonomen, 44, s. 355-360.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Fuglaas, Geir (1981)
Yrkesvalg og lønnsomhet: NHH kontra næringsliv og forvaltning
Bedriftsøkonomen, 43(9) , s. 480-485.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1981)
Probabilities proportional to time-state prices
Economics Letters, 8(4) , s. 1-6.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Fuglaas, Geir (1981)
Yrkesvalg og lønnsomhet: NHH kontra næringsliv og forvaltning
Bedriftsøkonomen, 43(9) , s. 480-485.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1981)
Probabilities proportional to time-state prices
Economics Letters, 8(4) , s. 1-6.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Fuglaas, Geir (1981)
Yrkesvalg og lønnsomhet: NHH kontra næringsliv og forvaltning
Bedriftsøkonomen, 43(9) , s. 480-485.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1981)
Probabilities proportional to time-state prices
Economics Letters, 8(4) , s. 1-6.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Schilbred, Cornelius M. (1980)
North Sea oil taxes and sharing of risk: a comparative case study
This paper examines how dividend policy influences conflicts of interest between majority and minority stockholders in a large sample of private firms with controlling blockholders. We find that a higher potential for stockholder conflicts is associated with higher payout. This tendency is stronger when the minority stockholder structure is diffuse and when the minority is not on the firm’s board. Minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority investment in the firm. These findings are consistent with the notion that dividend policy is used to mitigate agency costs, particularly when this benefits the majority in the longer run.
This paper examines how dividend policy influences conflicts of interest between majority and minority stockholders in a large sample of private firms with controlling blockholders. We find that a higher potential for stockholder conflicts is associated with higher payout. This tendency is stronger when the minority stockholder structure is diffuse and when the minority is not on the firm’s board. Minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority investment in the firm. These findings are consistent with the notion that dividend policy is used to mitigate agency costs, particularly when this benefits the majority in the longer run.
This paper examines how dividend policy influences conflicts of interest between majority and minority stockholders in a large sample of private firms with controlling blockholders. We find that a higher potential for stockholder conflicts is associated with higher payout. This tendency is stronger when the minority stockholder structure is diffuse and when the minority is not on the firm’s board. Minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority investment in the firm. These findings are consistent with the notion that dividend policy is used to mitigate agency costs, particularly when this benefits the majority in the longer run.
Corporate finance and governance in firms with limited liability: Basic characteristics
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
We analyze a wide range of corporate finance and governance characteristics in all active Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. This sample includes about 77,000 nonlisted (private) firms and 135 listed (public) firms per year. Nonlisted firms have barely been addressed in the finance literature, despite our finding that they employ four times more people than listed firms, have about four times higher revenues, hold twice as much assets, and constitute over 99% of the enterprises. Indirect evidence suggests that this is also the typical situation worldwide. The unexplored nature of nonlisted firms makes us address a large set of characteristics, and to focus more on describing overall patterns in the data rather than making elaborate tests of behavioral hypotheses. We find that the size distribution of firms in the economy is close to lognormal, which is consistent with independence between size and growth for the individual firm.
Corporate finance and governance in firms with limited liability: Basic characteristics
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
We analyze a wide range of corporate finance and governance characteristics in all active Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. This sample includes about 77,000 nonlisted (private) firms and 135 listed (public) firms per year. Nonlisted firms have barely been addressed in the finance literature, despite our finding that they employ four times more people than listed firms, have about four times higher revenues, hold twice as much assets, and constitute over 99% of the enterprises. Indirect evidence suggests that this is also the typical situation worldwide. The unexplored nature of nonlisted firms makes us address a large set of characteristics, and to focus more on describing overall patterns in the data rather than making elaborate tests of behavioral hypotheses. We find that the size distribution of firms in the economy is close to lognormal, which is consistent with independence between size and growth for the individual firm.
Corporate finance and governance in firms with limited liability: Basic characteristics
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
We analyze a wide range of corporate finance and governance characteristics in all active Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. This sample includes about 77,000 nonlisted (private) firms and 135 listed (public) firms per year. Nonlisted firms have barely been addressed in the finance literature, despite our finding that they employ four times more people than listed firms, have about four times higher revenues, hold twice as much assets, and constitute over 99% of the enterprises. Indirect evidence suggests that this is also the typical situation worldwide. The unexplored nature of nonlisted firms makes us address a large set of characteristics, and to focus more on describing overall patterns in the data rather than making elaborate tests of behavioral hypotheses. We find that the size distribution of firms in the economy is close to lognormal, which is consistent with independence between size and growth for the individual firm.
The corporate finance and governance of limited liability firms: Basic characteristics
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2007)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Conference Lecture]. Event
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2007)
Do stakeholders matter for corporate governance? Behavior and performance of Norwegian banks 1985-2002
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
The distribution of formal control rights among the firm’s stakeholders (such as stockholders, creditors, employees, politicians, and customers) attracts considerable public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the US is that firms should have profit maximization as their only objective, and that stockholders should be the dominant stakeholder in corporate governance. In contrast, conventional wisdom in Continental Europe and Japan is that firms should have multiple objectives and allocate formal power to more stakeholder types than just stockholders. The politics of corporate governance addresses this issue by regulating the owners’ ability to control the corporation. This report addresses this issue empirically by trying to answer two questions. First, what relationship do we actually observe between stakeholder structure and corporate behavior? For instance, do firms take less risk when stockholders share control rights with employees, customers, and politicians? Second, what is the real-world link between stakeholder structure and economic performance? For instance, do ownerless firms have lower returns to capital invested than firms owned by stockholders?
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2007)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Conference Lecture]. Event
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2007)
Do stakeholders matter for corporate governance? Behavior and performance of Norwegian banks 1985-2002
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
The distribution of formal control rights among the firm’s stakeholders (such as stockholders, creditors, employees, politicians, and customers) attracts considerable public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the US is that firms should have profit maximization as their only objective, and that stockholders should be the dominant stakeholder in corporate governance. In contrast, conventional wisdom in Continental Europe and Japan is that firms should have multiple objectives and allocate formal power to more stakeholder types than just stockholders. The politics of corporate governance addresses this issue by regulating the owners’ ability to control the corporation. This report addresses this issue empirically by trying to answer two questions. First, what relationship do we actually observe between stakeholder structure and corporate behavior? For instance, do firms take less risk when stockholders share control rights with employees, customers, and politicians? Second, what is the real-world link between stakeholder structure and economic performance? For instance, do ownerless firms have lower returns to capital invested than firms owned by stockholders?
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2007)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Conference Lecture]. Event
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Josefsen, Morten (2007)
Do stakeholders matter for corporate governance? Behavior and performance of Norwegian banks 1985-2002
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
The distribution of formal control rights among the firm’s stakeholders (such as stockholders, creditors, employees, politicians, and customers) attracts considerable public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the US is that firms should have profit maximization as their only objective, and that stockholders should be the dominant stakeholder in corporate governance. In contrast, conventional wisdom in Continental Europe and Japan is that firms should have multiple objectives and allocate formal power to more stakeholder types than just stockholders. The politics of corporate governance addresses this issue by regulating the owners’ ability to control the corporation. This report addresses this issue empirically by trying to answer two questions. First, what relationship do we actually observe between stakeholder structure and corporate behavior? For instance, do firms take less risk when stockholders share control rights with employees, customers, and politicians? Second, what is the real-world link between stakeholder structure and economic performance? For instance, do ownerless firms have lower returns to capital invested than firms owned by stockholders?
Bøhren, Øyvind; Priestley, Richard & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
The duration of equity ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-1999
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and whether ownership duration is related to rm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings over eleven years, we nd that on average the rm's largest owner stays less than three years and stays longer than owners with smaller stakes. The duration of nancial institutions and foreigners is shorter than that of individuals and industrial rms. We show that ownership duration is duration dependent as the probability of closing an equity position is a function of how long the owner has held the stake. Ownership duration appears to match the duration of the rm's investment projects. We nd no evidence that large owners vote by foot in the sense that bad news about earnings leads to duration ending. There is a negative relationship between ownership duration and a rm's performance in general, but the sign and strength of this relationship di ers across owner types. Long duration by nancial institutions and industrial corporations is negatively related to performance, whereas the opposite is true for individuals. This suggests that long term ownership may improve rm performance if the monitoring is direct as opposed to delegated.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2006)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Conference Lecture]. Event
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2006)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
[Professional Article]. Praktisk økonomi & finans, (3) , s. 91-103.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Priestley, Richard & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
The duration of equity ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-1999
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and whether ownership duration is related to rm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings over eleven years, we nd that on average the rm's largest owner stays less than three years and stays longer than owners with smaller stakes. The duration of nancial institutions and foreigners is shorter than that of individuals and industrial rms. We show that ownership duration is duration dependent as the probability of closing an equity position is a function of how long the owner has held the stake. Ownership duration appears to match the duration of the rm's investment projects. We nd no evidence that large owners vote by foot in the sense that bad news about earnings leads to duration ending. There is a negative relationship between ownership duration and a rm's performance in general, but the sign and strength of this relationship di ers across owner types. Long duration by nancial institutions and industrial corporations is negatively related to performance, whereas the opposite is true for individuals. This suggests that long term ownership may improve rm performance if the monitoring is direct as opposed to delegated.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2006)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Conference Lecture]. Event
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2006)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
[Professional Article]. Praktisk økonomi & finans, (3) , s. 91-103.
Bøhren, Øyvind; Priestley, Richard & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2006)
The duration of equity ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-1999
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and whether ownership duration is related to rm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings over eleven years, we nd that on average the rm's largest owner stays less than three years and stays longer than owners with smaller stakes. The duration of nancial institutions and foreigners is shorter than that of individuals and industrial rms. We show that ownership duration is duration dependent as the probability of closing an equity position is a function of how long the owner has held the stake. Ownership duration appears to match the duration of the rm's investment projects. We nd no evidence that large owners vote by foot in the sense that bad news about earnings leads to duration ending. There is a negative relationship between ownership duration and a rm's performance in general, but the sign and strength of this relationship di ers across owner types. Long duration by nancial institutions and industrial corporations is negatively related to performance, whereas the opposite is true for individuals. This suggests that long term ownership may improve rm performance if the monitoring is direct as opposed to delegated.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2006)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
[Conference Lecture]. Event
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Bøhren, Øyvind (2006)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
[Professional Article]. Praktisk økonomi & finans, (3) , s. 91-103.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2005)
The value-creating board: Theory and evidence
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
This paper explores empirically how board composition influences the conflict of interest between agents and principals, the production of information for monitoring and support, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. We find that potential agency costs in our sample firms are high because the ownership-driven monitoring incentives are low. The average board has only six members, gender diversity is low, roughly half the firms have employee directors, and most CEOs are neither directors in their firm nor elsewhere. Using a wide set of such board characteristics and new measures of board independence and director networking, static and dynamic fixed effects panel data models show that value-creating boards are aligned with their shareholders, but dependent on the CEO. Multiple directorships create valuable information networks, whereas diversity in terms of gender, board size, and employee directors reduces value. Models accounting for endogeneity and reverse causation support these conclusions.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2005)
The value-creating board: Theory and evidence
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
This paper explores empirically how board composition influences the conflict of interest between agents and principals, the production of information for monitoring and support, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. We find that potential agency costs in our sample firms are high because the ownership-driven monitoring incentives are low. The average board has only six members, gender diversity is low, roughly half the firms have employee directors, and most CEOs are neither directors in their firm nor elsewhere. Using a wide set of such board characteristics and new measures of board independence and director networking, static and dynamic fixed effects panel data models show that value-creating boards are aligned with their shareholders, but dependent on the CEO. Multiple directorships create valuable information networks, whereas diversity in terms of gender, board size, and employee directors reduces value. Models accounting for endogeneity and reverse causation support these conclusions.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Strøm, Øystein (2005)
The value-creating board: Theory and evidence
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
This paper explores empirically how board composition influences the conflict of interest between agents and principals, the production of information for monitoring and support, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. We find that potential agency costs in our sample firms are high because the ownership-driven monitoring incentives are low. The average board has only six members, gender diversity is low, roughly half the firms have employee directors, and most CEOs are neither directors in their firm nor elsewhere. Using a wide set of such board characteristics and new measures of board independence and director networking, static and dynamic fixed effects panel data models show that value-creating boards are aligned with their shareholders, but dependent on the CEO. Multiple directorships create valuable information networks, whereas diversity in terms of gender, board size, and employee directors reduces value. Models accounting for endogeneity and reverse causation support these conclusions.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Corporate governance and economic performance in Norwegian listed firms
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (2001)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Corporate governance and economic performance in Norwegian listed firms
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (2001)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2001)
Corporate governance and economic performance in Norwegian listed firms
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (2001)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2000)
The ownership structure of Norwegian firms: Characteristics of an outlier
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2000)
The ownership structure of Norwegian firms: Characteristics of an outlier
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ødegaard, Bernt Arne (2000)
The ownership structure of Norwegian firms: Characteristics of an outlier
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1999)
Prosjektanalyse
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag AS
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1999)
Prosjektanalyse
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag AS
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1999)
Prosjektanalyse
[Textbook]. Skarvet Forlag AS
Bøhren, Øyvind; Haug, Jørgen & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Consolidation policy and managerial discretion: Accounting for intercorporate shareholdings
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Bjørn Espen, Michalsen, Dag & Smith, David C, (1997)
Corporate dividend policy in Norway
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind; Haug, Jørgen & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Consolidation policy and managerial discretion: Accounting for intercorporate shareholdings
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Bjørn Espen, Michalsen, Dag & Smith, David C, (1997)
Corporate dividend policy in Norway
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind; Haug, Jørgen & Michalsen, Dag (1997)
Consolidation policy and managerial discretion: Accounting for intercorporate shareholdings
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind; Eckbo, Bjørn Espen, Michalsen, Dag & Smith, David C, (1997)
Corporate dividend policy in Norway
[Report Research]. BI Norwegian Business School
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Michalsen, Dag (1994)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
[Textbook]. Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Isachsen, Arne Jon (1991)
Forsker og forretningsmann: En verdiskapende allianse
[Popular Science Article]. Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 7(3) , s. 115-122.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1991)
Prosjektanalyse med PC-verktøy
[Textbook]. NKS
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1991)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring
[Textbook]. Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Isachsen, Arne Jon (1991)
Forsker og forretningsmann: En verdiskapende allianse
[Popular Science Article]. Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 7(3) , s. 115-122.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1991)
Prosjektanalyse med PC-verktøy
[Textbook]. NKS
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1991)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring
[Textbook]. Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind & Isachsen, Arne Jon (1991)
Forsker og forretningsmann: En verdiskapende allianse
[Popular Science Article]. Praktisk økonomi og ledelse, 7(3) , s. 115-122.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1991)
Prosjektanalyse med PC-verktøy
[Textbook]. NKS
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1991)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring
[Textbook]. Skarvet
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
Økonomisk risiko i oljeprosjekter
[Popular Science Article]. BI-forum, (5) , s. 10-15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
Erfaringer fra produktutvikling: Finansiell programvare for PC
[Popular Science Article]. BI-forum, (4) , s. 9-11.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1987)
Budsjettering, investering og finansiering
[Textbook]. Universitetsforlaget
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
Økonomisk risiko i oljeprosjekter
[Popular Science Article]. BI-forum, (5) , s. 10-15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
Erfaringer fra produktutvikling: Finansiell programvare for PC
[Popular Science Article]. BI-forum, (4) , s. 9-11.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1987)
Budsjettering, investering og finansiering
[Textbook]. Universitetsforlaget
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
Økonomisk risiko i oljeprosjekter
[Popular Science Article]. BI-forum, (5) , s. 10-15.
Bøhren, Øyvind (1987)
Erfaringer fra produktutvikling: Finansiell programvare for PC
[Popular Science Article]. BI-forum, (4) , s. 9-11.
Bøhren, Øyvind & Gjærum, Per Ivar (1987)
Budsjettering, investering og finansiering
[Textbook]. Universitetsforlaget
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1985)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
[Report Research]. Norges Handelshøyskole
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1985)
Risiko og lønnsomhet i oljeprosjekter: Eksempler på modellbruk ved større feltanalyser
[Report Research]. Norges Handelshøyskole
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1985)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
[Report Research]. Norges Handelshøyskole
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1985)
Risiko og lønnsomhet i oljeprosjekter: Eksempler på modellbruk ved større feltanalyser
[Report Research]. Norges Handelshøyskole
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1985)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
[Report Research]. Norges Handelshøyskole
Bøhren, Øyvind & Ekern, Steinar (1985)
Risiko og lønnsomhet i oljeprosjekter: Eksempler på modellbruk ved større feltanalyser
