Søren Wenstøp

Frontiers in Psychology 14 Doi: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1151155

We consider deception an example of behavior that challenges traditional explanations of moral behavior. Beguiling mechanisms, by which we mean deceptiveness with charming seduction for diversion, subtly influence moral sensitivity and judgment in moral dilemma situations. The duality of beguiling mechanisms is important to grasp, including how they relate to the ambiguity of situations. Further, we view moral behavior as quasi-adaptive, affectively based, and reliant on the processes of social cognition, arising out of a set of domain-general primitive predispositions that aggregate to produce moral “mindsets” and increasingly complex moral actions. Building on recent theoretical developments, contend that morality involves a complex heterarchical-hierarchical neurological architecture, where activity is dynamically and contextually dependent, as well as dependent on evolved brain structures and early life year socialization. We contribute to conceptualizing moral behavior from an integrated modern neural perspective. This provides a balance between moral decisions as situational, emotional, and genetically completed non-conscious processes, and the more traditional view of conscious reasoning. Beguiling mechanisms illustrate an integrative model of morality, consistent with emerging insights from affective and cognitive neuroscience.

EURO Journal on Decision Processes 4(1-2) p. 53-72 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40070-016-0057-5

This paper argues that the virtue of righteousness sustained by raw emotions can explain the apparent deadlock of the climate change debate, and proposes virtues that are more conducive to consequential action. The expectation that operational researchers are virtuous is based on an honorable tradition. Virtues are even more important now, especially in the context of climate change where a public debate is unfolding; in which deniers and believers accuse each other of lack of virtue. Scientists are in the midst of the debate whether they like it or not. Rational multi-criteria decision processes require deliberation involving values infused by temperate emotions, not to be caught up by strong emotions from righteous affect. They also require an instrumentality directed at practical engagement with physical reality. The origin of all values is raw affects in the emotional centers of our ancestral brains, which power the virtues that make us righteous, as well as the tempered qualitative feelings that are necessary for sound decision-making. Different communities nurture different self-reinforcing righteous positions, explaining why a meaningful climate change debate often gets side-tracked. Scientists are not exempt from righteousness but are in a position to dampen its effect by nurturing virtues that promote good science when they deal with climate related issues. In this article we identify several virtues that we believe are conducive for scientists’ work with mitigation and adaption. For example is important to be humble and avoiding hubris in geoengineering. And with regards to recovery and restoration of nature it is important to be open and accommodative with ecological sensitivity, care and patience. In general, work with mitigation and adaption requires respect for people, respect for science, accuracy and concern. A scientist should also have the courage to speak out about facts and thereby contribute to a more temperate and informed public debate. Thus courage and factualism are also important virtues.

Earth System Dynamics (ESD) 7(4) p. 831-850 Doi: https://doi.org/10.5194/esd-7-831-2016

We have made a simple system dynamics model, ESCIMO (Earth System Climate Interpretable Model), which runs on a desktop computer in seconds and is able to reproduce the main output from more complex climate models. ESCIMO represents the main causal mechanisms at work in the Earth system and is able to reproduce the broad outline of climate history from 1850 to 2015. We have run many simulations with ESCIMO to 2100 and beyond. In this paper we present the effects of introducing in 2015 six possible global policy interventions that cost around USD 1000 billion per year – around 1 % of world GDP. We tentatively conclude (a) that these policy interventions can at most reduce the global mean surface temperature – GMST – by up to 0.5 °C in 2050 and up to 1.0 °C in 2100 relative to no intervention. The exception is injection of aerosols into the stratosphere, which can reduce the GMST by more than 1.0 °C in a decade but creates other serious problems. We also conclude (b) that relatively cheap human intervention can keep global warming in this century below +2 °C relative to preindustrial times. Finally, we conclude (c) that run-away warming is unlikely to occur in this century but is likely to occur in the longer run. The ensuing warming is slow, however. In ESCIMO, it takes several hundred years to lift the GMST to +3 °C above preindustrial times through gradual self-reinforcing melting of the permafrost.

Issues in Social & Environmental Accounting 5(1/2) p. 65-81 Doi: https://doi.org/10.22164/isea.v5i1.55

This paper investigates rhetoric applied in 80 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) reports in 2005. A taxonomy of five distinct rhetorical strategies for describing the purpose of CSR is applied; Agency (profit), Benefit (collective welfare), Compliance (laws and contracts), Duty (duties), and Ethos (virtue). The findings reveal that very different rhetoric is applied. Ethos is the most common ethical perspective expressed in the reports, Benefit and Agency are on second and third place. Specific patterns of ethical reasoning appear to be common, while other possible reasoning strategies are rare. The most prevalent pattern of ethical reasoning is to link Agency and Benefit perspectives, claiming that Benefit is done for the sake of Agency. These findings constitute a new approach in CSR research.