We present a model in which workers make occupational choices and vote over a tax rate which determines the level of government spending. Workers in occupations whose services are in high (low) demand by the government favor high (low) taxes. We show that the socially efficient size of the public sector cannot be supported in a political economic equilibrium. The reason is that equilibrium tax rates always reward excessive entry into the politically most powerful sector, and thus the equilibrium size of government is always either too big or too small. We show that this is an example of a more general political economy result that extends well beyond the baseline model and holds quite generally: the combination of (i) competitive markets and (ii) free entry is inconsistent with (iii) allocative efficiency.
Røisland, Øistein; Sveen, Tommy & Torvik, Ragnar (2023)
Samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken i en liten, åpen økonomi
Vi utvikler en teori for det optimale samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken i konjunkturstyringen. Mens en i utgangspunktet kunne tro at penge- og finanspolitikken bør dra konjunkturene i samme retning, viser vi at dette ikke nødvendigvis er tilfelle. Dersom det ikke er store kostnader ved å bruke renten aktivt, skal penge- og finanspolitikken dra i hver sin retning ved inflasjonssjokk og valutakurssjokk. Grunnen er at pengepolitikken kan påvirke inflasjonen både gjennom etterspørselskanalen og gjennom valutakurskanalen, mens finanspolitikken bare kan benytte etterspørselskanalen. Pengepolitikken har derfor et komparativt fortrinn i å stabilisere inflasjonen, mens finanspolitikken har et komparativt fortrinn i å stabilisere produksjonen. Kun når det er tilstrekkelig store kostnader ved å endre renten, vil det være optimalt at penge- og finanspolitikken skal dra i samme retning ved inflasjonssjokk og valutakurssjokk. Kostnader ved bruk av finanspolitikk har ingen betydning for om penge- og finanspolitikk skal dra i samme retning eller ikke, men har implikasjoner for hvor sterk virkemiddelbruken bør være.
Bergholt, Drago; Røisland, Øistein, Sveen, Tommy & Torvik, Ragnar (2023)
We study how monetary policy should respond to shocks that permanently alter the steady state structure of the economy. In such a case monetary policy affects not only the short run misallocations due to nominal rigidities, but also relative prices which stimulate reallocation of capital. We consider a permanent and negative shock to export revenues that requires a larger traded sector and a smaller non-traded sector in the new steady state. This reallocation calls for a change in relative prices during the transition, but may also lead to a period of high unemployment. We show how an appropriate monetary policy could mitigate the welfare costs of the transition by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate, and thereby allowing inflation to increase in the short run. Traditional monetary policy regimes, such as inflation targeting or a fixed exchange rate, would imply high unemployment and inefficiently slow transition. Stabilizing nominal wage growth, in contrast, would be close to the welfare-optimal monetary policy.
Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2021)
The macroeconomics of COVID-19: a two-sector interpretation
We study the consequences of age-dependent preferences for economic growth and structural change in a two-sector model with overlapping generations and non-dimishing returns to capital. Savings and accumulation rates depend on the relative price of services consumed by old agents and on the intergenerational distribution of income. The feedback effects originating in preferences and income distribution yield three possible long-run growth outcomes: sustained endogenous growth, decumulation traps, and bounded accumulation. In the endogenous growth scenario, the transition features rising savings and accumulation rates accompanied by distributional shifts in favor of young workers, growing employment and rising prices in the service sector. Traps are triggered by initially low capital in manufacturing and low employment in services. Bounded accumulation yielding zero long-run growth in per capita incomes is induced by preferences, not by diminishing returns to capital.
Bjørnland, Hilde C; Thorsrud, Leif Anders & Torvik, Ragnar (2019)
In this paper we develop the first model to incorporate the dynamic productivity consequences of both the spending effect and the resource movement effect of oil abundance. We show that doing so dramatically alters the conclusions drawn from earlier models of learning by doing (LBD) and the Dutch disease. In particular, the resource movement effect suggests that the growth effects of natural resources are likely to be positive, turning previous growth results in the literature relying on the spending effect on their head. We motivate the relevance of our approach by the example of a major oil producer, Norway. Empirically we find that the effects of an increase in the price of oil may resemble results found in the earlier Dutch disease literature, while the effects of increased oil activity increases productivity in most industries. Therefore, models that only focus on windfall gains due to increased spending potential from higher oil prices, would conclude – incorrectly based on our analysis – that the resource sector cannot be an engine of growth.
Torvik, Ragnar (2019)
Ny teknologi, produktivitetsvekst og renter
Samfunnsøkonomen, 133(3), s. 40- 48.
Torvik, Ragnar (2018)
Oil prices and the exchange rate: Optimal monetary policy for oil-exporting countries
Arezki, Rabah; Boucekkine, Raouf, Frankel, Jeffrey, Laksaci, Mohammed & van der Ploeg, Rick (red.). Rethinking the Macroeconomics of Resource-Rich Countries
Torvik, Ragnar (2018)
Should Developing Countries Establish Petroleum Funds?
Many natural-resource-abundant countries have established petroleum funds as part of their strategy to manage their resource wealth. This paper examines reasons that such funds may be established, discusses how these funds are organized, and draws some policy lessons. The paper then develops a theory of how petroleum funds may affect the economic and political equilibrium of an economy, and how this depends on the initial institutions. A challenge with petroleum funds is that they may produce economic and political incentives that undermine their potential benefits. An alternative to establishing petroleum funds is to use revenues to invest domestically in sectors such as infrastructure, education, and health. Such investments have the potential to produce a better economic, as well as institutional, development. This is particularly the case if the initial institutions are weak.
In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy, such as patronage public employment, less costly. Our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth. In the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction, jointly interacting with increased patronage employment.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Realvalutakurs og oljeprisfall
Samfunnsøkonomen, 130(3), s. 41- 49.
Fergusson, Leopoldo; Robinson, James A., Torvik, Ragnar & Vargas, Juan F (2016)
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Mineral rents and social development in Norway
Hujo, Katja (red.). Mineral rents and the financing of social policy
Monetary policy decisions are typically characterized by three features: (i) decisions are made by a committee, (ii) the committee members often disagree, and (iii) the chairman is almost never on the losing side in the vote. We show that the combination of overconfident policymakers and a chairman with agenda-setting rights can explain all these features. The optimal agenda-setting power to the chairman is a strictly concave function of the degree of overconfidence. We also show that the quality of advice produced by the central bank staff is higher in a flat organization than in a hierarchical one.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
The Political Economy of Reform in Resource-Rich Countries
Arezki, Rabah; Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Sy, Amadou (red.). Beyond the Curse. Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources
Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia
The conventional wisdom is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not, then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this article, the authors show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning an armed conflict. Thus, in a situation in which all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, the authors show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. The authors explore this key aspect of the theory using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946—1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with their results, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.
On average, resource-abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource-poor counterparts. But the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources, but its variation. For every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana. Why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others? This paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource-abundant winners and losers differ. In light of this, it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse, with a particular emphasis on recent developments in political economy.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.
Congleton, Roger; Hillman, Arye & Konrad, Kai (red.). 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2
Matsen, Egil; Sveen, Tommy & Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 7(1)
This paper extends the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to analyze fiscal policy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. It is first shown that tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange rate dynamics. We also show how ``rational" agents may magnify or dampen the responses of ``irrational" agents, and discuss how, unlike in previous contributions, this is in our model purely a result of the shape of rational agents' utility functions.
When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualified violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this market for extortion the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the profitability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.
Trade liberalization and investment response in Zimbabwe
[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). Macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe
Torvik, Ragnar; robinson, james a & verdier, thierry (2002)
Political Foundations of the Resource Curse
[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). CEPR Discussion Paper 3422
Torvik, Ragnar & robinson, james a (2002)
White Elephants
[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). CEPR Discussion Paper 3459
Torvik, Ragnar (2001)
Learning by doing and the Dutch disease
European Economic Review, 45, s. 285- 306.
This paper develops a model of learning by doing and the Dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways. First, it is assumed that both the traded and the non-traded sector can contribute to learing. Second, it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors. It is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run, due to a shift in the contrast to standard models of the Dutch disease, production and productivity in both sectors may go up of down. The conditions for the different cases are worked out.
Torvik, Ragnar (2000)
Kommentarer til Nasjonalbudsjettet 2001
Sosialøkonomen, 54(7), s. 20- 22.
Torvik, Ragnar & Røisland, Øistein (2000)
Pengepolitisk regime og konkurranseutsatt sektor
Qvigstad, Jan Fredrik & Røisland, Øistein (red.). Perspektiver på pengepolitikken
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1999)
The Macroeconomics of Foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dutch Disease Effects Reconsidered
Gupta, Kanhaya (red.). Foreign Aid: New Perspectives
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)
Economic openness, trade restrictions and external shocks : modelling short run effects in Sub-Saharan Africa (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 86(1998))
Economic Modelling, 15, s. 257- 286.
Davies, Rob; Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)
Short-run consequences of trade liberalization : a computable general equilibrium model of Zimbabwe (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 85(1998))
Journal of Policy Modeling, 20(3), s. 305- 333.
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)
Zimbabwean trade liberalization : ex post evaluation (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 84(1998))
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22, s. 325- 346.
Torvik, Ragnar (1997)
Agricultural supply-led industrialization : a macromodel with sub-Saharan African characteristics (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 74(1997))
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 8, s. 351- 370.
Torvik, Ragnar (1997)
Real exchange rate dynamics and trade liberalization : the case of mulitple tariffs and unemployment (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 78(1997))
Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 6(3), s. 329- 344.
Kvaløy, Ola; Møen, Jarle & Torvik, Ragnar (2023)
Unyansert om skatt
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Haus-Reve, Silje; Dahl, Marianne, Torvik, Ragnar, A.G. van Bergeijk, Peter & Kvaløy, Ola (2022)
WAR ECONOMY The war in Ukraine has dramatically changed the outlook for the world economy. In a war economy the public obligation is to do what is necessary: to support the military effort to be able to protect and defend the territory under attract – leaving their everyday economy behind.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the sweeping sanctions the US and Europe have imposed on Russia in response, have triggered economic disruptions at four levels: direct, blowback, spillover, and systemic. But what are the long-term consequences of this disruptions war economy? How does it effect trade and do sanctions work as sticks for the development of the war?
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Distrikt vil tape
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Opprøret i Venezuela: – Det er vanskelig å fatte hvor dyp denne krisen er
Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Norges fremste økonomer er nær samstemte om formuesskatt og arveavgift: Skattekutt øker ulikheten
Klassekampen [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Mener prisfallet på boliger er større enn statistikken viser
ABC Nyheter [Internett]
Moen, Espen Rasmus & Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Oljefondet ut av oljeaksjer
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Norges Banks rentedom er klar: Holder renten uendret
Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Fastrentekutt fra Lånekassen
Dusken.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Flukten fra kemneren
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge
Dagbladet [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge
NTB [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vara lenge
Firda Tidend [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge
MSN [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge
Tidens Krav [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
- Rentefesten vil vare lenge
ABC Nyheter [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
- Rente-festen vil vare lenge
Haugesunds Avis [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
- Rentefesten vil vare lenge
Tønsbergs Blad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
25 prosent børsvekst med Trump: – Jeg er egentlig veldig bekymra
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Verden skjelver i buksene
adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Brekke, Jensen og økonomiprofessorene om Trump og Brexit
dn.no [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
De som har tapt på globaliseringen, har ikke blitt tatt på alvor
adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Nasjonalisme, ikke ulikhet
Minerva [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Må forvente fortsatt trykk på boligmarkedet i Moss
Moss Avis [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Skeptisk til nye boligkrav
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Splittet om boligmedisin
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Rikingene drar ifra
klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Solberg avviser refs for rekordstor oljepengebruk
klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Nå kommer fasiten fra Siv Jensen
Oppland Arbeiderblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Solberg avviser refs for rekordstor oljepengebruk
EnerWE [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Her er Sivs hemmelighet
NA24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Skal bruke 225 mrd. oljekroner
EnerWE [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Økonomer gir tommel opp for statsbudsjettet
NTB [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Karakterfall for finan sminister Siv Jensen
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Kreativ bokføring
klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dynamisk meg her og der
bergensavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
'Grunn til å være bekymret
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Bandt nærmere 100 mill. i fastrente
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Én usikkerhetsfaktor peker seg ut for 2016
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Kan få konsekvensar få norsk økonomi
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Hold på hatten!
Haugesundregionens Næringsforening [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Økonomene skroter gamle oljeprismodeller
NRK trøndelag [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan ryke
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
NRK [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Ny bunnotering for oljeprisen
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
Trønder-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Oljeformuens verdi kan reduseres med to tredjedeler
ENERWE [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredelar av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
Firda tidend [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredjedelar av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
Vikebladet Vestposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Mye av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
p4 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Mye av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
p5 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
Dagen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
1700 milliardar kan fordufte
nett.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Framtidig formue blir redusert
Hallingdølen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
NÅ BLØR NORGE
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Formuen redusert
Bergensavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Forberedt på å stramme inn
Trønder-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
lofotposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Advarer at to tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Store deler av formuen kan forsvinne
Troms Folkeblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Slik rammer oljekrisa din økonomi
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Kuttpolitikk gir børsuro
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Vi må kaste oss med i de ulike debattene
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Økonomiprofessor på hjemmebane
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Innherred er også en del av verdensbildet
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Skal passe på penga våre
Østlendingen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Byttet om roller på biblioteket
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Urbant område
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Å forlenge adgangen til permittering er et tveegget sverd
Rogalands Avis [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Litt ekstra varme i skyggen av en krise
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Å forlenge adgangen til permittering er et tveegget sverd
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Reformer eller stimuli?
Minerva [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dette er konsekvensene av de lave rentene
dine penger [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Venter negativ rente
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Venter negativ rente
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Trur renta blir låg i lang tid framover
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Når det blir billigere å oppbevare penger i en bankboks
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Eksperter om olje- og gassutvinning i Algerie: Attraktivt, men flere skyr risikoen
E24 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Alfahanner i duell
Sør-Trøndelag [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
«Alfahanner i duell»
Avisa Sør-Trøndelag [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Danske Bank vil ut av skyggen
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Varsler ny rentein struks
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Avisene på 1-2-3
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Tid for å redusere eller fjerne fradraget nå
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Fem økonomer i rentepanelet er enige
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Fem økonomer i rentepanelet er enige
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Vil ikke ha lavere rente nå
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Selvfølgelig går andelen oljepenger opp i norsk økonomi
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Hollandsk syke
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Kritiske til oljepenge bruken
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
BRUK MER OLJESENGER
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Klar beskjed til Siv: - Bruk mer oljepenger
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Bilindustrien hadde ikke utviklet seg raskere om vi hadde skutt alle hestene
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Bilindustrien hadde ikke utviklet seg raskere om vi hadde skutt alle
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Spår rekordlav rente i flere år
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Spår rekordlav rente i flere år
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Frykter rentefyring gir boligboble
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Frykter rentefyring gir boligboble
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
En forsmak på det amerikanske presidentvalget
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
En gavepakke til EU - takket være britene
gudbrandsdølen dagningen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
På nattbordet
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Det er en skattekonkurranse i Europa
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Umulig å si hvor store konsekvensene blir
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Det er en skattekonkurranse
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Tror rentekutt nå kan gjøre vondt verre
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
«Ingen krise», sier Olsen, men møtes med skepsis
msn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Ekspertene er skeptiske
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
- Ungene våre betaler vårt forbruk
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Trekker Jensen for høy pengebruk
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Går for rentekutt
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
- Må ta følgen av at vi er blitt fattigere
Innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Tre mot to
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
"Kommunene må påregne mindre penger"
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
''Det minste ondet er å senke renten''
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
- Jeg tror ikke grekerne forstår hva de stemmer over
adressa.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
- Ser ingen lettvinte løsninger for Hellas
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Snart helt tomt for penger
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Økonomisk kollaps i Kina kan ha startet
petro.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
– Dette kan være starten på Kinas kollaps
abcnyheter.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
I samme båt
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Flere land kan rammes av ressurs-forbannelsen
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Svart mandag kan gi bekmørk høst
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Etterlyser strakstiltak
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Fortsetter oljefesten
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
- Det er neppe noen god idé å holde igjen på pengesekken nå
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Advarer om krakk
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
"Gjør at forskjellene blir større
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dette bør du vite om rentekuttene
forskning.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dette bør du vite om rentekuttene
Adressa.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Mener renta burde vært kuttet
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
- Uendret rente mot boligboble
Levangeravisa [Avis]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
NTNU-forsker vil passe Oljefondet
Adresseavisen [Internett]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Hemmeligholder søkere
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Toppøkonomer ber Siv Jensen ruste opp Norge
e24.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Blir bedt om å bygge flere veier
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Ser lavere lønnsvekst
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Halvparten tror de får mer å rutte med
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Optimister - tross dystre spådommer
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallande oljepris kan halvere renta
Avisa Møre [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallande oljepris kan halvere renta
Hordaland [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten
E24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Rekordlav rente kan bli halvert
NA24 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Oljeprisen kan gi rente under én prosent
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
OLJE: Fallet i oljepris
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Vil halvere renten
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten
Bladet vesterålen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten
NTBTEKST [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten
framtid i nord [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Oljeprisen kan gi rente under én prosent
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kommentar ga twitter-kamp
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Med ryggraden som sugerør
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Har økt med 24 mrd. på ett år
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Har økt med 24 mrd. på ett år
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Agenda engasjerer sju akademiske rådgivere
Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Agenda engasjerer sju akademiske rådgivere
NTBTEKST [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kritiske til oljepengebruken
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Agenda samler krem en av akademikere
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Agenda samler krem
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Agenda samler kremen av akademikere
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kritiske til oljepengebruken
dn.no [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bildet er blitt styrket
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
4 % Handlingsregelen for bruk
Dagen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Professorer: - Handlingsregelen er for raus
Demokraten [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Professorer mener handlingsregelen er for raus
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Handlingsregelen er for raus
ENERWE [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Vil vrake dagens handlingsregel
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Uenige om rentebanen
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Professorer: - Handlingsregelen er for raus
NTBTEKST [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Professorer: - Handlingsregelen er for raus
Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten
OSLOBY [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NHO: - Norges Bank bør vurdere rentekutt nå
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
ICA AB er børsvinner i Sverige
Dagligvarehandelen [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Slik blir 2015
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Spår renten under én prosent
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
ANDRE MENINGER
Fremover [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
"SAGT PÅ NETT"
Bergensavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Melkekartongen ble for hard
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fallende oljepris kan halvere renta
Fremover [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Ekspert: - Norge vil få renter nær null
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Nå er det full olje-forvirring i DNB
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Norsk styringsrente må ned over en prosent
Nordens Nyheter [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Superøkonomer gir Erna & co. skattesmell
VG pluss [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
FÅR SKATTESMELL Superøkonomer gir Erna & co. det glatte lag
VG [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Derfor slakter de Erna og Siv
VG [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kutter ikke i oljeproduksjonen
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Verdien av våre gjenværende oljereserver vil barberes kraftig
dn.no [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Svekket OPEC fortsetter i samme takt
NTBTEKST [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fortsatt fall i oljeprisen etter OPEC-beslutning
NTBTEKST [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fortsatt fall i oljeprisen etter OPEC-beslutning
Bergens tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Pumper opp olje som før
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
OPEC-nei ga fortsatt fall i oljeprisen
Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fortsatt fall i oljeprisen etter Opec-beslutning
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Svekket OPEC fort- setter i samme takt
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bommer
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Ber om rentekutt nå
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten
NTBTEKST [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten
Harstad Tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Norges Bank må kutte renten
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Etterlyser tiltakspakke
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
DNs rentepanel
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Ber om rentekutt nå
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Mener Norges Bank må kutte renten nå
NA24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Må kutte renta nå
p4 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten
ABC Nyheter [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomer om oljeprisfallet: - Kutt renta nå
NORD24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomiprofessorer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten
E24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kan gi rentekutt denne uken
Stavangeravisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dette har skjedd natt til tirsdag 09.12
ABC Nyheter [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Krever rentekutt mot oljepriskollaps
Stavanger Aftenblad [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Økonomi-professorer mener Norges Bank må senke renten
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Interest rate cut demands among oil price fall
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Oljeprisfallet: - Kutt renta nå
Fremover [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Vil ha lavere rente
Levanger-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Interest rate cut demands among oil price fall
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Oljeprisfallet: - Kutt renta nå
FREMOVER [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Frykter lang tørke
Dagens næringsliv morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Frykter overoptimisme i boligmarkedet
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Frykter overoptimisme i boligmarkedet
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bråk og insentiver
Bergens tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kina vil redusere veksten i Norge
Bergens tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kina kommer til å kollapse
E24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Kina kommer til å kollapse
universitetsavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Advarer mot lavere rente
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Enige om uendret rente
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Frykter lang tørke
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Frykter lang tørke
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Frykter lang tørke
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Øystein Olsen får kritikk for forrige rentekutt
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Bankene gjør jobben for Olsen
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Hvordan reagerer du på at bankene hever renten?
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
For ivrige banker
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Skal boligprisene opp eller ned?
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Ber om avklaring Splittet syn
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Splittet syn på renteutsikter
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Ber Johnsen snu om hemmelighold
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Handlingsregelens sisteskanse
Ukeavisen ledelse [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Johnsen fortsetter hemmeligholdet
Dagens næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Ber om større bank-buffer
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Gir Jensen smekk
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Øystein Olsen får kritikk for forrige rentekutt
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Er boligmarkedet sykt?
adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Vil ikke endre renten
Dagens næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Handlingsregelens sisteskanse
Ukeavisen ledelse [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
– Norske politikere ikke bedre enn greske
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Vil ha klarere kommunikasjon fra Norges Bank
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Mener Olsen burde satt renten høyere
Nyhetene24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
- Norges Bank bør bli mer uavhengig
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Vil frata Jens all rentemakt
NA24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Vil løsrive Norges Bank
Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Ap: Helt uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten
Nationen [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
- Uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten
Telemarksavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Vil ikke legge om boligskatten
Agderposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Ap: - Helt uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten
Trønder-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Ap: - Uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten
Levangeravisa [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Mange sparer til barna sine
NRK [Internett]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Bøter til EU-land som ikke kutter
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Basker mellom kutt og innsats
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
EU basker mellom kutt og innsats
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Statsledere presset til å levere
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
-Euroen kan kollapse
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Euroens siste sjanse - igjen
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Statsledere presset til å levere
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Euroen «kan kollapse», mener norske økonomiprofessorer
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
HÅPER PÅ NY OLJEFEST - ...men eksperter advarer mot bakrus etter gigantfunn
VG [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Gullpriser til himmels
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
-Krevende spagat
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
- Flere rentehopp er «bensin på bålet»
NA24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
- Sannsynlig med ny finanskrise
Stavanger Aftenblad [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Mener EU bør la Hellas gå konk
Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Så mye tåler du gjeld Gjelden du realistisk tåler
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Takk, kjære Greenspan!
Aftenposten [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Takk, kjære Greenspan!
Aftenposten Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2010)
Mener staten har subsidiert DnB Nor
Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2010)
Staten har subsidiert DnB Nor
ABC Nyheter [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2010)
Dobbeltmoral å være i skatteparadis
E24 [Internett]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
Gullkortet er statsstøtte, Skauge!
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
Toppforskernes råd til NTNU
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
Lærer u-land nasjonalisering
Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
Virker underlig
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Advarer mot «billige» lån
NRK Trøndelag [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Overflodens paradoks
Forskning.no [Internett]
Nøstbakken, Linda & Torvik, Ragnar (1)
Lakseskatt som på Færøyene er en dårlig idé
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Mehlum, Halvor; Natvik, Gisle James & Torvik, Ragnar (2021)
The Inefficient Combination: Competitive Markets, Free Entry, and Democracy
[Report]. Centre for Applied Macroeconomics and Commodity Prices (CAMP).
Davies, Rob; Mehlum, Halvor, Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
How the Zimbabweans pay for the war against covid-19
[Article in business/trade/industry journal]. EDI COVID-19 ESSAY SERIES
Holden, Steinar; Bjørnland, Hilde C, von Brasch, Thomas Rolf Lydersen Lystad, Løken, Katrine Vellesen, Sæther, Erik Magnus, Torstensen, Kjersti Næss & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
Covid-19 – Analyse av økonomiske tiltak, insentiver for vekst og omstilling
[Report]. Finansdepartementet.
Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
Macroeconomics in the time of the Corona
[Report]. Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP).
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
How does fiscal policy affect the Norwegian economy?
Should Central Banks care about Traded and non-Traded Sectors?
[Article in business/trade/industry journal]. IUP Journal of Bank Management, 5(1)
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Chacón, Mario (2006)
When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Chacón, Mario (2006)
When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia
[Report]. Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2006)
A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint
[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research..
Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Chacón, Mario (2006)
When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"
[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
Globalization - Implications for Norway
[Academic lecture]. Norges Banks Etterutdanningsseminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2006)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Academic lecture]. Public Economics Seminar.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Robinson, James A.; Chacón, Mario & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"
[Academic lecture]. Prio Seminar.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia
[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.
Aslaksen, Silje & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi.
The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition employs models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition employs political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium because the costs and benefits of buying votes change. Although providing much insight, a primary disadvantage of these two model traditions is that they have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. This question is simply determined by the type of model one chooses to study. Yet an important empirical literature suggests that a main effect of resource rents may be exactly that it affects the political choice between democracy and civil conflict. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study this choice. The institutional outcome in our theory is consequently endogenous. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria, and discuss how our approach, mechanisms and results differ from the earlier theories.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & moene, karl ove (2005)
Cursed by resources or institutions?
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners, and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions. With grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Such a theory finds strong support in data. A key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions. When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse - as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Academic lecture]. European Economic Assiciation.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)
A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar, Tilburg University.
Aslaksen, Silje & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Conflict and democracy in rentier states
[Academic lecture]. Third ECPR General Conference.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2005)
Savers, spenders, and fiscal policy in a small open economy
[Academic lecture]. Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics.
Rainfall, Poverty and Crime in 19th Century Germany, MEMORANDUM No 04/2004
[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi.
This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in an open economy. We extend the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. We first show how the Dornbusch (1983) consumption-based real interest rate for open economies is modified when labor supply is endogenous. We then turn to the effects of fiscal policy when there are both savers and spenders. With this heterogeneity taken into account, tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange-rate dynamics. We also show how "rational" savers may magnify or dampen the responses of "irrational" spenders, and show how this is related to features of the utility functions.
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2004)
Optimal Dutch disease
[Academic lecture]. Workshop on resource curse.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy
[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy
[Academic lecture]. Institute seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
White Elephants
[Academic lecture]. Macroeconomic effects of natural resources.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
White Elephants
[Academic lecture]. Nasjonalt Forskermøte for Økonomer.
Torvik, Ragnar & Aslaksen, Silje (2004)
Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States
[Academic lecture]. CSCW Prio konferanse.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint
[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint
[Academic lecture]. Development Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2004)
Institutions and the resource curse
[Academic lecture]. DEGIT IX.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2004)
Predator or Prey? Parasitic enterprises in economic development
[Report]. Department of Economics,.
In many developing and transition economies Mafia-like activities are rampant. Extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives. Incorporated in a model of industrialization, bimodal club convergence may result. Economies may get stuck in a Predators' Club characterized by a vicious circle of poverty and predation. Societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club. Poor societies with high flow of new entrepreneurs, however, may grow out of the trap and join the rich Producers' Club.
[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
A dynamic macroeconomic model is used to analyse the interaction between economic growth, unemployment and crime. The model exhibits increasing returns to aggregate capital due to endogenous crime. Capital investments increases the demand for labor and reduces the extent of criminal activity. Reduced criminal activity in turn increases the return on capital. As this linkage works via the aggregate labor demand the increasing return is external to the individual firm. Hence, the economy has possibly two equilibria: a) One where unemployment and crime rates are high and capital stock and income is low. and b) one where unemployment and crime rates are low and capital stock and income is high. Equilibrium a) has the characteristics of a poverty trap. The existence of a poverty trap has important implications for the speed of reform implementation. A too abrupt reform may throw the economy into a vicious circle of increasing crime and unempoyment
