Ragnar Torvik

Bjørnland, Hilde C; Thorsrud, Leif Anders & Torvik, Ragnar (2019)

Dutch disease dynamics reconsidered

European Economic Review, 119, s. 411- 433. Doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.016 - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

In this paper we develop the first model to incorporate the dynamic productivity consequences of both the spending effect and the resource movement effect of oil abundance. We show that doing so dramatically alters the conclusions drawn from earlier models of learning by doing (LBD) and the Dutch disease. In particular, the resource movement effect suggests that the growth effects of natural resources are likely to be positive, turning previous growth results in the literature relying on the spending effect on their head. We motivate the relevance of our approach by the example of a major oil producer, Norway. Empirically we find that the effects of an increase in the price of oil may resemble results found in the earlier Dutch disease literature, while the effects of increased oil activity increases productivity in most industries. Therefore, models that only focus on windfall gains due to increased spending potential from higher oil prices, would conclude – incorrectly based on our analysis – that the resource sector cannot be an engine of growth.

Torvik, Ragnar (2019)

Ny teknologi, produktivitetsvekst og renter

Samfunnsøkonomen, 133(3), s. 40- 48.

Torvik, Ragnar (2018)

Oil prices and the exchange rate: Optimal monetary policy for oil-exporting countries

Arezki, Rabah; Boucekkine, Raouf, Frankel, Jeffrey, Laksaci, Mohammed & van der Ploeg, Rick (red.). Rethinking the Macroeconomics of Resource-Rich Countries

Torvik, Ragnar (2018)

Should Developing Countries Establish Petroleum Funds?

Energy Journal, 39(4) Doi: 10.5547/01956574.39.4.rtor - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv

Many natural-resource-abundant countries have established petroleum funds as part of their strategy to manage their resource wealth. This paper examines reasons that such funds may be established, discusses how these funds are organized, and draws some policy lessons. The paper then develops a theory of how petroleum funds may affect the economic and political equilibrium of an economy, and how this depends on the initial institutions. A challenge with petroleum funds is that they may produce economic and political incentives that undermine their potential benefits. An alternative to establishing petroleum funds is to use revenues to invest domestically in sectors such as infrastructure, education, and health. Such investments have the potential to produce a better economic, as well as institutional, development. This is particularly the case if the initial institutions are weak.

Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Valente, Simone (2017)

Sparemultiplikatoren

Samfunnsøkonomen, s. 51- 53.

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Pengepolitikk eller finanspolitikk i konjunkturstyringen?

Samfunnsøkonomen, 131(4), s. 21- 27.

Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry (2017)

The political economy of public income volatility: With an application to the resource curse

Journal of Public Economics, 145, s. 243- 252. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.014

In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy, such as patronage public employment, less costly. Our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth. In the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction, jointly interacting with increased patronage employment.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Realvalutakurs og oljeprisfall

Samfunnsøkonomen, 130(3), s. 41- 49.

Fergusson, Leopoldo; Robinson, James A., Torvik, Ragnar & Vargas, Juan F (2016)

The Need for Enemies

Economic Journal, 126(593), s. 1018- 1054. Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12174

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Endogenous presidentialism

Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(4), s. 907- 942. Doi: 10.1111/jeea.12162

Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Valente, Simone (2016)

The Savings Multiplier

Journal of Monetary Economics, 83, s. 90- 105. Doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.009

Matsen, Egil; Natvik, Gisle James & Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Petro populism

Journal of Development Economics, 118, s. 1- 12. Doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.010

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Pengepolitikk i en oljeøkonomi

Samfunnsøkonomen, 129(2), s. 34- 45.

Borge, Lars-Erik; Parmer, Pernille & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Local natural resource curse?

Journal of Public Economics, 131, s. 101- 114. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.002

Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, T (2014)

Political foundations of the resource curse: A simplification and a comment

Journal of Development Economics, 106, s. 194- 198. Doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.09.004

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Institutional comparative statics

Acemoglu, Daron; Arellano, Manuel & Dekel, Eddie (red.). Advances in Economics and Econometrics — Tenth World Congress, Volume II: Applied Economics

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Review of Economic Studies, 80(3), s. 845- 875. Doi: 10.1093/restud/rdt007

Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Mineral rents and social development in Norway

Hujo, Katja (red.). Mineral rents and the financing of social policy

Claussen, Carl Andreas; Matsen, Egil, Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Overconfidence, monetary policy committees and chairman dominance

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81(2), s. 699- 711. Doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.12.003

Monetary policy decisions are typically characterized by three features: (i) decisions are made by a committee, (ii) the committee members often disagree, and (iii) the chairman is almost never on the losing side in the vote. We show that the combination of overconfident policymakers and a chairman with agenda-setting rights can explain all these features. The optimal agenda-setting power to the chairman is a strictly concave function of the degree of overconfidence. We also show that the quality of advice produced by the central bank staff is higher in a flat organization than in a hierarchical one.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

The Political Economy of Reform in Resource-Rich Countries

Arezki, Rabah; Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Sy, Amadou (red.). Beyond the Curse. Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources

Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia

Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(3), s. 366- 396. Doi: 10.1177/0022002711401871

The conventional wisdom is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not, then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this article, the authors show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning an armed conflict. Thus, in a situation in which all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, the authors show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. The authors explore this key aspect of the theory using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946—1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with their results, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)

The Real Swing Voter's Curse

The American Economic Review, 99(2), s. 310- 315. Doi: 10.1257/aer.99.2.310

Torvik, Ragnar (2009)

Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?

Oxford review of economic policy, 25(2), s. 241- 256. Doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grp015

On average, resource-abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource-poor counterparts. But the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources, but its variation. For every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana. Why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others? This paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource-abundant winners and losers differ. In light of this, it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse, with a particular emphasis on recent developments in political economy.

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

European Economic Review, 53(7), s. 786- 798. Doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.02.006

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2008)

Institutions and the resource curse

Congleton, Roger; Hillman, Arye & Konrad, Kai (red.). 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2

Matsen, Egil; Sveen, Tommy & Torvik, Ragnar (2007)

Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 7(1)

This paper extends the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to analyze fiscal policy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. It is first shown that tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange rate dynamics. We also show how ``rational" agents may magnify or dampen the responses of ``irrational" agents, and discuss how, unlike in previous contributions, this is in our model purely a result of the shape of rational agents' utility functions.

Mehlum, H; Miguel, E & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

Poverty and crime in 19th century Germany

Journal of Urban Economics, 59

Robinson, JA; Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, T (2006)

Political foundations of the resource curse

Journal of Development Economics, 79

Mehlum, H; moene, karl ove, Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

Institutions and the resource curse

Economic Journal, 116

Torvik, Ragnar; moene, karl ove & Mehlum, Halvor (2006)

Cursed by Resources or Institutions?

The World Economy, s. 1117- 1131.

Torvik, Ragnar; Røisland, Øistein & Leitemo, Kai (2006)

Should Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Care about Traded and Non-Traded Sectors?

IUP Journal of Bank Management, 1, s. 53- 63.

Torvik, Ragnar & Aslaksen, Silje (2006)

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), s. 571- 586.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

Parasites

Bowles, Samuel; Durlauf, Steven & Hoff, Karla (red.). Poverty Traps

Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2006)

Parasites

Bowles, Samuel; Durlauf, Steven N. & Hoff, Karla (red.). Poverty Traps

Leitemo, Kai; Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Monetary Policy Rules and The Exchange Rate Channel

Applied Financial Economics, 16(15), s. 1165- 1170.

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Optimal Dutch disease

Journal of Development Economics, 78(2), s. 494- 515. Doi: 10.1016

Mehlum, H; Moene, K & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Crime induced poverty traps

Journal of Development Economics, 77

Robinson, JA & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

White elephants

Journal of Public Economics, 89

Leitemo, Kai; Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Monetary policy rules and the exchange rate channel

Applied Financial Economics, 15, s. 1165- 1170.

Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2004)

Exhange rate versus inflation targetin: a theory of output fluctuations in traded and no-traded sectors

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 13(3), s. 265- 285.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Destructive Creativity

Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), s. 77- 83.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Predator or Prey? Parasitic enterprises in economic development

European Economic Review, 47(2), s. 79- 98.

Mehlum, Halvor; moene, karl ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Predator or Prey? Parasitic Enterprises in Economic Development

European Economic Review, 47, s. 275- 294.

Mehlum, Halvor; moene, karl ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Destructive Creativity

Nordisk tidskrift för politisk ekonomi, 29(1), s. 77- 83.

Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Interactions between Agriculture and Industry: Theoretical Analysis of the Consequences of Discriminating Agriculture i

Review of Development Economics, 7(1), s. 138- 151.

Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Finanspolitikk, inflasjon og valutakurs

Økonomisk forum, 57(8), s. 10- 14.

Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Optimum currency areas under inflation targeting

Open Economies Review, 14(2), s. 99- 118.

Torvik, Ragnar; Leitemo, Kai & Røisland, Øistein (2002)

Time inconsistency and the exchange rate channel of monetary policy

?, 104(3), s. 391- 397.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)

Plunder & Protection Inc

Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), s. 447- 459.

When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualified violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this market for extortion the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the profitability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)

Market-based extortion

Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics APSA-CP, 13(1)

Torvik, Ragnar (2002)

Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare

Journal of Development Economics, 67, s. 455- 470.

Torvik, Ragnar; Leitemo, Kai & Røisland, Øistein (2002)

Time inconsistency and the exchange rate channel of monetary policy

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(3), s. 391- 397.

Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & moene, karl ove (2002)

Plunder & Protection Inc

Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), s. 447- 459.

Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Rattsø, Jørn (2002)

Trade liberalization and investment response in Zimbabwe

[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). Macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe

Torvik, Ragnar; robinson, james a & verdier, thierry (2002)

Political Foundations of the Resource Curse

[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). CEPR Discussion Paper 3422

Torvik, Ragnar & robinson, james a (2002)

White Elephants

[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). CEPR Discussion Paper 3459

Torvik, Ragnar (2001)

Learning by doing and the Dutch disease

European Economic Review, 45, s. 285- 306.

This paper develops a model of learning by doing and the Dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways. First, it is assumed that both the traded and the non-traded sector can contribute to learing. Second, it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors. It is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run, due to a shift in the contrast to standard models of the Dutch disease, production and productivity in both sectors may go up of down. The conditions for the different cases are worked out.

Torvik, Ragnar (2000)

Kommentarer til Nasjonalbudsjettet 2001

Sosialøkonomen, 54(7), s. 20- 22.

Torvik, Ragnar & Røisland, Øistein (2000)

Pengepolitisk regime og konkurranseutsatt sektor

Qvigstad, Jan Fredrik & Røisland, Øistein (red.). Perspektiver på pengepolitikken

Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1999)

The Macroeconomics of Foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dutch Disease Effects Reconsidered

Gupta, Kanhaya (red.). Foreign Aid: New Perspectives

Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)

Economic openness, trade restrictions and external shocks : modelling short run effects in Sub-Saharan Africa (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 86(1998))

Economic Modelling, 15, s. 257- 286.

Davies, Rob; Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)

Short-run consequences of trade liberalization : a computable general equilibrium model of Zimbabwe (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 85(1998))

Journal of Policy Modeling, 20(3), s. 305- 333.

Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)

Zimbabwean trade liberalization : ex post evaluation (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 84(1998))

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22, s. 325- 346.

Torvik, Ragnar (1997)

Agricultural supply-led industrialization : a macromodel with sub-Saharan African characteristics (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 74(1997))

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 8, s. 351- 370.

Torvik, Ragnar (1997)

Real exchange rate dynamics and trade liberalization : the case of mulitple tariffs and unemployment (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 78(1997))

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 6(3), s. 329- 344.

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Norges Banks rentedom er klar: Holder renten uendret

Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Fastrentekutt fra Lånekassen

Dusken.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Flukten fra kemneren

Klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge

Dagbladet [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge

NTB [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vara lenge

Firda Tidend [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge

MSN [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Rentepanel: – Rentefesten vil vare lenge

Tidens Krav [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

- Rentefesten vil vare lenge

ABC Nyheter [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

- Rente-festen vil vare lenge

Haugesunds Avis [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

- Rentefesten vil vare lenge

Tønsbergs Blad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

25 prosent børsvekst med Trump: – Jeg er egentlig veldig bekymra

NRK [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Verden skjelver i buksene

adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Brekke, Jensen og økonomiprofessorene om Trump og Brexit

dn.no [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

De som har tapt på globaliseringen, har ikke blitt tatt på alvor

adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Nasjonalisme, ikke ulikhet

Minerva [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2017)

Må forvente fortsatt trykk på boligmarkedet i Moss

Moss Avis [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Skeptisk til nye boligkrav

dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Splittet om boligmedisin

dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Rikingene drar ifra

klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Solberg avviser refs for rekordstor oljepengebruk

klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Nå kommer fasiten fra Siv Jensen

Oppland Arbeiderblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Solberg avviser refs for rekordstor oljepengebruk

EnerWE [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Her er Sivs hemmelighet

NA24 [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Skal bruke 225 mrd. oljekroner

EnerWE [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Økonomer gir tommel opp for statsbudsjettet

NTB [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Karakterfall for finan sminister Siv Jensen

dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Kreativ bokføring

klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Dynamisk meg her og der

bergensavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

'Grunn til å være bekymret

dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Bandt nærmere 100 mill. i fastrente

dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Én usikkerhetsfaktor peker seg ut for 2016

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Kan få konsekvensar få norsk økonomi

Klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Hold på hatten!

Haugesundregionens Næringsforening [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Økonomene skroter gamle oljeprismodeller

NRK trøndelag [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan ryke

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

NRK [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Ny bunnotering for oljeprisen

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

Trønder-Avisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Oljeformuens verdi kan reduseres med to tredjedeler

ENERWE [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredelar av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

Firda tidend [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredjedelar av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

Vikebladet Vestposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Mye av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

p4 [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Mye av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

p5 [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

Dagen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

1700 milliardar kan fordufte

nett.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Framtidig formue blir redusert

Hallingdølen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

NÅ BLØR NORGE

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Formuen redusert

Bergensavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Forberedt på å stramme inn

Trønder-Avisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

To tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

lofotposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Advarer at to tredjedeler av oljeformuen kan forsvinne

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Store deler av formuen kan forsvinne

Troms Folkeblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Slik rammer oljekrisa din økonomi

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Kuttpolitikk gir børsuro

Klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Vi må kaste oss med i de ulike debattene

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Økonomiprofessor på hjemmebane

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Innherred er også en del av verdensbildet

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Skal passe på penga våre

Østlendingen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Byttet om roller på biblioteket

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Urbant område

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Å forlenge adgangen til permittering er et tveegget sverd

Rogalands Avis [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Litt ekstra varme i skyggen av en krise

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Å forlenge adgangen til permittering er et tveegget sverd

Dagsavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Reformer eller stimuli?

Minerva [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Dette er konsekvensene av de lave rentene

dine penger [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Venter negativ rente

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Venter negativ rente

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Trur renta blir låg i lang tid framover

Klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Når det blir billigere å oppbevare penger i en bankboks

Dagsavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Eksperter om olje- og gassutvinning i Algerie: Attraktivt, men flere skyr risikoen

E24 [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Alfahanner i duell

Sør-Trøndelag [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

«Alfahanner i duell»

Avisa Sør-Trøndelag [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Danske Bank vil ut av skyggen

innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Varsler ny rentein struks

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Avisene på 1-2-3

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Tid for å redusere eller fjerne fradraget nå

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Fem økonomer i rentepanelet er enige

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Fem økonomer i rentepanelet er enige

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Vil ikke ha lavere rente nå

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Selvfølgelig går andelen oljepenger opp i norsk økonomi

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Hollandsk syke

Klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Kritiske til oljepenge bruken

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

BRUK MER OLJESENGER

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Klar beskjed til Siv: - Bruk mer oljepenger

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Bilindustrien hadde ikke utviklet seg raskere om vi hadde skutt alle hestene

Adresseavisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Bilindustrien hadde ikke utviklet seg raskere om vi hadde skutt alle

Adresseavisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Spår rekordlav rente i flere år

Adresseavisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Spår rekordlav rente i flere år

Adresseavisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Frykter rentefyring gir boligboble

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Frykter rentefyring gir boligboble

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

En forsmak på det amerikanske presidentvalget

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

En gavepakke til EU - takket være britene

gudbrandsdølen dagningen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

På nattbordet

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Det er en skattekonkurranse i Europa

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Umulig å si hvor store konsekvensene blir

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Det er en skattekonkurranse

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Tror rentekutt nå kan gjøre vondt verre

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

«Ingen krise», sier Olsen, men møtes med skepsis

msn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Ekspertene er skeptiske

Aftenposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

- Ungene våre betaler vårt forbruk

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Trekker Jensen for høy pengebruk

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Går for rentekutt

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

- Må ta følgen av at vi er blitt fattigere

Innherred [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Tre mot to

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

"Kommunene må påregne mindre penger"

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

''Det minste ondet er å senke renten''

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

- Jeg tror ikke grekerne forstår hva de stemmer over

adressa.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

- Ser ingen lettvinte løsninger for Hellas

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Snart helt tomt for penger

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Økonomisk kollaps i Kina kan ha startet

petro.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

– Dette kan være starten på Kinas kollaps

abcnyheter.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

I samme båt

Bergens Tidende [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Flere land kan rammes av ressurs-forbannelsen

Aftenposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Svart mandag kan gi bekmørk høst

Bergens Tidende [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Etterlyser strakstiltak

Klassekampen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Fortsetter oljefesten

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

- Det er neppe noen god idé å holde igjen på pengesekken nå

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Advarer om krakk

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

"Gjør at forskjellene blir større

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Dette bør du vite om rentekuttene

forskning.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Dette bør du vite om rentekuttene

Adressa.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Mener renta burde vært kuttet

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

- Uendret rente mot boligboble

Levangeravisa [Avis]

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

NTNU-forsker vil passe Oljefondet

Adresseavisen [Internett]

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Hemmeligholder søkere

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Toppøkonomer ber Siv Jensen ruste opp Norge

e24.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Blir bedt om å bygge flere veier

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Ser lavere lønnsvekst

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Halvparten tror de får mer å rutte med

Nationen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Optimister - tross dystre spådommer

Nationen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallande oljepris kan halvere renta

Avisa Møre [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallande oljepris kan halvere renta

Hordaland [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten

E24 [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Rekordlav rente kan bli halvert

NA24 [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Oljeprisen kan gi rente under én prosent

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

OLJE: Fallet i oljepris

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Vil halvere renten

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten

Bladet vesterålen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten

NTBTEKST [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallende oljepris kan halvere renten

framtid i nord [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Oljeprisen kan gi rente under én prosent

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kommentar ga twitter-kamp

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Med ryggraden som sugerør

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Har økt med 24 mrd. på ett år

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Har økt med 24 mrd. på ett år

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Agenda engasjerer sju akademiske rådgivere

Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Agenda engasjerer sju akademiske rådgivere

NTBTEKST [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kritiske til oljepengebruken

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Agenda samler krem en av akademikere

Dagsavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Agenda samler krem

Dagsavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Agenda samler kremen av akademikere

Dagsavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kritiske til oljepengebruken

dn.no [Fagblad]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Bildet er blitt styrket

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

4 % Handlingsregelen for bruk

Dagen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Professorer: - Handlingsregelen er for raus

Demokraten [Fagblad]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Professorer mener handlingsregelen er for raus

NRK [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Handlingsregelen er for raus

ENERWE [Fagblad]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Vil vrake dagens handlingsregel

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Uenige om rentebanen

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Professorer: - Handlingsregelen er for raus

NTBTEKST [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Professorer: - Handlingsregelen er for raus

Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten

OSLOBY [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

NHO: - Norges Bank bør vurdere rentekutt nå

NRK [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

ICA AB er børsvinner i Sverige

Dagligvarehandelen [Fagblad]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Slik blir 2015

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Spår renten under én prosent

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

ANDRE MENINGER

Fremover [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

"SAGT PÅ NETT"

Bergensavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Melkekartongen ble for hard

Nationen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fallende oljepris kan halvere renta

Fremover [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Ekspert: - Norge vil få renter nær null

NRK [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Nå er det full olje-forvirring i DNB

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Norsk styringsrente må ned over en prosent

Nordens Nyheter [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Superøkonomer gir Erna & co. skattesmell

VG pluss [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

FÅR SKATTESMELL Superøkonomer gir Erna & co. det glatte lag

VG [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Derfor slakter de Erna og Siv

VG [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kutter ikke i oljeproduksjonen

NRK [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Verdien av våre gjenværende oljereserver vil barberes kraftig

dn.no [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Svekket OPEC fortsetter i samme takt

NTBTEKST [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fortsatt fall i oljeprisen etter OPEC-beslutning

NTBTEKST [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fortsatt fall i oljeprisen etter OPEC-beslutning

Bergens tidene [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Pumper opp olje som før

Dagsavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

OPEC-nei ga fortsatt fall i oljeprisen

Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Fortsatt fall i oljeprisen etter Opec-beslutning

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Svekket OPEC fort- setter i samme takt

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Bommer

Nationen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Ber om rentekutt nå

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten

NTBTEKST [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten

Aftenposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten

Harstad Tidene [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Norges Bank må kutte renten

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Etterlyser tiltakspakke

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

DNs rentepanel

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Ber om rentekutt nå

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Mener Norges Bank må kutte renten nå

NA24 [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Må kutte renta nå

p4 [Radio]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten

ABC Nyheter [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomer om oljeprisfallet: - Kutt renta nå

NORD24 [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomiprofessorer mener Norges Bank må kutte renten

E24 [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kan gi rentekutt denne uken

Stavangeravisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Dette har skjedd natt til tirsdag 09.12

ABC Nyheter [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Krever rentekutt mot oljepriskollaps

Stavanger Aftenblad [Fagblad]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Økonomi-professorer mener Norges Bank må senke renten

Nationen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Interest rate cut demands among oil price fall

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Oljeprisfallet: - Kutt renta nå

Fremover [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Vil ha lavere rente

Levanger-Avisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Interest rate cut demands among oil price fall

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Oljeprisfallet: - Kutt renta nå

FREMOVER [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Frykter lang tørke

Dagens næringsliv morgen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Frykter overoptimisme i boligmarkedet

dn.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Frykter overoptimisme i boligmarkedet

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Bråk og insentiver

Bergens tidene [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kina vil redusere veksten i Norge

Bergens tidene [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kina kommer til å kollapse

E24 [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Kina kommer til å kollapse

universitetsavisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Advarer mot lavere rente

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Enige om uendret rente

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Frykter lang tørke

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Frykter lang tørke

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Frykter lang tørke

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Øystein Olsen får kritikk for forrige rentekutt

E24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Bankene gjør jobben for Olsen

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Hvordan reagerer du på at bankene hever renten?

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

For ivrige banker

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Skal boligprisene opp eller ned?

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Ber om avklaring Splittet syn

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Splittet syn på renteutsikter

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Ber Johnsen snu om hemmelighold

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Handlingsregelens sisteskanse

Ukeavisen ledelse [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Johnsen fortsetter hemmeligholdet

Dagens næringsliv [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Ber om større bank-buffer

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Gir Jensen smekk

Dagens næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Øystein Olsen får kritikk for forrige rentekutt

E24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Er boligmarkedet sykt?

adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Vil ikke endre renten

Dagens næringsliv [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Handlingsregelens sisteskanse

Ukeavisen ledelse [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

– Norske politikere ikke bedre enn greske

NRK [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Vil ha klarere kommunikasjon fra Norges Bank

E24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Mener Olsen burde satt renten høyere

Nyhetene24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

- Norges Bank bør bli mer uavhengig

E24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Vil frata Jens all rentemakt

NA24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Vil løsrive Norges Bank

Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Ap: Helt uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten

Nationen [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

- Uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten

Telemarksavisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Vil ikke legge om boligskatten

Agderposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Ap: - Helt uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten

Trønder-Avisa [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Ap: - Uaktuelt å legge om boligskatten

Levangeravisa [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Mange sparer til barna sine

NRK [Internett]

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Bøter til EU-land som ikke kutter

Bergens Tidende [Avis]

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Basker mellom kutt og innsats

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

EU basker mellom kutt og innsats

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Statsledere presset til å levere

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

-Euroen kan kollapse

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Euroens siste sjanse - igjen

Bergens Tidende [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Statsledere presset til å levere

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Euroen «kan kollapse», mener norske økonomiprofessorer

Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

HÅPER PÅ NY OLJEFEST - ...men eksperter advarer mot bakrus etter gigantfunn

VG [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Gullpriser til himmels

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

-Krevende spagat

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

- Flere rentehopp er «bensin på bålet»

NA24 [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

- Sannsynlig med ny finanskrise

Stavanger Aftenblad [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Mener EU bør la Hellas gå konk

Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Så mye tåler du gjeld Gjelden du realistisk tåler

Dagbladet [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Takk, kjære Greenspan!

Aftenposten [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Takk, kjære Greenspan!

Aftenposten Morgen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2010)

Mener staten har subsidiert DnB Nor

Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2010)

Staten har subsidiert DnB Nor

ABC Nyheter [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2010)

Dobbeltmoral å være i skatteparadis

E24 [Internett]

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)

Gullkortet er statsstøtte, Skauge!

Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2009)

Toppforskernes råd til NTNU

Adresseavisen [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2007)

Lærer u-land nasjonalisering

Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

Virker underlig

Aftenposten [Avis]

Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Advarer mot «billige» lån

NRK Trøndelag [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Overflodens paradoks

Forskning.no [Internett]

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Oil prices and macroeconomic policy

[Academic lecture]. University of Oslo - conference in honour of Asbjørn Rødseth.

Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Daron, Acemoglu (2016)

The political agenda effect and state centralization

[Academic lecture]. ESOP Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Institutions and their evolution

[Academic lecture]. 10th Annual workshop on Political Economy.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Optimal monetary policy for oil exporting countries

[Academic lecture]. CMI Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Should Tanzania establish a sovereign wealth fund?

[Academic lecture]. REPOA Annual Conference.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

The political economy of public income volatility: with an application to the resource curse

[Academic lecture]. University of Luxembourg Department Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

Formal institutions and development in low-income countries: positive and normative theory

[Academic lecture]. Economic Development and Institutions end of inception year conference.

Torvik, Ragnar (2016)

The theory of institutions and economic growth

[Academic lecture]. Economic Development and Institutions Conference 2016.

Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & verdier, thierry (2015)

The political economy of public income volatility: with an application to the resource curse

[Academic lecture]. Oxford OXCARRE Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Natural Resources and Endogenous Institutions

[Academic lecture]. 6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL INTERACTIONS.

Torvik, Ragnar (2015)

Natural Resources and Institutions

[Academic lecture]. REPOA Conference 2015.

Torvik, Ragnar; Borge, Lars-Erik & parmer, pernille (2014)

Local natural resource curse?

[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar; Borge, Lars-Erik & parmer, pernille (2014)

Local natural resource curse

[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2014)

Natural resources and endogenous institutions

[Academic lecture]. Natural Resources and Governancs.

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Natural resources and institutions

[Academic lecture]. DIAL Development Conference.

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Chinas savings multiplier

[Academic lecture]. Department seminar Uppsala University.

Torvik, Ragnar (2013)

Chinas savings multiplier

[Academic lecture]. department seminar University of Gothenburg.

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Internasjonale erfaringer med håndtering av en stor oljeformue

[Academic lecture]. Holdenutvalget.

Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & acemoglu, daron (2012)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. European Development Research Network conference.

Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & acemoglu, daron (2012)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.

Torvik, Ragnar; Matsen, Egil & Natvik, Gisle J. (2012)

Petro Populism

[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.

Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & acemoglu, daron (2012)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2012)

Transparency and accountability in resource rich countries

[Academic lecture]. UNDERSTANDING AND AVOIDING THE OIL CURSE IN THE ARAB WORLD.

Torvik, Ragnar; Vredin, Anders & Wilhelmsen, Bjørn Roger (2012)

Norges Bank Watch 2012 An Independent Evaluation of Monetary Policy in Norway

[Report]. Handelshøyskolen BI.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Petro Populism

[Academic lecture]. LACEA 2011 Conference Santiago.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Endogenous Presidentialism

[Academic lecture]. Universidad Los Andes department seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. BI department seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. OXCARRE conference 2011, Oxford University.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. ESOP seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. Department seminar Universiity of Bern.

Torvik, Ragnar (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

[Academic lecture]. Tilburg conference on development economics.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Natvik, Gisle J. (2009)

The strategy of campaign promises

[Academic lecture]. Macrochair Conference.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Natvik, Gisle J. (2009)

Petro-populism

[Academic lecture]. Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2008)

Endogenous Presidentialism

[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research, USA.

Torvik, Ragnar (2008)

Hvorfor er skatteparadiser mer skadelig for utviklingsland?

[Academic lecture]. Offentlig utvalg om skatteparadiser.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2008)

Endogenous Presidentialism

[Academic lecture]. Northwestern University.

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2008)

When is democracy an equilibrium?

[Academic lecture]. George Mason University.

Torvik, Ragnar (2007)

Why do some resource rich countries succeed while others do not

[Academic lecture]. Oxcarre launch conference.

Torvik, Ragnar (2007)

Rikdommens Paradoks

[Academic lecture]. Seminar Finansdepartementet.

Torvik, Ragnar (2007)

Rikdommens paradoks - relevant for Norge?

[Academic lecture]. 29. nasjonale forskermøte for økonomer.

Torvik, Ragnar (2007)

Formuesforvaltning i oljeøkonomier - internasjonale erfaringer

[Academic lecture]. Valutaseminar.

Leitemo, Kai; Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

Should Central Banks care about Traded and non-Traded Sectors?

[Article in business/trade/industry journal]. IUP Journal of Bank Management, 5(1)

Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Chacón, Mario (2006)

When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia

[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.

Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Chacón, Mario (2006)

When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia

[Report]. Centre for Economic Policy Research.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2006)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research..

Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Chacón, Mario (2006)

When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"

[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

Globalization - Implications for Norway

[Academic lecture]. Norges Banks Etterutdanningsseminar.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Academic lecture]. Public Economics Seminar.

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Academic lecture]. Seminar.

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Academic lecture]. Seminar.

Robinson, James A.; Chacón, Mario & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"

[Academic lecture]. Prio Seminar.

Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Academic lecture]. Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar (2006)

When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia

[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.

Aslaksen, Silje & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states

[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi.

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition employs models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition employs political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium because the costs and benefits of buying votes change. Although providing much insight, a primary disadvantage of these two model traditions is that they have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. This question is simply determined by the type of model one chooses to study. Yet an important empirical literature suggests that a main effect of resource rents may be exactly that it affects the political choice between democracy and civil conflict. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study this choice. The institutional outcome in our theory is consequently endogenous. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria, and discuss how our approach, mechanisms and results differ from the earlier theories.

Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & moene, karl ove (2005)

Cursed by resources or institutions?

[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.

Natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners, and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions. With grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Such a theory finds strong support in data. A key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions. When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse - as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Academic lecture]. European Economic Assiciation.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

[Academic lecture]. Department seminar, Tilburg University.

Aslaksen, Silje & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)

Conflict and democracy in rentier states

[Academic lecture]. Third ECPR General Conference.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2005)

Savers, spenders, and fiscal policy in a small open economy

[Academic lecture]. Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics.

Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Miguel, Ted (2004)

Rainfall, Poverty and Crime in 19th Century Germany, MEMORANDUM No 04/2004

[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)

Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy

[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi.

This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in an open economy. We extend the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. We first show how the Dornbusch (1983) consumption-based real interest rate for open economies is modified when labor supply is endogenous. We then turn to the effects of fiscal policy when there are both savers and spenders. With this heterogeneity taken into account, tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange-rate dynamics. We also show how "rational" savers may magnify or dampen the responses of "irrational" spenders, and show how this is related to features of the utility functions.

Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2004)

Optimal Dutch disease

[Academic lecture]. Workshop on resource curse.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)

Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy

[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)

Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy

[Academic lecture]. Seminar.

Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)

Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy

[Academic lecture]. Institute seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)

White Elephants

[Academic lecture]. Macroeconomic effects of natural resources.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)

White Elephants

[Academic lecture]. Nasjonalt Forskermøte for Økonomer.

Torvik, Ragnar & Aslaksen, Silje (2004)

Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States

[Academic lecture]. CSCW Prio konferanse.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

[Academic lecture]. Development Seminar.

Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2004)

Institutions and the resource curse

[Academic lecture]. DEGIT IX.

Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2004)

Institutions and the resource curse

[Academic lecture]. CSCW Prio.

Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Moene, Karl-Ove (2003)

Parasites; Memo 16/2003

[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Torvik, Ragnar (2003)

Realvalutakurs og innfasing av oljeinntekter

[Report]. Norges Bank.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)

Plunder & Protections Inc

[Report]. Økonomisk institutt.

Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)

Institutions and the resource curse

[Report]. Økonomisk Institutt, Univ. i Oslo.

Moene, Karl-Ove; Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2000)

Predator or Prey? Parasitic enterprises in economic development

[Report]. Department of Economics,.

In many developing and transition economies Mafia-like activities are rampant. Extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives. Incorporated in a model of industrialization, bimodal club convergence may result. Economies may get stuck in a Predators' Club characterized by a vicious circle of poverty and predation. Societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club. Poor societies with high flow of new entrepreneurs, however, may grow out of the trap and join the rich Producers' Club.

Moene, Karl-Ove; Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (1999)

Crime induced poverty traps

[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

A dynamic macroeconomic model is used to analyse the interaction between economic growth, unemployment and crime. The model exhibits increasing returns to aggregate capital due to endogenous crime. Capital investments increases the demand for labor and reduces the extent of criminal activity. Reduced criminal activity in turn increases the return on capital. As this linkage works via the aggregate labor demand the increasing return is external to the individual firm. Hence, the economy has possibly two equilibria: a) One where unemployment and crime rates are high and capital stock and income is low. and b) one where unemployment and crime rates are low and capital stock and income is high. Equilibrium a) has the characteristics of a poverty trap. The existence of a poverty trap has important implications for the speed of reform implementation. A too abrupt reform may throw the economy into a vicious circle of increasing crime and unempoyment