Ragnar Torvik
Professor II - Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi
Professor II - Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi
Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2021)
Review of Keynesian Economics, 9(2), s. 165- 174. Doi: 10.4337/roke.2021.02.01
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
Journal of comparative economics, 48, s. 749- 778. Doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2020.03.004 - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
Samfunnsøkonomen, s. 24- 34. - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
Baland, Jean-Marie; Bourguignon, Francois, Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Verdier, Thierry (red.). The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions
Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Valente, Simone (2020)
Journal of International Trade and Economic Development Doi: 10.1080/09638199.2020.1716834 - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
We study the consequences of age-dependent preferences for economic growth and structural change in a two-sector model with overlapping generations and non-dimishing returns to capital. Savings and accumulation rates depend on the relative price of services consumed by old agents and on the intergenerational distribution of income. The feedback effects originating in preferences and income distribution yield three possible long-run growth outcomes: sustained endogenous growth, decumulation traps, and bounded accumulation. In the endogenous growth scenario, the transition features rising savings and accumulation rates accompanied by distributional shifts in favor of young workers, growing employment and rising prices in the service sector. Traps are triggered by initially low capital in manufacturing and low employment in services. Bounded accumulation yielding zero long-run growth in per capita incomes is induced by preferences, not by diminishing returns to capital.
Bjørnland, Hilde C; Thorsrud, Leif Anders & Torvik, Ragnar (2019)
European Economic Review, 119, s. 411- 433. Doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.016 - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
In this paper we develop the first model to incorporate the dynamic productivity consequences of both the spending effect and the resource movement effect of oil abundance. We show that doing so dramatically alters the conclusions drawn from earlier models of learning by doing (LBD) and the Dutch disease. In particular, the resource movement effect suggests that the growth effects of natural resources are likely to be positive, turning previous growth results in the literature relying on the spending effect on their head. We motivate the relevance of our approach by the example of a major oil producer, Norway. Empirically we find that the effects of an increase in the price of oil may resemble results found in the earlier Dutch disease literature, while the effects of increased oil activity increases productivity in most industries. Therefore, models that only focus on windfall gains due to increased spending potential from higher oil prices, would conclude – incorrectly based on our analysis – that the resource sector cannot be an engine of growth.
Torvik, Ragnar (2019)
Samfunnsøkonomen, 133(3), s. 40- 48.
Torvik, Ragnar (2018)
Arezki, Rabah; Boucekkine, Raouf, Frankel, Jeffrey, Laksaci, Mohammed & van der Ploeg, Rick (red.). Rethinking the Macroeconomics of Resource-Rich Countries
Torvik, Ragnar (2018)
Energy Journal, 39(4) Doi: 10.5547/01956574.39.4.rtor - Fulltekst i vitenarkiv
Many natural-resource-abundant countries have established petroleum funds as part of their strategy to manage their resource wealth. This paper examines reasons that such funds may be established, discusses how these funds are organized, and draws some policy lessons. The paper then develops a theory of how petroleum funds may affect the economic and political equilibrium of an economy, and how this depends on the initial institutions. A challenge with petroleum funds is that they may produce economic and political incentives that undermine their potential benefits. An alternative to establishing petroleum funds is to use revenues to invest domestically in sectors such as infrastructure, education, and health. Such investments have the potential to produce a better economic, as well as institutional, development. This is particularly the case if the initial institutions are weak.
Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Valente, Simone (2017)
Samfunnsøkonomen, s. 51- 53.
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Samfunnsøkonomen, 131(4), s. 21- 27.
Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry (2017)
Journal of Public Economics, 145, s. 243- 252. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.014
In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy, such as patronage public employment, less costly. Our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth. In the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction, jointly interacting with increased patronage employment.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Samfunnsøkonomen, 130(3), s. 41- 49.
Fergusson, Leopoldo; Robinson, James A., Torvik, Ragnar & Vargas, Juan F (2016)
Economic Journal, 126(593), s. 1018- 1054. Doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12174
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Journal of the European Economic Association, 14(4), s. 907- 942. Doi: 10.1111/jeea.12162
Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Valente, Simone (2016)
Journal of Monetary Economics, 83, s. 90- 105. Doi: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.009
Matsen, Egil; Natvik, Gisle James & Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Journal of Development Economics, 118, s. 1- 12. Doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.010
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Samfunnsøkonomen, 129(2), s. 34- 45.
Borge, Lars-Erik; Parmer, Pernille & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Journal of Public Economics, 131, s. 101- 114. Doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.002
Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, T (2014)
Journal of Development Economics, 106, s. 194- 198. Doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.09.004
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Acemoglu, Daron; Arellano, Manuel & Dekel, Eddie (red.). Advances in Economics and Econometrics — Tenth World Congress, Volume II: Applied Economics
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Review of Economic Studies, 80(3), s. 845- 875. Doi: 10.1093/restud/rdt007
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Hujo, Katja (red.). Mineral rents and the financing of social policy
Claussen, Carl Andreas; Matsen, Egil, Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 81(2), s. 699- 711. Doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.12.003
Monetary policy decisions are typically characterized by three features: (i) decisions are made by a committee, (ii) the committee members often disagree, and (iii) the chairman is almost never on the losing side in the vote. We show that the combination of overconfident policymakers and a chairman with agenda-setting rights can explain all these features. The optimal agenda-setting power to the chairman is a strictly concave function of the degree of overconfidence. We also show that the quality of advice produced by the central bank staff is higher in a flat organization than in a hierarchical one.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Arezki, Rabah; Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Sy, Amadou (red.). Beyond the Curse. Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources
Chacón, Mario; Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55(3), s. 366- 396. Doi: 10.1177/0022002711401871
The conventional wisdom is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not, then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this article, the authors show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning an armed conflict. Thus, in a situation in which all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, the authors show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. The authors explore this key aspect of the theory using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946—1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with their results, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
The American Economic Review, 99(2), s. 310- 315. Doi: 10.1257/aer.99.2.310
Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
Oxford review of economic policy, 25(2), s. 241- 256. Doi: 10.1093/oxrep/grp015
On average, resource-abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource-poor counterparts. But the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources, but its variation. For every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana. Why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others? This paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource-abundant winners and losers differ. In light of this, it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse, with a particular emphasis on recent developments in political economy.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
European Economic Review, 53(7), s. 786- 798. Doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.02.006
Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2008)
Congleton, Roger; Hillman, Arye & Konrad, Kai (red.). 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2
Matsen, Egil; Sveen, Tommy & Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 7(1)
This paper extends the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to analyze fiscal policy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. It is first shown that tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange rate dynamics. We also show how ``rational" agents may magnify or dampen the responses of ``irrational" agents, and discuss how, unlike in previous contributions, this is in our model purely a result of the shape of rational agents' utility functions.
Mehlum, H; Miguel, E & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
Journal of Urban Economics, 59
Robinson, JA; Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, T (2006)
Journal of Development Economics, 79
Mehlum, H; moene, karl ove, Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
Economic Journal, 116
Torvik, Ragnar; moene, karl ove & Mehlum, Halvor (2006)
The World Economy, s. 1117- 1131.
Torvik, Ragnar; Røisland, Øistein & Leitemo, Kai (2006)
IUP Journal of Bank Management, 1, s. 53- 63.
Torvik, Ragnar & Aslaksen, Silje (2006)
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), s. 571- 586.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
Bowles, Samuel; Durlauf, Steven & Hoff, Karla (red.). Poverty Traps
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2006)
Bowles, Samuel; Durlauf, Steven N. & Hoff, Karla (red.). Poverty Traps
Leitemo, Kai; Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Applied Financial Economics, 16(15), s. 1165- 1170.
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Journal of Development Economics, 78(2), s. 494- 515. Doi: 10.1016
Mehlum, H; Moene, K & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Journal of Development Economics, 77
Robinson, JA & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Journal of Public Economics, 89
Leitemo, Kai; Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Applied Financial Economics, 15, s. 1165- 1170.
Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2004)
Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 13(3), s. 265- 285.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 29(1), s. 77- 83.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
European Economic Review, 47(2), s. 79- 98.
Mehlum, Halvor; moene, karl ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
European Economic Review, 47, s. 275- 294.
Mehlum, Halvor; moene, karl ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
Nordisk tidskrift för politisk ekonomi, 29(1), s. 77- 83.
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
Review of Development Economics, 7(1), s. 138- 151.
Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
Økonomisk forum, 57(8), s. 10- 14.
Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
Open Economies Review, 14(2), s. 99- 118.
Torvik, Ragnar; Leitemo, Kai & Røisland, Øistein (2002)
?, 104(3), s. 391- 397.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)
Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), s. 447- 459.
When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualified violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this market for extortion the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the profitability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)
Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics APSA-CP, 13(1)
Torvik, Ragnar (2002)
Journal of Development Economics, 67, s. 455- 470.
Torvik, Ragnar; Leitemo, Kai & Røisland, Øistein (2002)
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 104(3), s. 391- 397.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & moene, karl ove (2002)
Journal of Peace Research, 39(4), s. 447- 459.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Rattsø, Jørn (2002)
[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). Macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe
Torvik, Ragnar; robinson, james a & verdier, thierry (2002)
[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). CEPR Discussion Paper 3422
Torvik, Ragnar & robinson, james a (2002)
[Mangler etternavn], [Mangler fornavn] (red.). CEPR Discussion Paper 3459
Torvik, Ragnar (2001)
European Economic Review, 45, s. 285- 306.
This paper develops a model of learning by doing and the Dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways. First, it is assumed that both the traded and the non-traded sector can contribute to learing. Second, it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors. It is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run, due to a shift in the contrast to standard models of the Dutch disease, production and productivity in both sectors may go up of down. The conditions for the different cases are worked out.
Torvik, Ragnar (2000)
Sosialøkonomen, 54(7), s. 20- 22.
Torvik, Ragnar & Røisland, Øistein (2000)
Qvigstad, Jan Fredrik & Røisland, Øistein (red.). Perspektiver på pengepolitikken
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1999)
Gupta, Kanhaya (red.). Foreign Aid: New Perspectives
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)
Economic Modelling, 15, s. 257- 286.
Davies, Rob; Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)
Journal of Policy Modeling, 20(3), s. 305- 333.
Rattsø, Jørn & Torvik, Ragnar (1998)
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 22, s. 325- 346.
Torvik, Ragnar (1997)
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 8, s. 351- 370.
Torvik, Ragnar (1997)
Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 6(3), s. 329- 344.
Kvaløy, Ola; Møen, Jarle & Torvik, Ragnar (2023)
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Haus-Reve, Silje; Dahl, Marianne, Torvik, Ragnar, A.G. van Bergeijk, Peter & Kvaløy, Ola (2022)
https://kknomics.no/program/fagseminaret [Internett]
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the sweeping sanctions the US and Europe have imposed on Russia in response, have triggered economic disruptions at four levels: direct, blowback, spillover, and systemic. But what are the long-term consequences of this disruptions war economy? How does it effect trade and do sanctions work as sticks for the development of the war?
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Klassekampen [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
ABC Nyheter [Internett]
Moen, Espen Rasmus & Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Dagens næringsliv [Kronikk]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Dusken.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Dagbladet [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
NTB [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Firda Tidend [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
MSN [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Tidens Krav [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
ABC Nyheter [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Haugesunds Avis [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Tønsbergs Blad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
dn.no [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Minerva [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Moss Avis [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Oppland Arbeiderblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
EnerWE [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
NA24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
EnerWE [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
NTB [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
bergensavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Haugesundregionens Næringsforening [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
NRK trøndelag [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
NRK [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Trønder-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
ENERWE [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Firda tidend [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Vikebladet Vestposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
p4 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
p5 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
nett.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Hallingdølen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Bergensavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Trønder-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
lofotposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Troms Folkeblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Østlendingen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Rogalands Avis [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Minerva [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dine penger [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
E24 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Sør-Trøndelag [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Avisa Sør-Trøndelag [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Adresseavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
gudbrandsdølen dagningen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
msn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Innherred [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
adressa.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
petro.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
abcnyheter.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Klassekampen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
forskning.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Adressa.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Levangeravisa [Avis]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Adresseavisen [Internett]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
e24.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Avisa Møre [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Hordaland [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
E24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NA24 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bladet vesterålen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NTBTEKST [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
framtid i nord [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NTBTEKST [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Demokraten [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
ENERWE [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NTBTEKST [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
OSLOBY [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagligvarehandelen [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fremover [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bergensavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fremover [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Nordens Nyheter [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
VG pluss [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
VG [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
VG [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NTBTEKST [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NTBTEKST [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bergens tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagsavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fædrelandsvennen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NTBTEKST [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Harstad Tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NA24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
p4 [Radio]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
ABC Nyheter [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
NORD24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
E24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Stavangeravisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
ABC Nyheter [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Fagblad]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Nationen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Fremover [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Levanger-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
FREMOVER [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
dn.no [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bergens tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Bergens tidene [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
E24 [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
universitetsavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Ukeavisen ledelse [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Dagens næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
Ukeavisen ledelse [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
NRK [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Nyhetene24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
E24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
NA24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Nationen [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Telemarksavisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Agderposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Trønder-Avisa [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Levangeravisa [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
NRK [Internett]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Bergens Tidende [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
VG [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
NA24 [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Stavanger Aftenblad [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Dagbladet [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Aftenposten [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
Aftenposten Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2010)
Dagens Næringsliv Morgen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2010)
ABC Nyheter [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2010)
E24 [Internett]
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
Dagens Næringsliv [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2009)
Adresseavisen [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
Dagens Næringsliv [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
Aftenposten [Avis]
Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
NRK Trøndelag [Internett]
Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
Forskning.no [Internett]
Mehlum, Halvor; Natvik, Gisle James & Torvik, Ragnar (2021)
[Report]. Centre for Applied Macroeconomics and Commodity Prices (CAMP).
Davies, Rob; Mehlum, Halvor, Moene, Karl Ove (Kalle) & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
[Article in business/trade/industry journal]. EDI COVID-19 ESSAY SERIES
Holden, Steinar; Bjørnland, Hilde C, von Brasch, Thomas Rolf Lydersen Lystad, Løken, Katrine Vellesen, Sæther, Erik Magnus, Torstensen, Kjersti Næss & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
[Report]. Finansdepartementet.
Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2020)
[Report]. Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP).
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. Finansdepartementet åpent seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. PETROSAM 2 SEMINARET.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. University of Oslo - conference in honour of Asbjørn Rødseth.
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Daron, Acemoglu (2016)
[Academic lecture]. ESOP Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. 10th Annual workshop on Political Economy.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. CMI Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. REPOA Annual Conference.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. University of Luxembourg Department Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. Economic Development and Institutions end of inception year conference.
Torvik, Ragnar (2016)
[Academic lecture]. Economic Development and Institutions Conference 2016.
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & verdier, thierry (2015)
[Academic lecture]. Oxford OXCARRE Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
[Academic lecture]. 6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL INTERACTIONS.
Torvik, Ragnar (2015)
[Academic lecture]. REPOA Conference 2015.
Torvik, Ragnar; Borge, Lars-Erik & parmer, pernille (2014)
[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar; Borge, Lars-Erik & parmer, pernille (2014)
[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2014)
[Academic lecture]. Natural Resources and Governancs.
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
[Academic lecture]. DIAL Development Conference.
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar Uppsala University.
Torvik, Ragnar (2013)
[Academic lecture]. department seminar University of Gothenburg.
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
[Academic lecture]. Holdenutvalget.
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & acemoglu, daron (2012)
[Academic lecture]. European Development Research Network conference.
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & acemoglu, daron (2012)
[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.
Torvik, Ragnar; Matsen, Egil & Natvik, Gisle J. (2012)
[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.
Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & acemoglu, daron (2012)
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2012)
[Academic lecture]. UNDERSTANDING AND AVOIDING THE OIL CURSE IN THE ARAB WORLD.
Torvik, Ragnar; Vredin, Anders & Wilhelmsen, Bjørn Roger (2012)
[Report]. Handelshøyskolen BI.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. LACEA 2011 Conference Santiago.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. Universidad Los Andes department seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. BI department seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. OXCARRE conference 2011, Oxford University.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. ESOP seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar Universiity of Bern.
Torvik, Ragnar (2011)
[Academic lecture]. Tilburg conference on development economics.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Natvik, Gisle J. (2009)
[Academic lecture]. Macrochair Conference.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Natvik, Gisle J. (2009)
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2008)
[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research, USA.
Torvik, Ragnar (2008)
[Academic lecture]. Offentlig utvalg om skatteparadiser.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2008)
[Academic lecture]. Northwestern University.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2008)
[Academic lecture]. George Mason University.
Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
[Academic lecture]. Oxcarre launch conference.
Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
[Academic lecture]. Seminar Finansdepartementet.
Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
[Academic lecture]. 29. nasjonale forskermøte for økonomer.
Torvik, Ragnar (2007)
[Academic lecture]. Valutaseminar.
Leitemo, Kai; Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Article in business/trade/industry journal]. IUP Journal of Bank Management, 5(1)
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Chacón, Mario (2006)
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Torvik, Ragnar; Robinson, James A. & Chacón, Mario (2006)
[Report]. Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2006)
[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research..
Robinson, James A.; Torvik, Ragnar & Chacón, Mario (2006)
[Report]. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Norges Banks Etterutdanningsseminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Public Economics Seminar.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Robinson, James A.; Chacón, Mario & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Prio Seminar.
Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar (2006)
[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.
Aslaksen, Silje & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi.
The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition employs models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition employs political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium because the costs and benefits of buying votes change. Although providing much insight, a primary disadvantage of these two model traditions is that they have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. This question is simply determined by the type of model one chooses to study. Yet an important empirical literature suggests that a main effect of resource rents may be exactly that it affects the political choice between democracy and civil conflict. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study this choice. The institutional outcome in our theory is consequently endogenous. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria, and discuss how our approach, mechanisms and results differ from the earlier theories.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & moene, karl ove (2005)
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners, and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions. With grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Such a theory finds strong support in data. A key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions. When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse - as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU.
Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)
[Academic lecture]. European Economic Assiciation.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2005)
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar, Tilburg University.
Aslaksen, Silje & Torvik, Ragnar (2005)
[Academic lecture]. Third ECPR General Conference.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2005)
[Academic lecture]. Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics.
Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Miguel, Ted (2004)
[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
[Report]. Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi.
This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in an open economy. We extend the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. We first show how the Dornbusch (1983) consumption-based real interest rate for open economies is modified when labor supply is endogenous. We then turn to the effects of fiscal policy when there are both savers and spenders. With this heterogeneity taken into account, tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange-rate dynamics. We also show how "rational" savers may magnify or dampen the responses of "irrational" spenders, and show how this is related to features of the utility functions.
Matsen, Egil & Torvik, Ragnar (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Workshop on resource curse.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Instituttseminar.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Seminar.
Matsen, Egil; Torvik, Ragnar & Sveen, Tommy (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Institute seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Macroeconomic effects of natural resources.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Nasjonalt Forskermøte for Økonomer.
Torvik, Ragnar & Aslaksen, Silje (2004)
[Academic lecture]. CSCW Prio konferanse.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Department seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Department Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar & Robinson, James A. (2004)
[Academic lecture]. Development Seminar.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2004)
[Academic lecture]. DEGIT IX.
Torvik, Ragnar; Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl (2004)
[Academic lecture]. CSCW Prio.
Mehlum, Halvor; Torvik, Ragnar & Moene, Karl-Ove (2003)
[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
Torvik, Ragnar (2003)
[Report]. Norges Bank.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)
[Report]. Økonomisk institutt.
Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl-Ove & Torvik, Ragnar (2002)
[Report]. Økonomisk Institutt, Univ. i Oslo.
Moene, Karl-Ove; Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (2000)
[Report]. Department of Economics,.
In many developing and transition economies Mafia-like activities are rampant. Extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives. Incorporated in a model of industrialization, bimodal club convergence may result. Economies may get stuck in a Predators' Club characterized by a vicious circle of poverty and predation. Societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club. Poor societies with high flow of new entrepreneurs, however, may grow out of the trap and join the rich Producers' Club.
Moene, Karl-Ove; Mehlum, Halvor & Torvik, Ragnar (1999)
[Report]. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.
A dynamic macroeconomic model is used to analyse the interaction between economic growth, unemployment and crime. The model exhibits increasing returns to aggregate capital due to endogenous crime. Capital investments increases the demand for labor and reduces the extent of criminal activity. Reduced criminal activity in turn increases the return on capital. As this linkage works via the aggregate labor demand the increasing return is external to the individual firm. Hence, the economy has possibly two equilibria: a) One where unemployment and crime rates are high and capital stock and income is low. and b) one where unemployment and crime rates are low and capital stock and income is high. Equilibrium a) has the characteristics of a poverty trap. The existence of a poverty trap has important implications for the speed of reform implementation. A too abrupt reform may throw the economy into a vicious circle of increasing crime and unempoyment
År | Akademisk institusjon | Grad |
---|---|---|
1995 | University of Oslo | Ph.D Dr. Polit. |
1990 | University of Oslo | Master Cand. Oecon |
År | Arbeidsgiver | Tittel |
---|---|---|
2003 - Present | BI Norwegian Business School | Adjunct Professor |
1998 - Present | Norwegian University of Science and Technology | Professor |
1995 - 1998 | Central Bank of Norway | N/A |
1990 - 1995 | University of Oslo | N/A |