Jon H Fiva

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2024)

Bound by Borders: Voter Mobilization Through Social Networks

British Journal of Political Science, 54(4) , s. 1198-1216. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123424000164 - Full text in research archive

A vast and growing quantitative literature considers how social networks shape political mobilization but the degree to which turnout decisions are strategic remains ambiguous. Unlike previous studies, we establish personal links between voters and candidates and exploit discontinuous incentives to mobilize across district boundaries to estimate causal effects. Considering three types of networks – families, co-workers, and immigrant communities – we show that a group member's candidacy acts as a mobilizational impulse propagating through the group's network. In family networks, some of this impulse is non-strategic, surviving past district boundaries. However, the bulk of family mobilization is bound by the candidate's district boundary, as is the entirety of the mobilizational effects in the other networks.

Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2023)

Child Penalties in Politics

Economic Journal, 134(658) , s. 648-670. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead084

Women tend to experience a substantial decline in their labour income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such ‘child penalties’ also exist in the political arena? Using comprehensive administrative data from Norway, we find that women are less likely than men to secure elected office after their first child is born. The effects manifest already from the nomination stage, where mothers receive less favourable rankings on party lists relative to comparable fathers. This paper broadens our understanding of a fundamental social issue in political representation and demonstrates how motherhood affects even positively selected women.

Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2023)

Child Penalties in Politics

Economic Journal, 134(658) , s. 648-670. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead084

Women tend to experience a substantial decline in their labour income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such ‘child penalties’ also exist in the political arena? Using comprehensive administrative data from Norway, we find that women are less likely than men to secure elected office after their first child is born. The effects manifest already from the nomination stage, where mothers receive less favourable rankings on party lists relative to comparable fathers. This paper broadens our understanding of a fundamental social issue in political representation and demonstrates how motherhood affects even positively selected women.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H., Smith, Daniel M. & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)

Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort

Journal of Public Economics, 200 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104457 - Full text in research archive

How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2021)

Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 16(2) , s. 185-213. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019147 - Full text in research archive

We investigate whether geographic representation affects local voting behavior in closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, where conventional theoretical wisdom suggests a limited role of localism in voter preferences. Using detailed data on Norwegian parliamentary candidates' hometowns, we show that parties engage in geographic balancing when constructing candidate lists. However, because most districts contain more municipalities than seats, not all municipalities will ultimately see a local candidate elected. A regression discontinuity design applied to marginal candidates reveals that parties obtain higher within-district support in subsequent elections in incumbents' hometowns — novel evidence of "friends-and-neighbors" voting in an otherwise party-centered environment. Exploring the mechanisms, we find that represented municipalities often continue to have locally-connected candidates in top positions, in contrast to municipalities with losing candidates, and are more frequently referenced in legislative speeches. There is no evidence that unequal representation creates inequalities in distributive policies.

Fiva, Jon H.; Geys, Benny, Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)

Political Alignment and Bureaucratic Pay

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART), 31(3) , s. 596-615. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaa053 - Full text in research archive

Building on agency-theoretical perspectives of public bureaucracies, we argue that politician–bureaucrat preference alignment can have important implications for bureaucrats’ pay. We study such private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians using detailed data on all 1,632 top administrators active in all Norwegian municipalities over a period of 25 years (1991–2015). Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician–bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of top bureaucrats ran for political office. We focus explicitly on individuals at the very top of the administrative hierarchy and are able to separate the intensive margin (i.e., wage increases) from any additional effects at the extensive margin (i.e., new appointments). Using close elections for inference in a regression discontinuity analysis, we find that politician–bureaucrat alignment significantly increases top bureaucrats’ wage even in the Norwegian civil service system. This has important implications also from a theoretical perspective. Our results indeed go against predictions from models with policymotivated bureaucrats, but are consistent with politically aligned principal–agent matches being more productive.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H., Smith, Daniel M. & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)

Moral hazard in electoral teams: List rank and campaign effort

Journal of Public Economics, 200 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104457 - Full text in research archive

How do parties motivate candidates to exert effort in closed-list elections, where seat outcomes are uncertain only for candidates in marginal list positions? We argue that parties can solve this moral hazard problem by committing ex ante to allocate higher offices in government, such as cabinet portfolios, monotonically with list rank. Under this schedule of compensation, parties have incentives to rank candidates in order of quality (under some conditions) and candidates have incentives to increase the volume and geo-diversity of their campaign efforts as their rank improves. Using detailed data on Norwegian candidates and their use of mass and social media in recent elections, we confirm that (1) candidate quality increases with list rank, and (2) candidates in safer ranks shift from intra-district to extra-district and national media exposure—a composition of effort that can increase their party’s chance of entering government, and thus their own potential share of the spoils.

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2021)

Local Representation and Voter Mobilization in Closed-list Proportional Representation Systems

Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 16(2) , s. 185-213. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00019147 - Full text in research archive

We investigate whether geographic representation affects local voting behavior in closed-list proportional representation (PR) systems, where conventional theoretical wisdom suggests a limited role of localism in voter preferences. Using detailed data on Norwegian parliamentary candidates' hometowns, we show that parties engage in geographic balancing when constructing candidate lists. However, because most districts contain more municipalities than seats, not all municipalities will ultimately see a local candidate elected. A regression discontinuity design applied to marginal candidates reveals that parties obtain higher within-district support in subsequent elections in incumbents' hometowns — novel evidence of "friends-and-neighbors" voting in an otherwise party-centered environment. Exploring the mechanisms, we find that represented municipalities often continue to have locally-connected candidates in top positions, in contrast to municipalities with losing candidates, and are more frequently referenced in legislative speeches. There is no evidence that unequal representation creates inequalities in distributive policies.

Fiva, Jon H.; Geys, Benny, Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)

Political Alignment and Bureaucratic Pay

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART), 31(3) , s. 596-615. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muaa053 - Full text in research archive

Building on agency-theoretical perspectives of public bureaucracies, we argue that politician–bureaucrat preference alignment can have important implications for bureaucrats’ pay. We study such private gains to bureaucrats from their political alignment with elected politicians using detailed data on all 1,632 top administrators active in all Norwegian municipalities over a period of 25 years (1991–2015). Whereas existing studies generally rely on proxies for politician–bureaucrat political alignment, a rare feature of our data allows measuring it directly since 27% of top bureaucrats ran for political office. We focus explicitly on individuals at the very top of the administrative hierarchy and are able to separate the intensive margin (i.e., wage increases) from any additional effects at the extensive margin (i.e., new appointments). Using close elections for inference in a regression discontinuity analysis, we find that politician–bureaucrat alignment significantly increases top bureaucrats’ wage even in the Norwegian civil service system. This has important implications also from a theoretical perspective. Our results indeed go against predictions from models with policymotivated bureaucrats, but are consistent with politically aligned principal–agent matches being more productive.

Cirone, Alexandra; Cox, Gary W. & Fiva, Jon H. (2020)

Seniority-Based Nominations and Political Careers

American Political Science Review, 115(1) , s. 234-251. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000416 - Full text in research archive

This paper investigates party use of seniority systems to allocate nominations for elected and appointed offices. Such systems, which can regulate party members’ access to offices at multiple levels of their careers, are defined by two main rules or norms: an incumbent re-nomination norm and a seniority progression norm. Using comprehensive electoral and candidate data from Norwegian local and national elections from 1945 to 2019, we find systematic patterns consistent with these two norms. Our work illuminates an institutional aspect of candidate selection that the current literature has ignored while noting some of the important consequences of seniority-based nominations for party cohesion and stability.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon Hernes & Smith, Daniel M. (2020)

Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections

Political Analysis, 28(2) , s. 168-185. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2019.28 - Full text in research archive

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Hix, Simon (2020)

Electoral Reform and Strategic Coordination

British Journal of Political Science, 51(4) , s. 1782-1791. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000747 - Full text in research archive

Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. The authors find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the introduction of PR.

Cirone, Alexandra; Cox, Gary W. & Fiva, Jon H. (2020)

Seniority-Based Nominations and Political Careers

American Political Science Review, 115(1) , s. 234-251. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055420000416 - Full text in research archive

This paper investigates party use of seniority systems to allocate nominations for elected and appointed offices. Such systems, which can regulate party members’ access to offices at multiple levels of their careers, are defined by two main rules or norms: an incumbent re-nomination norm and a seniority progression norm. Using comprehensive electoral and candidate data from Norwegian local and national elections from 1945 to 2019, we find systematic patterns consistent with these two norms. Our work illuminates an institutional aspect of candidate selection that the current literature has ignored while noting some of the important consequences of seniority-based nominations for party cohesion and stability.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon Hernes & Smith, Daniel M. (2020)

Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections

Political Analysis, 28(2) , s. 168-185. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/pan.2019.28 - Full text in research archive

The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share-denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Hix, Simon (2020)

Electoral Reform and Strategic Coordination

British Journal of Political Science, 51(4) , s. 1782-1791. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000747 - Full text in research archive

Electoral reform creates new strategic coordination incentives for voters and elites, but endogeneity problems make such effects hard to identify. This article addresses this issue by investigating an extraordinary dataset, from the introduction of proportional representation (PR) in Norway in 1919, which permits the measurement of parties’ vote shares in pre-reform single-member districts and in the same geographic units in the post-reform multi-member districts. The electoral reform had an immediate effect on the fragmentation of the party system, due in part to strategic party entry. The authors find, though, that another main effect of the reform was that many voters switched between existing parties, particularly between the Liberals and Conservatives, as the incentives for these voters to coordinate against Labor were removed by the introduction of PR.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel Markham (2019)

Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation

Comparative Political Studies, 52, s. 102-133. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018762369 - Full text in research archive

A prominent line of theories holds that proportional representation (PR) was introduced in many European democracies by a fragmented bloc of conservative parties seeking to preserve their legislative seat shares after franchise extension and industrialization increased the vote base of socialist parties. In contrast to this “seat-maximization” account, we focus on how PR affected party leaders’ control over nominations, thereby enabling them to discipline their followers and build more cohesive parties. We explore this “party-building” account in the case of Norway, using roll call data from six reform proposals in 1919. We show that leaders were more likely to vote in favor of PR than rank-and-file members, even controlling for the parties’ expected seat payoffs and the district-level socialist electoral threat facing individual legislators. Moreover, using within-legislator variation, we show that the internal cohesion of parties increased significantly after the introduction of PR

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel Markham (2019)

Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation

Comparative Political Studies, 52, s. 102-133. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018762369 - Full text in research archive

A prominent line of theories holds that proportional representation (PR) was introduced in many European democracies by a fragmented bloc of conservative parties seeking to preserve their legislative seat shares after franchise extension and industrialization increased the vote base of socialist parties. In contrast to this “seat-maximization” account, we focus on how PR affected party leaders’ control over nominations, thereby enabling them to discipline their followers and build more cohesive parties. We explore this “party-building” account in the case of Norway, using roll call data from six reform proposals in 1919. We show that leaders were more likely to vote in favor of PR than rank-and-file members, even controlling for the parties’ expected seat payoffs and the district-level socialist electoral threat facing individual legislators. Moreover, using within-legislator variation, we show that the internal cohesion of parties increased significantly after the introduction of PR

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2018)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120(1) , s. 3-30. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12229 - Full text in research archive

We show that small shifts in representation can affect policy in proportional election systems. Using data from Norway, we find that a larger left-wing party leads to more property taxation, higher childcare spending, and lower elderly care spending, while local public goods appear to be a non-partisan issue. These effects are partly due to shifts in bloc majorities, and partly due to changes in the left–right position of the council, keeping the majority constant. The estimates on spending allocations are rather imprecise, but they are consistent with evidence on politicians' fiscal preferences and patterns in media attention.

Fiva, Jon H. & Røhr, Helene Lie (2018)

Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems

European Economic Review, 101(January 2018) , s. 142-156. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.09.011 - Full text in research archive

Incumbents tend to have a solid electoral advantage in candidate-centered electoral settings. Do similar incumbency effects exist in more party-centered environments? We estimate incumbency effects in an open-list proportional representation system, exploiting that seats are first allocated across parties, and then to candidates within party lists. Using data from Norwegian local elections 2003–2015, we document that a candidate that barely wins a seat in the local council has about a 9 percentage points (43%) higher probability of being elected in the next election compared to a candidate that just misses out on a seat on the same party list. We find no evidence that voters contribute to this personal incumbency advantage. Rather, it seems as if party elites are instrumental in securing the electoral success of their party affiliates. We show that incumbents and non-incumbents run again in the subsequent election at about equal rates, but that incumbents tend to advance in the party hierarchy and obtain safer ballot positions in future elections, which is what ultimately leads to electoral success.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2018)

Political dynasties and the incumbency advantage in party-centered environments

American Political Science Review, 112(3) , s. 706-712. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000047 - Full text in research archive

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2018)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120(1) , s. 3-30. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12229 - Full text in research archive

We show that small shifts in representation can affect policy in proportional election systems. Using data from Norway, we find that a larger left-wing party leads to more property taxation, higher childcare spending, and lower elderly care spending, while local public goods appear to be a non-partisan issue. These effects are partly due to shifts in bloc majorities, and partly due to changes in the left–right position of the council, keeping the majority constant. The estimates on spending allocations are rather imprecise, but they are consistent with evidence on politicians' fiscal preferences and patterns in media attention.

Fiva, Jon H. & Røhr, Helene Lie (2018)

Climbing the ranks: incumbency effects in party-list systems

European Economic Review, 101(January 2018) , s. 142-156. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.09.011 - Full text in research archive

Incumbents tend to have a solid electoral advantage in candidate-centered electoral settings. Do similar incumbency effects exist in more party-centered environments? We estimate incumbency effects in an open-list proportional representation system, exploiting that seats are first allocated across parties, and then to candidates within party lists. Using data from Norwegian local elections 2003–2015, we document that a candidate that barely wins a seat in the local council has about a 9 percentage points (43%) higher probability of being elected in the next election compared to a candidate that just misses out on a seat on the same party list. We find no evidence that voters contribute to this personal incumbency advantage. Rather, it seems as if party elites are instrumental in securing the electoral success of their party affiliates. We show that incumbents and non-incumbents run again in the subsequent election at about equal rates, but that incumbents tend to advance in the party hierarchy and obtain safer ballot positions in future elections, which is what ultimately leads to electoral success.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2018)

Political dynasties and the incumbency advantage in party-centered environments

American Political Science Review, 112(3) , s. 706-712. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000047 - Full text in research archive

A handful of recent studies have investigated the causal effect of incumbency on dynasty formation in candidate-centered electoral contexts. We use candidate-level data and a regression discontinuity design to estimate the incumbency advantage and its relation to dynasty formation in the party-centered, closed-list, proportional-representation setting of Norway. The results indicate that the incumbency advantage exists even in this party-centered environment; however, in contrast to recent findings for the United States and the Philippines, we find no evidence that incumbency is important to the formation of dynasties. This finding underscores the need for more research into the role of internal party organizational networks in the perpetuation of political dynasties.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)

Norwegian parliamentary elections, 1906?2013: representation and turnout across four electoral systems

West European Politics, 40(6) , s. 1373-1391. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1298016 - Full text in research archive

Since gaining full independence in 1905, Norway has experienced more than a century of democratic elections, and has reformed its electoral system three times, most notably with the switch from a two-round runoff system to proportional representation in 1919. This research note introduces a new dataset featuring all candidates running for parliamentary (Storting) elections from 1906 to 2013, and documents the patterns over time and across electoral systems in the development of the party system; candidates’ gender, age, occupation, and geographic ties; and voter turnout. Scholars interested in using the dataset can gain access to it through the Norwegian Centre for Research Data

Borge, Lars-Erik; Fiva, Jon H., Rattsø, Jørn & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2017)

Frivillig kommunesammenslåing - betydningen av folketall, inntekt og politisk avstand

Helsepolitikkens faglige premisser, , s. 17-28.

I denne artikkelen analyserer vi lokale folkeavstemninger om kommunesammenslåing. Det forventes at stor forskjell i folketall, inntektsnivå og politiske preferanser mellom kommuner vil gjøre sammenslåing vanskelig. Det foreligger data for 253 folkeavstemninger i den reformprosess som nå foregår. Mange kommuner har holdt flere avstemninger og har stilt spørsmål om flere alternativer. Analysen her baserer seg på forskjeller blant kommuner innen en aktuell sammenslåings-konstellasjonen og ser bare på symmetriske folkeavstemninger. Hovedresultatet er en positiv sammenheng mellom folketall og andel ja-stemmer til sammenslåing. Bekymringen for å bli overkjørt ser ut til å være større enn håpet om stordriftsgevinster for små kommuner. Analysen indikerer at politisk avstand betyr noe i tillegg – man ønsker ikke å bli styrt av et annet politisk flertall. Vi studerer også beslutningen om å holde avstemning og valgdeltagelsen. Små kommuner har høyere tilbøyelighet til å holde folkeavstemning. Små og rike kommuner innen konstellasjonen har høyere valgdeltagelse – de har mer å forsvare.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)

Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway

Electoral Studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, 45, s. 130-140. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.11.021 - Full text in research archive

What effect do candidates with local ties have on voter turnout and party support? A considerable challenge within the existing literature on the personal vote, including that part which derives from local ties, is disentangling it from the party vote using observational data. We exploit the unique institutional context of Norway’s historical two-round system, and data measured at the municipality level, to evaluate the mobilizational impact of voter attachment to parties versus (local) candidates. Under this system, entry into the second round was unrestricted, with the number and identity of candidates determined by elite coordination decisions. In municipalities where coordination at the district level between rounds resulted in the withdrawal of a candidate with local ties, we document a strong negative effect on both turnout and party support, which highlights the value of the personal vote for mobilization, and the potential trade-offs that confront parties and coalitions in nomination decisions.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)

Norwegian parliamentary elections, 1906?2013: representation and turnout across four electoral systems

West European Politics, 40(6) , s. 1373-1391. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1298016 - Full text in research archive

Since gaining full independence in 1905, Norway has experienced more than a century of democratic elections, and has reformed its electoral system three times, most notably with the switch from a two-round runoff system to proportional representation in 1919. This research note introduces a new dataset featuring all candidates running for parliamentary (Storting) elections from 1906 to 2013, and documents the patterns over time and across electoral systems in the development of the party system; candidates’ gender, age, occupation, and geographic ties; and voter turnout. Scholars interested in using the dataset can gain access to it through the Norwegian Centre for Research Data

Borge, Lars-Erik; Fiva, Jon H., Rattsø, Jørn & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2017)

Frivillig kommunesammenslåing - betydningen av folketall, inntekt og politisk avstand

Helsepolitikkens faglige premisser, , s. 17-28.

I denne artikkelen analyserer vi lokale folkeavstemninger om kommunesammenslåing. Det forventes at stor forskjell i folketall, inntektsnivå og politiske preferanser mellom kommuner vil gjøre sammenslåing vanskelig. Det foreligger data for 253 folkeavstemninger i den reformprosess som nå foregår. Mange kommuner har holdt flere avstemninger og har stilt spørsmål om flere alternativer. Analysen her baserer seg på forskjeller blant kommuner innen en aktuell sammenslåings-konstellasjonen og ser bare på symmetriske folkeavstemninger. Hovedresultatet er en positiv sammenheng mellom folketall og andel ja-stemmer til sammenslåing. Bekymringen for å bli overkjørt ser ut til å være større enn håpet om stordriftsgevinster for små kommuner. Analysen indikerer at politisk avstand betyr noe i tillegg – man ønsker ikke å bli styrt av et annet politisk flertall. Vi studerer også beslutningen om å holde avstemning og valgdeltagelsen. Små kommuner har høyere tilbøyelighet til å holde folkeavstemning. Små og rike kommuner innen konstellasjonen har høyere valgdeltagelse – de har mer å forsvare.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)

Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway

Electoral Studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, 45, s. 130-140. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2016.11.021 - Full text in research archive

What effect do candidates with local ties have on voter turnout and party support? A considerable challenge within the existing literature on the personal vote, including that part which derives from local ties, is disentangling it from the party vote using observational data. We exploit the unique institutional context of Norway’s historical two-round system, and data measured at the municipality level, to evaluate the mobilizational impact of voter attachment to parties versus (local) candidates. Under this system, entry into the second round was unrestricted, with the number and identity of candidates determined by elite coordination decisions. In municipalities where coordination at the district level between rounds resulted in the withdrawal of a candidate with local ties, we document a strong negative effect on both turnout and party support, which highlights the value of the personal vote for mobilization, and the potential trade-offs that confront parties and coalitions in nomination decisions.

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)

Local favoritism in at-large proportional representation systems

Journal of Public Economics, 143(November) , s. 15-26. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.002 - Full text in research archive

Pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system. We estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed-list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown. Using data from Norwegian regional governments, we still find a hometown bias. We document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the regional governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments. Citizens also tend to vote more often for parties whose gubernatorial candidate is from their own hometown, consistent with expectations of particularistic benefits. A possible explanation is that regional council members are often recruited from local politics and remain loyal to their roots. We find no evidence that regional council experience affects politicians' future career prospects at the local level.

Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle (2016)

Mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reform

British Journal of Political Science, 46(2) , s. 265-279. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000209 - Full text in research archive

To understand how electoral reform affects political outcomes, one needs to assess its total effect, incorporating how the reform affects the outcomes given the political status quo (the mechanical effects) and the additional reactions of political agents (the psychological effects). We propose a framework that allow us to ascertain the relative magnitude of mechanical and various psychological effects. The empirical approach is based on pairwise comparisons of actual and counterfactual seat allocation outcomes. We use the design to analyze a nationwide municipal electoral reform in Norway, which changed the seat allocation method from D'Hondt to Modified Sainte-Laguë. We document clear psychological effects.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout

Journal of Politics, 78(4) , s. 1249-1263. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/686804 - Full text in research archive

A substantial body of research examines whether increasing the proportionality of an electoral system increases turnout, mostly based on cross-national comparisons. In this study, we offer two main contributions to the previous literature. First, we show that moving from a single-member district system to proportional representation in multimember districts should, according to recent theories of elite mobilization, produce a contraction in the distribution of mobilizational effort across districts and, hence, a contraction in the distribution of turnout rates. Second, we exploit a within-country panel data set based on stable subnational geographic units before and after Norway’s historic 1919 electoral reform in order to test various implications stemming from the contraction hypothesis. We find significant support for the predictions of the elite mobilization models.

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)

Local favoritism in at-large proportional representation systems

Journal of Public Economics, 143(November) , s. 15-26. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.08.002 - Full text in research archive

Pork barrel spending is typically attributed to the strategic behavior of political elites hoping to be electorally rewarded by voters residing in their districts. Such behavior is expected to depend on the incentives imposed by the electoral system. We estimate the causal effect of local representation in a closed-list proportional representation system where individual candidates have no clear electoral incentive to favor their hometown. Using data from Norwegian regional governments, we still find a hometown bias. We document that municipalities with a representative on the regional council from the same party as the regional governor tend to obtain more funding for local investments. Citizens also tend to vote more often for parties whose gubernatorial candidate is from their own hometown, consistent with expectations of particularistic benefits. A possible explanation is that regional council members are often recruited from local politics and remain loyal to their roots. We find no evidence that regional council experience affects politicians' future career prospects at the local level.

Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle (2016)

Mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reform

British Journal of Political Science, 46(2) , s. 265-279. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123414000209 - Full text in research archive

To understand how electoral reform affects political outcomes, one needs to assess its total effect, incorporating how the reform affects the outcomes given the political status quo (the mechanical effects) and the additional reactions of political agents (the psychological effects). We propose a framework that allow us to ascertain the relative magnitude of mechanical and various psychological effects. The empirical approach is based on pairwise comparisons of actual and counterfactual seat allocation outcomes. We use the design to analyze a nationwide municipal electoral reform in Norway, which changed the seat allocation method from D'Hondt to Modified Sainte-Laguë. We document clear psychological effects.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

The Contraction Effect: How Proportional Representation Affects Mobilization and Turnout

Journal of Politics, 78(4) , s. 1249-1263. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1086/686804 - Full text in research archive

A substantial body of research examines whether increasing the proportionality of an electoral system increases turnout, mostly based on cross-national comparisons. In this study, we offer two main contributions to the previous literature. First, we show that moving from a single-member district system to proportional representation in multimember districts should, according to recent theories of elite mobilization, produce a contraction in the distribution of mobilizational effort across districts and, hence, a contraction in the distribution of turnout rates. Second, we exploit a within-country panel data set based on stable subnational geographic units before and after Norway’s historic 1919 electoral reform in order to test various implications stemming from the contraction hypothesis. We find significant support for the predictions of the elite mobilization models.

Cools, Sara; Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2015)

Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 117(3) , s. 801-828. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12113

Reserving a share of the parental leave period for fathers is considered necessary for inducing fathers to take leave, and for men's increased participation in child-rearing. We investigate how a parental leave reform directed towards fathers impacted leave taking, and in turn children's and parents' long term outcomes. A paternal leave quota greatly increases the share of men taking paternity leave. We find evidence that children's school performance improves as a result, particularly in families where the father has higher education than the mother. We find no evidence that paternity leave counters the traditional allocation of parents' labor supply.

Cools, Sara; Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2015)

Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 117(3) , s. 801-828. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12113

Reserving a share of the parental leave period for fathers is considered necessary for inducing fathers to take leave, and for men's increased participation in child-rearing. We investigate how a parental leave reform directed towards fathers impacted leave taking, and in turn children's and parents' long term outcomes. A paternal leave quota greatly increases the share of men taking paternity leave. We find evidence that children's school performance improves as a result, particularly in families where the father has higher education than the mother. We find no evidence that paternity leave counters the traditional allocation of parents' labor supply.

Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle J. (2014)

Voting when the stakes are high

Journal of Public Economics, 110, s. 157-166. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.10.003

Most theories of voter behavior predict that electoral participation will be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction by studying how participation is affected by exogenous variation in local governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters.Utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on participation: Higher stakes at the local level increase participation at the local relative to the regional election. Survey evidence indicates that the underlying mechanism relates to citizens' acquisition of information.

Fiva, Jon H.; Hægeland, Torbjørn, Rønning, Marte & Syse, Astri (2014)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

Journal of Health Economics, 36(July) , s. 98-111. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.04.001

The public health care systems in the Nordic countries provide high quality care almost free of charge to all citizens. However, social inequalities in health persist. Previous research has, for example, documented substantial educational inequalities in cancer survival. We investigate to what extent this may be driven by differential access to and utilization of high quality treatment options. Quasi-experimental evidence based on the establishment of regional cancer wards indicates that i) highly educated individuals utilized centralized specialized treatment to a greater extent than less educated patients and ii) the use of such treatment improved these patients' survival.

Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle J. (2014)

Voting when the stakes are high

Journal of Public Economics, 110, s. 157-166. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.10.003

Most theories of voter behavior predict that electoral participation will be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction by studying how participation is affected by exogenous variation in local governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters.Utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on participation: Higher stakes at the local level increase participation at the local relative to the regional election. Survey evidence indicates that the underlying mechanism relates to citizens' acquisition of information.

Fiva, Jon H.; Hægeland, Torbjørn, Rønning, Marte & Syse, Astri (2014)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

Journal of Health Economics, 36(July) , s. 98-111. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.04.001

The public health care systems in the Nordic countries provide high quality care almost free of charge to all citizens. However, social inequalities in health persist. Previous research has, for example, documented substantial educational inequalities in cancer survival. We investigate to what extent this may be driven by differential access to and utilization of high quality treatment options. Quasi-experimental evidence based on the establishment of regional cancer wards indicates that i) highly educated individuals utilized centralized specialized treatment to a greater extent than less educated patients and ii) the use of such treatment improved these patients' survival.

Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle J. (2013)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

Public Choice, 157(1-2) , s. 305-331. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9946-8

An insight from dynamic political economy is that elected officials may use state variables to affect the choices of their successors. We exploit the staggered timing of local and national elections in Norway to investigate how politicians' re-election probabilities affect their investments in physical capital. Because popularity is endogenous to politics, we use an instrumental variable approach based on regional movements in ideological sentiment. We find that higher re-election probabilities stimulate investments, particularly in purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbent parties. This aligns with theory where capital and current expenditures are considered complementary inputs to government production.

Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle J. (2013)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

Public Choice, 157(1-2) , s. 305-331. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-012-9946-8

An insight from dynamic political economy is that elected officials may use state variables to affect the choices of their successors. We exploit the staggered timing of local and national elections in Norway to investigate how politicians' re-election probabilities affect their investments in physical capital. Because popularity is endogenous to politics, we use an instrumental variable approach based on regional movements in ideological sentiment. We find that higher re-election probabilities stimulate investments, particularly in purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbent parties. This aligns with theory where capital and current expenditures are considered complementary inputs to government production.

Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2011)

Information Shocks and the Dynamics of the Housing Market

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(3) , s. 525-552. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01651.x

Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2011)

Information Shocks and the Dynamics of the Housing Market

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(3) , s. 525-552. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2011.01651.x

Fiva, Jon H.; Hægeland, Torbjørn & Rønning, Marte (2010)

Health Status After Cancer: Does It Matter Which Hospital You Belong To?

BMC Health Services Research, 10 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-10-204

Fiva, Jon H.; Hægeland, Torbjørn & Rønning, Marte (2010)

Health Status After Cancer: Does It Matter Which Hospital You Belong To?

BMC Health Services Research, 10 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6963-10-204

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Does welfare policy affect residential choices? An empirical investigation accounting for policy endogeneity

Journal of Public Economics, 93(3-4) , s. 529-540. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.001

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Does welfare policy affect residential choices? An empirical investigation accounting for policy endogeneity

Journal of Public Economics, 93(3-4) , s. 529-540. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.11.001

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2008)

The incentive effects of property taxation: Evidence from Norwegian school districts

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 38(1) , s. 49-62. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2007.08.008

Recent theoretical contributions indicate favorable incentive effects of property taxation on public service providers. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with data from Norwegian school districts. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited for analyzing the effects of property taxation because one can compare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The empirical results indicate that, conditional on resource use, property taxation improves school quality measured as students' result on the national examination.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2008)

The incentive effects of property taxation: Evidence from Norwegian school districts

Regional Science and Urban Economics, 38(1) , s. 49-62. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2007.08.008

Recent theoretical contributions indicate favorable incentive effects of property taxation on public service providers. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with data from Norwegian school districts. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited for analyzing the effects of property taxation because one can compare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The empirical results indicate that, conditional on resource use, property taxation improves school quality measured as students' result on the national examination.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2007)

Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway

Public Choice, 132(3-4) , s. 457-470. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9171-z

Fiscal competition may influence the design of tax systems. The tax competition literature has concentrated on mobility of tax base and tax levels, while we turn the attention to the political decision-making system and the determination of tax structure. In the Norwegian setting local governments make a discrete choice whether to have property tax. The local choice is investigated in an econometric model allowing for yardstick competition. Our results indicate that yardstick competition explains the distinct geographic pattern in local property taxation observed. Grants have no effect on the propensity to have property taxation, consistent with the flypaper effect. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.

Fiva, Jon H. & Rattsø, Jørn (2007)

Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway

Public Choice, 132(3-4) , s. 457-470.

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Sentral finansiering av lokal offentligt tjenesteproduksjon: Bailout-problemet

Økonomisk forum, (2)

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2007)

Local choice of property taxation: evidence from Norway

Public Choice, 132(3-4) , s. 457-470. Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9171-z

Fiscal competition may influence the design of tax systems. The tax competition literature has concentrated on mobility of tax base and tax levels, while we turn the attention to the political decision-making system and the determination of tax structure. In the Norwegian setting local governments make a discrete choice whether to have property tax. The local choice is investigated in an econometric model allowing for yardstick competition. Our results indicate that yardstick competition explains the distinct geographic pattern in local property taxation observed. Grants have no effect on the propensity to have property taxation, consistent with the flypaper effect. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.

Fiva, Jon H. & Rattsø, Jørn (2007)

Local Choice of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norway

Public Choice, 132(3-4) , s. 457-470.

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Sentral finansiering av lokal offentligt tjenesteproduksjon: Bailout-problemet

Økonomisk forum, (2)

Rattsø, Jørn & Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Welfare Competition in Norway: Norms and Expenditures

European Journal of Political Economy, 22, s. 202-220.

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending

FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis (FA), 62, s. 250-280.

Rattsø, Jørn & Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Welfare Competition in Norway: Norms and Expenditures

European Journal of Political Economy, 22, s. 202-220.

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending

FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis (FA), 62, s. 250-280.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

Welfare competition in Norway: Norms and expenditures

European Journal of Political Economy, 22, s. 202-222.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

Welfare competition in Norway: Norms and expenditures

European Journal of Political Economy, 22, s. 202-222.

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)

Glasstaket består i lokalpolitikken

[Kronikk]

King, Max-Emil Mohn & Fiva, Jon H. (2022)

Vi har undersøkt om barn er en karrierebrems i politikken. Vi finner betydelige kjønnsforskjeller.

[Kronikk]

King, Max-Emil Mohn & Fiva, Jon H. (2022)

Vi har undersøkt om barn er en karrierebrems i politikken. Vi finner betydelige kjønnsforskjeller.

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)

Lokal favorisering

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)

Lokal favorisering

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James (2015)

Skatten de elsker å hate https://www.bi.no/bizreview/artikler/skatten-de-elsker-a-hate/

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H.; Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune J. (2015)

Én stemme kan endre politikken http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2015/09/13/2040/Kommunevalg/n-stemme-kan-endre-politikken

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James (2015)

Skatten de elsker å hate https://www.bi.no/bizreview/artikler/skatten-de-elsker-a-hate/

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H.; Helland, Leif & Sørensen, Rune J. (2015)

Én stemme kan endre politikken http://www.dn.no/meninger/debatt/2015/09/13/2040/Kommunevalg/n-stemme-kan-endre-politikken

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Trekk lodd, Halvorsen

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Trekk lodd, Halvorsen

[Kronikk]

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Ingen vits i pappaperm?

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Flere stemmer i rike kommuner

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Boligprisene påvirkes av skolerangering

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Ingen vits i pappaperm?

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Flere stemmer i rike kommuner

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Boligprisene påvirkes av skolerangering

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Kommuner vil ikke ha «sosial» tilflytting

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Kniper på sosialhjelpen for å slippe tilflytting

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Høy stønad frister

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Kommuner vil ikke ha «sosial» tilflytting

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Kniper på sosialhjelpen for å slippe tilflytting

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Høy stønad frister

[Journal]

Fiva, Jon H. (2023)

Political Economy Workshop 2023

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)

Sick of politics?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Cirone, Alexandra; Cox, Gary W., Fiva, Jon H., Smith, Daniel M. & Teele, Dawn (2023)

Gender Gaps in Political Seniority Systems

[Report Research]. Elsevier

Closed-list proportional representation (PR) generates higher average levels of descriptive representation for women. But because parties control candidate promotion, often based on seniority rules, gender bias in the seniority system can potentially curtail women’s career advancement. We theorize how seniority systems might operate in a gender-neutral way at three stages of a typical national-level political career: (1) nomination, (2) renomination and rank advancement, and (3) promotion to cabinet. Using detailed candidate-level data from Norway covering more than a century of elections, we find that career advancement in the seniority system is generally gender-neutral. However, we also identify two “majoritarian bottlenecks”—local mayoralties and top list positions—where women’s seniority-based career advancement may face challenges, and describe how parties appear to have employed workarounds to prevent these bottlenecks from adversely affecting women’s representation at higher levels of the political hierarchy.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2023)

Bound by Borders: Voter Mobilization through Social Networks

[Report Research]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)

Sick of politics?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2023)

Political Economy Workshop 2023

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2023)

Sick of politics?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Cirone, Alexandra; Cox, Gary W., Fiva, Jon H., Smith, Daniel M. & Teele, Dawn (2023)

Gender Gaps in Political Seniority Systems

[Report Research]. Elsevier

Closed-list proportional representation (PR) generates higher average levels of descriptive representation for women. But because parties control candidate promotion, often based on seniority rules, gender bias in the seniority system can potentially curtail women’s career advancement. We theorize how seniority systems might operate in a gender-neutral way at three stages of a typical national-level political career: (1) nomination, (2) renomination and rank advancement, and (3) promotion to cabinet. Using detailed candidate-level data from Norway covering more than a century of elections, we find that career advancement in the seniority system is generally gender-neutral. However, we also identify two “majoritarian bottlenecks”—local mayoralties and top list positions—where women’s seniority-based career advancement may face challenges, and describe how parties appear to have employed workarounds to prevent these bottlenecks from adversely affecting women’s representation at higher levels of the political hierarchy.

Cox, Gary W.; Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2023)

Bound by Borders: Voter Mobilization through Social Networks

[Report Research]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2022)

Child Penalties in Politics

[Report Research]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

Women tend to experience substantial declines in their labor income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such “child penalties” also exist in the political arena? Using extensive administrative data from Norway and an event-study methodology, we find that women drop out of local politics to a larger extent than men after their first child is born. Parenthood also seems to have a differential long-term effect on women and men's political careers, which may explain why women, especially women with children, are underrepresented at higher levels of the political hierarchy.

Fiva, Jon H. & Nedregård, Oda (2022)

How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status

[Report Research]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.

Fiva, Jon H. (2022)

Political Economy Workshop 2022

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & King, Max-Emil Mohn (2022)

Child Penalties in Politics

[Report Research]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

Women tend to experience substantial declines in their labor income after their first child is born, while men do not. Do such “child penalties” also exist in the political arena? Using extensive administrative data from Norway and an event-study methodology, we find that women drop out of local politics to a larger extent than men after their first child is born. Parenthood also seems to have a differential long-term effect on women and men's political careers, which may explain why women, especially women with children, are underrepresented at higher levels of the political hierarchy.

Fiva, Jon H. & Nedregård, Oda (2022)

How Does Party Discipline Affect Legislative Behavior? Evidence from Within-Session Variation in Lame Duck Status

[Report Research]. Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research

How important are political parties in motivating and disciplining elected officials? Using a difference-in-discontinuity design, we study how shocks to incumbents’ re-election probabilities affect legislative behavior in a setting where parties fully control candidate selection. We find that within-session variation in lame-duck status has a strong negative effect on the probability of showing up in parliament to vote. We find, however, no clear evidence that lame-duck status affects the extent to which legislators deviate from the party line. Our findings align well with the citizen-candidate framework, where candidates have fixed ideological positions that do not vary based on electoral incentives.

Fiva, Jon H. (2022)

Political Economy Workshop 2022

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Hagen, Terje P. & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)

Kommunal organisering

[Textbook]. Universitetsforlaget

Fiva, Jon H.; Hagen, Terje P. & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2021)

Kommunal organisering

[Textbook]. Universitetsforlaget

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)

Popular, but not powerful: Local candidates under closed-list proportional representation

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Geographic representation is considered to be an important factor in candidate nominations, even under closed-list proportional representation (PR), and may also matter for distributive policy outcomes. However, since nominations are determined strategically, the causal effects of representation for local areas are difficult to iden-tify. We study candidate nominations, voter behavior, and distributive policies in the closed-list PR setting of Norway (1953-2013). Exploiting as-good-as-random election outcomes for candidates who are marginally close to winning a seat in parliament, we find that parties obtain higher support in subsequent elections in the hometowns of narrowly-elected candidates. This effect appears to be driven by an increase in the probability of having the local candidate at the top of the party list in the next election. However, we find no effect of local representation on geographically targeted policy benefits for the hometown. Our results suggest that local candidates under closed-list PR are able to attract and mobilize local voters, but either do not have the power to obtain distributive benefits for their localities, or are not interested in seeking them.

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel M. (2017)

Popular, but not powerful: Local candidates under closed-list proportional representation

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Geographic representation is considered to be an important factor in candidate nominations, even under closed-list proportional representation (PR), and may also matter for distributive policy outcomes. However, since nominations are determined strategically, the causal effects of representation for local areas are difficult to iden-tify. We study candidate nominations, voter behavior, and distributive policies in the closed-list PR setting of Norway (1953-2013). Exploiting as-good-as-random election outcomes for candidates who are marginally close to winning a seat in parliament, we find that parties obtain higher support in subsequent elections in the hometowns of narrowly-elected candidates. This effect appears to be driven by an increase in the probability of having the local candidate at the top of the party list in the next election. However, we find no effect of local representation on geographically targeted policy benefits for the hometown. Our results suggest that local candidates under closed-list PR are able to attract and mobilize local voters, but either do not have the power to obtain distributive benefits for their localities, or are not interested in seeking them.

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)

Does local representation matter under closed-list PR?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Fiva, Jon H. (2016)

Favoriserer politikere sitt eget hjemsted?

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)

Local favoritism under at-large proportional representation systems

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)

Popular, but not powerful. Local candidates under closed-list proportional representation

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

Popular, but not Powerful: Local Candidates under Closed-list Proportional Representation

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Halse, Askill Harkjerr; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)

A bridge too far? The political economy of local road investments in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

Local Candidates and Voter Mobilization: Evidence from Historical Two-Round Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)

Does local representation matter under closed-list PR?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Fiva, Jon H. (2016)

Favoriserer politikere sitt eget hjemsted?

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2016)

Local favoritism under at-large proportional representation systems

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)

Popular, but not powerful. Local candidates under closed-list proportional representation

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Halse, Askill Harkjerr & Smith, Daniel M. (2016)

Popular, but not Powerful: Local Candidates under Closed-list Proportional Representation

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Halse, Askill Harkjerr; Fiva, Jon H. & Smith, Daniel Markham (2016)

A bridge too far? The political economy of local road investments in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2015)

Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2015)

Political Dynasties in Party-Centered Environments

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2015)

Veivalg og gjenvalg

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2015)

Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2015)

Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2015)

Political Dynasties in Party-Centered Environments

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2015)

Veivalg og gjenvalg

[Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2015)

Local Favoritism in At-large Proportional Representation Systems

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Halse, Askill Harkjerr (2014)

Unconditional love? Pork barrel politics in the absence of electoral incentives

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle (2013)

Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Syse, Astri; Fiva, Jon H., Hægeland, Torbjørn & Rønning, Marte (2013)

Access to treatment and educational inequalities in cancer survival

[Report Research]. Statistisk sentralbyrå

The public health care systems in the Nordic countries provide high quality care almost free of charge to all citizens. However, social inequalities in health persist. Previous research has, for example, documented substantial educational inequalities in cancer survival. We investigate to what extent this may be driven by differential access to and utilization of high quality treatment options. Quasi-experimental evidence based on the establishment of regional cancer wards indicates that i) highly educated individuals utilized centralized specialized treatment to a greater extent than less educated patients and ii) the use of such treatment improved these patients' survival.

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2013)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties

[Report Research]. CESifo Working Paper Series

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Folke, Olle (2013)

Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Syse, Astri; Fiva, Jon H., Hægeland, Torbjørn & Rønning, Marte (2013)

Access to treatment and educational inequalities in cancer survival

[Report Research]. Statistisk sentralbyrå

The public health care systems in the Nordic countries provide high quality care almost free of charge to all citizens. However, social inequalities in health persist. Previous research has, for example, documented substantial educational inequalities in cancer survival. We investigate to what extent this may be driven by differential access to and utilization of high quality treatment options. Quasi-experimental evidence based on the establishment of regional cancer wards indicates that i) highly educated individuals utilized centralized specialized treatment to a greater extent than less educated patients and ii) the use of such treatment improved these patients' survival.

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2013)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties

[Report Research]. CESifo Working Paper Series

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Folke, Olle & Sørensen, Rune Jørgen (2013)

The Power of Parties: Evidence From Close Municipal Elections in Norway

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Paternity Leave

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

The Power of Parties

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Paternity Leave

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

The Power of Parties

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2012)

Access to Treatment and Educational Inequalities in Cancer Survival

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle James & Andersen, Jørgen Juel (2011)

Voting when the stakes are high

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Political Representation and Fiscal Policy: A Casual or Causal Relationship?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Cools, Sara; Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2011)

Pappaperm

[Professional Article]. Samfunnsøkonomen, 125(9) , s. 21-23.

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Voting When the Stakes are High

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H.; Natvik, Gisle James & Andersen, Jørgen Juel (2011)

Voting when the stakes are high

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Mechanical and Psychological Effects of Electoral Reform

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Political Representation and Fiscal Policy: A Casual or Causal Relationship?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Cools, Sara; Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2011)

Pappaperm

[Professional Article]. Samfunnsøkonomen, 125(9) , s. 21-23.

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Causal Effects of Paternity Leave on Children and Parents

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2011)

Voting When the Stakes are High

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James (2010)

Voting when the Stakes are High

[Report Research]. Norges Bank

Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.

Andersen, Jørgen Juel; Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James (2010)

Voting when the Stakes are High

[Report Research]. Norges Bank

Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do Re-election Probalities Influence Public Investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election proba- bility and explore empirically how this variation in°uences the incumbents' invest- ment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This result aligns with a theoretical framework where political par- ties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between capital and °ow variables in government production.

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do Re-Election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election proba- bility and explore empirically how this variation in°uences the incumbents' invest- ment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This result aligns with a theoretical framework where political par- ties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between capital and °ow variables in government production.

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do Re-election Probalities Influence Public Investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election proba- bility and explore empirically how this variation in°uences the incumbents' invest- ment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This result aligns with a theoretical framework where political par- ties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between capital and °ow variables in government production.

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do Re-Election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election proba- bility and explore empirically how this variation in°uences the incumbents' invest- ment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This result aligns with a theoretical framework where political par- ties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between capital and °ow variables in government production.

Fiva, Jon H. (2009)

Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2008)

Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?

[Report Research]. Statistisk sentralbyrå

Abstract: This paper analyzes housing market reactions to the release of previously unpublished information on school quality. Using the sharp discontinuity in the information environment allows us to study price changes within school catchment areas, thus controlling for neighborhood unobservables. We find a substantial housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators, suggesting that households care about school quality, and may be willing to pay for better schools. The publication effect is robust to a number of sensitivity checks, but does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to prepublication levels after two to three months. We discuss this reversion in relation to the literature on behavioral finance and the concept of limited attention. Keywords: valuation of school quality, hedonic methods, price reversion JEL classification: I21, I28, R21, R23

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2008)

Does the housing market react to new information on school quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. & Kirkebøen, Lars Johannessen (2008)

Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?

[Report Research]. Statistisk sentralbyrå

Abstract: This paper analyzes housing market reactions to the release of previously unpublished information on school quality. Using the sharp discontinuity in the information environment allows us to study price changes within school catchment areas, thus controlling for neighborhood unobservables. We find a substantial housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators, suggesting that households care about school quality, and may be willing to pay for better schools. The publication effect is robust to a number of sensitivity checks, but does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to prepublication levels after two to three months. We discuss this reversion in relation to the literature on behavioral finance and the concept of limited attention. Keywords: valuation of school quality, hedonic methods, price reversion JEL classification: I21, I28, R21, R23

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does the Housing Market React to New Information on School Quality?

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon H. (2007)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? An Empirical Investigation Accounting for Policy Endogeneity

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2006)

The Incentive Effects of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norwegian School Districts

[Report Research]. Statistisk sentralbyrå

Abstract: Recent theoretical contributions indicate favorable incentive effects of property taxation on public service providers. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with data from Norwegian school districts. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited for analyzing the effects of property taxation because one can compare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The empirical results indicate that, conditional on resource use, property taxation improves school quality measured as students’ result on the national examination. Keywords: Property taxation; Disciplining device; Public sector quality

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

Does Welfare Policy Affect Residential Choices? Evidence from a Natural Experiment

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2006)

New Evidence on the Effect of Fiscal Decentralization on the Size and Composition of Government Spending

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2006)

The Incentive Effects of Property Taxation: Evidence from Norwegian School Districts

[Report Research]. Statistisk sentralbyrå

Abstract: Recent theoretical contributions indicate favorable incentive effects of property taxation on public service providers. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with data from Norwegian school districts. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited for analyzing the effects of property taxation because one can compare school districts with and without property taxation. To take into account potential endogeneity of the choice of implementing property taxation, we rely on instrumental variable techniques. The empirical results indicate that, conditional on resource use, property taxation improves school quality measured as students’ result on the national examination. Keywords: Property taxation; Disciplining device; Public sector quality

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

‘Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice’

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency [Vitenskapelig foredrag]

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

Decentralization with property taxation to improve incentives: Evidence from local governments’ discrete choice

[Report Research]. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Decentralization of government with property tax financing is the standard recipe for public sector reform. Fiscal competition is assumed to stimulate efficiency and hold down the tax level. Property taxation offers additional incentives for efficiency. We study the incentive mechanisms involved using data for decentralized governments and in a setting where they can choose to have property taxation or not. The empirical analysis addresses whether fiscal competition and political control problems influence the choice of having property taxation. The results indicate that both incentive mechanisms are relevant and consequently support the standard advice. Fiscal competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in local taxation and political fragmentation seems to motivate property taxation to control common pool problems. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2005)

New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government

[Report Research]. Ifo Institute for Economic Research

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2005)

‘New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government’

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency

[Report Research]. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Recent theoretical contributions have emphasized the favorable incentive effects of property taxation. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with Norwegian data on student performance. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited to analyzing the effects of property taxation because we can compare school districts with and without property taxation. In addition, we focus on an alternative incentive mechanism – competition between school districts. The empirical results indicate that students in school districts that levy residential property taxes perform better at the national examination than students in comparable school districts. Strategic interaction in school quality is present, but the magnitude of the interaction effect is modest.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

‘Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice’

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency [Vitenskapelig foredrag]

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

Decentralization with property taxation to improve incentives: Evidence from local governments’ discrete choice

[Report Research]. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Decentralization of government with property tax financing is the standard recipe for public sector reform. Fiscal competition is assumed to stimulate efficiency and hold down the tax level. Property taxation offers additional incentives for efficiency. We study the incentive mechanisms involved using data for decentralized governments and in a setting where they can choose to have property taxation or not. The empirical analysis addresses whether fiscal competition and political control problems influence the choice of having property taxation. The results indicate that both incentive mechanisms are relevant and consequently support the standard advice. Fiscal competition generates a distinct geographic pattern in local taxation and political fragmentation seems to motivate property taxation to control common pool problems. The main methodological challenge handled concerns spatial interaction with discrete choice.

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rattsø, Jørn (2005)

Decentralization with Property Taxation to Improve Incentives: Evidence from Local Governments’ Discrete Choice

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2005)

New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government

[Report Research]. Ifo Institute for Economic Research

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes (2005)

‘New Evidence on Fiscal Decentralization and the Size of Government’

[Conference Lecture]. Event

Fiva, Jon Hernes & Rønning, Marte (2005)

Property Taxation as a Determinant of School District Efficiency

[Report Research]. Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Recent theoretical contributions have emphasized the favorable incentive effects of property taxation. The object of this paper is to confront these theories with Norwegian data on student performance. The institutional setting in Norway is well suited to analyzing the effects of property taxation because we can compare school districts with and without property taxation. In addition, we focus on an alternative incentive mechanism – competition between school districts. The empirical results indicate that students in school districts that levy residential property taxes perform better at the national examination than students in comparable school districts. Strategic interaction in school quality is present, but the magnitude of the interaction effect is modest.