John Christian Langli

Auditing: A journal of Practice and Theory (AJPT) 37(3) p. 91-115 Doi: https://doi.org/10.2308/ajpt-51896

This paper examines how audit effort, measured by the estimated number of audit hours used to perform the clients' audits, is associated with engagement partners' formal education, continuing professional education (CPE), and professional experience. Although the literature provides considerable evidence for the determinants of audit fees, our understanding of how audit effort is related to these partner characteristics is limited. The aim of this paper is to shed light on partner specific factors that may influence how much audit effort they and their team members exert. Using a sample of 1,738 unique partners and 178,770 client-year observations, we find evidence that auditors with a master's degree exert more effort than those with a bachelor's degree. We also find a positive relation between audit effort and CPE. The relation between audit effort and professional experience is non-linear: the least experienced auditors put in the least effort, moderately experienced auditors exert the most effort, while the effort level of the most experienced auditors is in between. We also document that the accuracy of going concern modified audit reports is higher for more knowledgeable auditors.

Finance in Society: An Anthology in Honour of Thore Johnsen p. 252-287

Praktisk Økonomi & Finans 32 [i.e. 33](2) p. 200-215 Doi: https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2871-2016-02-09

Hvis selskaper som velger bort revisor begynner å selge svart eller kreve fradrag for fiktive eller private utgifter etter fravalget av revisor, vil de ha en lavere vekst i omsetningen eller en svakere utvikling i driftsresultatet enn sammenliknbare selskaper som har beholdt revisor. Jeg tester om disse to effektene er observerbare hos AS som har valgt bort revisor i årene 2011–2014. Resultatene er entydige: Omsetningsveksten er minst like høy og utviklingen i driftsresultatet minst like god hos fravalgselskapene som hos sammenliknbare selskaper som har beholdt revisor, hvilket ikke er som forventet dersom fravalgselskapene begynner å unndra skatt etter fravalget. En rekke sensitivitetsanalyser, inklusiv analyser av selskaper etablert etter kravene til aksjekapital ble redusert med virkning fra 1.1.2012, rokker ikke ved konklusjonen.

Praktisk Økonomi & Finans 32 [i.e. 33](1) p. 111-125 Doi: https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2871-2016-01-12

En rekke aksjeselskaper (ASer) valgte bort revisor i 2011. Dersom fravalget av revisor påvirket bankenes eller kreditorenes risikovurdering, er det rimelig å forvente at selskapene som valgte bort revisor vil få høyere lånerente eller dårligere tilgang til kreditt etter fravalget. Vi undersøker utviklingen fra 2010 til 2012 for ASer som kvalifiserte for fravalg i 2011. Resultatene er entydige. Vi finner ingen tegn til negative finansieringseffekter for de som valgte bort revisor i 2011 sammenliknet med de som beholdt revisor.

Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 42(9) p. 1216-1250 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12170

Although a large proportion of firms are family owned and most family firms are private, our understanding of private family firms is limited. Using confidential information on family relationship between board members, CEOs, and shareholders, this is the first study that provides large-scale evidence on the association between governance structure and firm performance in family controlled private firms. Our sample is unique as it covers almost all private limited liability firms in Norway, spans 11 years, traces firm ownership to ultimate owners, and identifies family relationship using data on kinship, marriage, and adoption. The results show a U-shaped relationship between family ownership and firm performance. Higher ownership of the second largest owner, higher percentage of family members on the board, stronger family power, and smaller boards are associated with higher firm performance. In addition, the positive association between the ownership of the second largest owner and firm performance also occurs when the second largest owner is a member of the controlling family, but the association is stronger when the second largest owner is a non-family member. We further test the relative importance of these test variables and find that ownership structure is more associated with firm performance than board structure.

The Routledge Companion to Auditing p. 148-158

Accounting, Organizations and Society 37(7) p. 500-517 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.06.002

We are interested in understanding how agency conflicts in private firms arise through ownership structures and family relationships. Specifically, we analyze auditors’ increase of effort and firms’ choice of auditors in situations with higher level of agency conflicts. For a large sample of private firms, we use unique and confidential data (obtained through special permission by the government) to measure direct and ultimate ownership for each shareholder as well as extended family relationships (based on marriage and blood lines, going back four generations and extending out to fourth cousin) among all shareholders, board members, and CEOs. We first find that audit fees, our proxy for audit effort, vary as hypothesized with firmlevel characteristics related to ownership structures and family relationships. Second, we find evidence that firms in higher agency cost settings respond by having their financial statements audited by a higher-quality auditor (i.e., a Big 4 firm). However, for CEO family-related settings (i.e., where the CEO is related to the major shareholder or as the number of board members related to the CEO increases), we find no evidence of a greater demand for a Big 4 auditor.

Praktisk Økonomi & Finans p. 67-92

Accounting Review 85(2) p. 573-605 Doi: https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2010.85.2.573

Praktisk Økonomi & Finans 25(1) p. 104-119

Magma forskning og viten 10(6) p. 32-48

? 13(4) p. 713-742

Ekonomisk brottslighet och nationalstatens kontrollmakt/Leif Appelgren & Hans Sjögren (red.)

? 33(5)