I am a Professor of Economics at BI Norwegian Business School. I hold a Ph.D in Economics from the London School of Economics, where I also was employed as Lecturer. In the academic year 2004-2005 I was visiting professor at Northwestern University. From 2011-2016 I was non-voting member of the board of Norges Bank, which is also the board of the Government pension fund (NBIM).
My area of research is mostly within economic theory, with applications mainly to labor economics and industrial organization. I have also done empirical works within labor economics. I have published in leading journals like the Journal of Political Economy, the Review of Economic Studies, and American Economic Review. I am Research Fellow at the CEPR (Center for Economic Policy Research), and Fellow of the European Economic Association. In 2011 I was Scientific Chairman for the EEA annual congress in Oslo. I am also associated editor (previously editor) of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics and partner in the consulting firm Oeconomica.
I have undertaken projects within several different industries, including telecommunication, agriculture, energy and housing. I have testified in court as an expert witness on a number of occasions, for the Supreme court in 2014.
Research areas
My research interests can broadly be categorized as follows:
Economic theory:
* Competitive markets (general equilibrium) with search frictions. With applications to equilibrium unemployment theory and the theory of human capital.
* Labor contracts in general equilibrium. With applications to macroeconomics (explaining fluctuations), equilibrium unemployment, industry structure and public economics.
*Topics in industrial economics and political economy: Regulation, Anti-trust, Network externalities, ownership structure, and voter behavior.
Applied economics:
*Competition policy and regulation. I have analyzed a large number of industries in Norway: the telecommunication industry, electricity production and distribution, the dairy industry, the publishing industry, public housing etc.
*Economic (litigation) consulting. I have broad experience from a number of cases at all levels of the Norwegian court system.
* Macroeconomic analysis.
* Optimal ownership structure.
* Long-term public finance (advisor to the Treasury spring 2004).
Teaching areas:
As department chair I have limited teaching responsibilities, but I am responsible for DRE 7005 Topics in Search Theory.
Several externalities arise when agents shield optimally to avoid infection during an epidemic. We classify externalities into static and dynamic and compare the decentralized and optimal solutions when agents derive utility from social interaction. For low infection costs agents shield too little; for high costs they shield too much because of a “rat race to shield”: they delay social action until other agents contract the disease and society reaches herd immunity. Other externalities drive more wedges between the private and social outcomes. The expectation of a fully effective vaccine that ends the disease faster changes results, reversing excessive shielding.
Garibaldi, Pietro; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Pissarides, Christopher A. (2023)
We discuss the connections between epidemiology models and the search and matching (SAM) approach and draw conclusions about modeling the trade-offs between lockdowns and disease spread. We review the pre-COVID epidemics literature, which was mainly by epidemiologists, and the post-COVID surge in economics papers that use meeting technologies to model the trade-offs. We argue that modeling the decentralized equilibrium with economic trade-offs gives rise to substantially different results from the earlier epidemics literature, but policy action is still welfare-improving because of several externalities.
In the Varian (1980; American Economic Review 70(4) (1980), 651–59) model of price competition, a change from simultaneous to sequential price setting dramatically changes equilibrium strategies, and in the unique symmetric, equilibrium prices are pushed up to the monopoly price. There also exists an asymmetric equilibrium with lower average prices. Our main contribution is to test these predictions in the laboratory. Our data strongly support the qualitative model predictions. However, a fraction of players set low prices in accordance with the asymmetric equilibrium, which is puzzling. We show that the puzzle to a large extent can be resolved by introducing competitive preferences in the model.
Boeri, Tito; Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen Rasmus (2021)
In medio stat victus Labor Demand Effects of an Increase in the Retirement Age
After falling for four decades, statutory retirement ages are increasing in most OECD countries. The labor market adjustment to these reforms has not yet been thoroughly investigated by the literature. We draw on a major pension reform that took place in Italy in December 2011 that increased the retirement age by up to six years for some categories of workers. We have access to a unique dataset validated by the Italian social security administration (INPS), which identifies in each private firm, based on an administrative exam of eligibility conditions, how many workers were locked in by the sudden increase in the retirement age, and for how long. We find that firms mostly affected by the lock in are those that were downsizing even before the policy shock. The increase in the retirement age seems to displace more middle-aged workers than young workers. Furthermore, there is not a one-to-one increase in the number of older workers in the firms where some workers were locked in by the reform. We provide tentative explanations for these results, based on the interaction between retirement, employment protection legislation and liquidity constraints of firms.
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nilssen, Tore (2020)
INNLEDNING Det har foregått en intens diskusjon den siste tiden om hvorvidt det bør innføres et forbud mot prisdiskriminering på leverandørnivå i dagligvaremarkedet. Kjede har stått mot kjede, professor mot professor. Det er utarbeidet en rekke rapporter og innspill på oppdrag fra både bransjeaktører og myndigheter. Vi har fått i oppdrag av Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet å gjennomgå de innspill og rapporter som er kommet i saken, og vurdere argumentene som er fremsatt for og mot inngrep mot prisdiskriminering. Videre er vi bedt om å komme med vår anbefaling om slike inngrep. Blant de mange innspillene identifiserte vi tre viktige konstellasjoner som representative for ulike syn i debatten. Den første er Foros og Kind som har produsert en rekke innspill og rapporter på oppdrag fra advokatfirmaet BAHR og Rema 1000. Argumentene i disse rapportene oppfatter vi som i favør av å regulere – eller i alle fall gripe inn mot – ulike innkjøpspriser (Foros og Kind, 2018a, b; 2019a, b; Foros, Kind og Shaffer, 2018). De som tydeligst argumenterer mot å legge restriksjoner på innkjøpsprisene, er Oslo Economics (2019), skrevet på oppdrag fra NorgesGruppen; se også Bergh m. fl. (2020). Den tredje sentrale rapporten er Johansen og Straume (2019), skrevet på oppdrag fra Konkurransetilsynet. Denne rapporten framhever, i større grad enn de andre, usikkerheten rundt forventede effekter av å regulere eller gripe inn mot ulike innkjøpspriser. Den plasserer seg derfor et sted mellom Foros og Kind og Oslo Economics, men kanskje noe nærmere den siste.
Partner selection is a vital feature of human behavior with important consequences for individuals, families, and society. We use the term hypergamy to describe a phenomenon whereby there is a tendency for husbands to be of higher rank within the male earnings capacity distribution than their wives are within the female distribution. Such patterns are difficult to verify empirically because earnings are both a cause and an effect of the mating process. Using parental earnings rank as a predetermined measure of earnings capacity to solve the simultaneity problem, we show that hypergamy is an important feature of today’s mating patterns in one of the most gender-equal societies in the world, namely Norway. Through its influence on household specialization, we argue that hypergamy may explain parts of the remaining gender wage gap.
Housing transactions by moving homeowners take two steps—buying a new house and selling the old one. This paper argues that the transaction sequence decisions of moving homeowners have important effects on the housing market. Moving homeowners prefer to buy first whenever there are more buyers than sellers in the market. However, this congests the buyer side of the market and increases the buyer–seller ratio, further strengthening the incentives of other moving owners to buy first. This endogenous strategic complementarity leads to multiple steady state equilibria and large fluctuations, which are broadly consistent with stylized facts about the housing cycle.
Moen, Espen Rasmus; Wulfsberg, Fredrik & Aas, Øyvind Nilsen (2019)
In this paper, we study price dispersion in the Norwegian retail market for 766 products across 4,297 stores over 60 months. Price dispersion for homogeneous products is significant and persistent, with a coefficient of variation of 37 percent for the median product. Price dispersion differs between product categories and over time. Store heterogeneity accounts for 30 percent of the observed variation in prices for the median product–month, and for around 50 percent for the sample as a whole. Price dispersion is still prevalent after correcting for store heterogeneity.
Boeri, Tito; Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen Rasmus (2018)
Financial constraints in search equilibrium: Mortensen Pissarides meet Holmstrom and Tirole
A key lesson from the Great Recession is that firms’ leverage and access to finance are important for hiring and firing decisions. It is now empirically established that bank lending is correlated with employment losses when credit conditions deteriorate. We provide further evidence of this and make causal inferences on the effect of leverage on job losses drawing on a new firm-level dataset that we assembled on employment and financial positions of European firms. Yet, in the Diamond Mortensen Pissarides (DMP) model there is no role for finance. All projects that display positive net present values are realized and financial markets are assumed to be perfect. What if financial markets are not perfect? Does a different access to finance influence the firm’s hiring and firing decisions? The paper uses the concept of limited pledgeability proposed by Holmstrom and Tirole to integrate financial imperfections and labor market imperfections. A negative shock wipes out the firm’s physical capital and leads to job destruction unless internal cash was accumulated by firms. If firms hold liquid assets they may thus protect their search capital, defined as the cost of attracting and hiring workers. The paper explores the trade-off between size and precautionary cash holdings in both partial and general equilibrium. We find that if labor market frictions disappear, so does the motive for firms to hold liquidity. This suggests a fundamental complementarity between labor market frictions and holding of liquid assets by firms.
Moen, Espen Rasmus & Riis, Christian (2017)
Regulating the Norwegian Telecommunications Market in 2016: How Much is Necessary?
Finance in Society: An Anthology in Honour of Thore Johnsen, , s. 389-406.
Boeri, Tito; Garibaldi, Pietro & Moen, Espen Rasmus (2017)
All OECD countries have either legally mandated severance pay or compensations imposed by industry-level bargaining in case of employer initiated job separations. The paper shows that mandatory severance is optimal in presence of wage deferrals induced by workers' moral hazard. We also establish a link between optimal severance and efficiency of the legal system and characterize the effects of shifting the burden of proof from the employer to the worker. Quantitatively, the welfare effects of suboptimal severance payments vary in general equilibrium between 1 and 3 %. The model accounts also for two neglected features of the legislation. The first is the discretion of judges in declaring the nature, economic vs. disciplinary, of the layoff. The second feature regards the relationship between severance and tenure. Our theory gives necessary conditions under which optimal severance is increasing with tenure, as generally observed.
Helland, Leif; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Preugschat, Edgar (2017)
Information and coordination frictions in experimental posted offer markets
We experimentally investigate buyer and seller behavior in small markets with two kinds of frictions. First, a subset of buyers may have (severely) limited information about prices, and choose a seller at random. Second, sellers may not be able to serve all potential customers. Such capacity constraints can lead to coordination frictions where some sellers and buyers may not be able to trade. Theory predicts very different equilibrium outcomes when we vary the set-up along these two dimensions. In particular, it implies that a higher number of informed buyers will lead to lower prices when sellers do not face capacity constraints, while prices may actually increase if sellers are capacity constrained, as shown by Lester (2011). In the experiment, the differences between the constrained and non-constrained case are confirmed; prices fall when sellers are not capacity constrained but either do not fall by much or even increase when they are not. We find that prices are quite close to the predicted equilibrium values except in treatments where unconstrained sellers face a large fraction of informed buyers. However, introducing noise into the theoretical decision making process produces a pattern of deviations that fits well with the observed ones.
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Preugschat, Edgar (2017)
Productivity spillovers through labor mobility in search equilibrium
This paper proposes an explicit model of spillovers through labor flows in a framework with search frictions. Firms can choose to innovate or to imitate by hiring a worker from a firm that has already innovated. We show that if innovating firms can commit to long-term wage contracts with their workers, productivity spillovers are fully internalized. If firms cannot commit to long-term wage contracts, there is too little innovation and too much imitation in equilibrium. Our model is tractable and allows us to analyze welfare effects of various policies in the limited commitment case. We find that subsidizing innovation and taxing imitation improves welfare. Moreover, allowing innovating firms to charge different forms of fees or rent out workers to imitating firms may also improve welfare. By contrast, non-pecuniary measures that reduce the efficiency of the search process, always reduce welfare.
The paper proposes a model of on-the-job search and industry dynamics in which search is directed. Firms permanently di er in productivity levels, their production function features constant returns to scale, and search costs are convex in search intensity. Wages are determined in a competitive manner, as rms advertise wage contracts (expected discounted incomes) so as to balance wage costs and search costs (queue length). Firms are assumed to sort out their coordination problems with their employees in such a way that the on-the-job search behavior of workers maximizes the match surplus. Our model has several novel features. First, it is close in spirit to the competitive model, with a tractable and unique equilibrium, and is therefore useful for empirical testing. Second, on-the-job search is an e cient response to rm heterogeneities and convex search costs. Third, the equilibrium leans towards a job ladder, where unemployed workers apply to low-productivity rms o ering low wages, and then gradually move on to more productive, higher-paying rms. With a continuum of rm types, the job ladder i strict, in the sense that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the productivity of the current employer and that of the rms she searches for. The paper also contributes methodologically, as the existence proof requires a version of Schauder's xed point theorem that is not commonly used by economists. Finally, our model o ers di erent implications for the dynamics of job-to-job transitions than existing models of random search.
We examine the origins and outcome of entrepreneurship on the basis of exceptionally comprehensive Norwegian matched worker–firm–owner data. In contrast to most existing studies, our notion of entrepreneurship not only comprises self-employment, but also employment in partly self-owned limited liability companies. Based on this extended entrepreneurship concept, we find that entrepreneurship tends to be profitable. It also raises income variability, but the most successful quartile gains much more than the least successful quartile loses. Key determinants of the decision to become an entrepreneur are occupational qualifications, family resources, gender, and work environments. Individual unemployment encourages, while aggregate unemployment discourages, entrepreneurship.
The American Economic Review, 100(2) , s. 343-347.
Fjeldstad, Øystein; Moen, Espen R. & Riis, Christian (2006)
Regulation and competition in the Norwegian telecommunication market
Competition and Welfare: The Norwegian Experience, Lars Sørgaard (ed),
Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R. & Riis, Christian (2006)
Contract renewal and incentives in public procurement
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24(2) , s. 269-285.
This paper explores how the government's choice of renewal policy in public procurement programs can be used as a mechanism to provide firms with incentives to supply quality. A public service is produced by several firms. The firms participate in a tournament where they are ranked according to the quality of their services, and rewarded in terms of contract renewals. We analyse the firms' incentives to produce high-quality services, and find that they are maximised if 50% of the contracts are renewed. The optimal renewal policy trades off incentive provision (which requires that a relatively large fraction of the firms are replaced each period) against the entry costs of new firms. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Moen, Espen R. & Rosen, Åsa (2006)
Equilibrium incentive contracts and efficiency wages
Journal of the European Economic Association, 4, s. 1165-1192.
We analyze the optimal (efficiency) wage contract when output is contractible but firms neither observe the workers' effort nor their match-specific productivity. Firms offer wage contracts that optimally trade off effort and wage costs. As a result, employed workers enjoy rents, which in turn creates unemployment. Nonetheless, the incentive power of the equilibrium wage contract is constrained efficient in the absence of taxes and unemployment benefits. We also show that more high-powered incentive contracts tend to be associated with higher equilibrium unemployment rates.
Moen, Espen R. & Rosen, Åsa (2005)
Performance pay and adverse selection
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 107(2) , s. 279-298.
It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyze an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the firms' gain from worker self-selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive contracts are excessively high-powered, thereby inducing the more productive workers to exert too much effort and increasing agency costs stemming from the misallocation of effort.
Moen, Espen R. & Rosen, Åsa (2004)
Does Poaching Distort Training
?, 71(4) , s. 1143-1162.
Moen, Espen R. (2003)
Do Good Workers Hurt Bad Workers-or is it the Other Way Around?
International Economic Review, 44, s. 779-799.
Dalen, Dag Morten; Fehr, Nils-H. M. Von der & Moen, Espen R. (2003)
Regulation with Wage Bargaining
Economic Journal, 113(487) , s. 525-538.
Golombek, Rolf & Moen, Espen R. (2002)
Do negotiated agreements lead to cost efficiency
Journal of Economics, 76(2) , s. 22-22.
Moen, Espen R. (2001)
Hva skal vi gjøre med SDØE?
Økonomisk forum, 55(5) , s. 29-34.
Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R. & Riis, Christian (2001)
Public Ownership as a Signalling Device
Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC), 27(1) , s. 3-12.
Moen, Espen (1999)
Education, Ranking, and Competition for Jobs
Journal of Labor Economics, vol 17, s. 694-723.
Isachsen, Arne Jon & Moen, Espen (1999)
Er eurotilknytning så ille? Tiden baner veien for euro i Norge
Sosialøkonomen, (Des.)
Golombek, Rolf & Moen, Espen (1999)
Er frivillige avtaler kostnadseffektive?
Sosialøkonomen, (Des.)
Moen, Espen R. (1998)
Efficient Ways to Finance Human Capital Investments
Economica, 65, s. 491-505.
Moen, Espen R. & Riis, Christian (1998)
Investeringer i kunnskap
Markeder, ressurser og fordeling,
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nilssen, Tore (2022)
Bjerkholt og enkle svar om dagligvareprisene
[Kronikk]
Moen, Espen Rasmus & Riis, Christian (2022)
Husholdningene bør få strømstøtte
[Kronikk]
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nilssen, Tore (2020)
Påbud om like innkjøpspriser kan gi dyrere dagligvarer
[Kronikk]
Moen, Espen Rasmus & Nenov, Plamen (2020)
Kjøpe først eller selge først i boligmarkedet?
[Kronikk]
Moen, Espen Rasmus & Torvik, Ragnar (2017)
Oljefondet ut av oljeaksjer
[Kronikk]
Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & Moen, Espen Rasmus (2017)
Deling åpner for ny verdiskapning
[Kronikk]
Riis, Christian & Moen, Espen Rasmus (2017)
Skattelette? Hvilken skattelette?
[Kronikk]
Bjørnland, Hilde C & Moen, Espen R (2011)
Oljens Ringvirkninger
[Kronikk]
Holden, Steinar & Moen, Espen R (2009)
Se opp for likviditetsfellen!
[Kronikk]
Moen, Espen Rasmus (2022)
Prinsipper for rasjonell politikk etter makrosjokk med anvendelser på dagens strømkrise
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen Rasmus & Riis, Christian (2015)
Agglomerasjonsmodell
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Agglomerasjonsffekter en samlebetegnelse for svært ulike mekanismer som har det til felles at de stimuleres av økt befolkningstetthet. Det er grunn til å tro at infrastrukturinvesteringer som knytter befolkningskonsentrasjoner tettere sammen, vil kunne gi effekter langs flere av de samme dimensjonene. Vi vil derfor ikke her forsøke å identifisere enkeltårsaker, men benytte estimater fra etablerte studier for makroeffekter av økt effektiv populasjon som en tilnærming - riktignok med den viktige modifikasjon at vi tar eksplisitt hensyn til at avstand har en dempende effekt.
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen R & Riis, Christian (2014)
Samfunnsøkonomiske virkninger av fergefri E-39 Stavanger-Bergen
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Rapporten drøfter og beregner de samfunnsøkonomiske virkningene av en fergefri veiforbindelse E-39 fra Stavanger til Bergen. Det er to strekninger med to nye forbindelsespunkter som blir gjenstand for analyse. Den første strekningen er Stavanger- Haugesund, der nåværende ferge over Boknafjorden erstattes av tunnelforbindelse. Den andre strekningen er Stord-Bergen der fergen over Bjørnefjorden erstattes med broforbindelse. De nye forbindelsene evalueres hver for seg i et konsistent kost-nytte rammeverk. I analysen inkluderer vi både de direkte nytte- og kostnadseffektene, som tidsbesparelser og investeringskostnader, samtidig som vi inkluderer avledete virkninger forbundet med at økt integrasjon tenderer til å øke produktiviteten i markedene. Det viktige nye bidraget i vår analyse er analysen av agglomerasjonsgevinstene forbundet med økt integrasjon av markeder. Når det gjelder de direkte nytte- og kostnadsvirkningene benytter vi etablert metodikk, slik de er beskrevet i NOU 2012:16 Samfunnsøkonomiske analyser. For agglomerasjonseffektene baserer vi oss på en etter hvert rik litteratur2. Denne drøfter teoretisk de ulike mekanismene som genererer produktivitetsgevinster av integrasjon, og empirisk anslår størrelsesorden på effektene. Vi bidrar ikke med en selvstendig empirisk analyse, men benytter estimater som er dokumentert i kvalifiserte og kjente arbeider. Disse integreres i et modellverktøy som korrigerer for at veiinvesteringer reduserer den effektive avstanden mellom befolkningskonsentrasjoner, uten at det medfører full integrasjon. Vi gjennomfører en hovedanalyse som suppleres med en alternativ beregning. I hovedanalysen legger vi til grunn anslag for trafikkveksten utført i analyser av Transportøkonomisk institutt. I den alternative beregningen benyttes noen alternative anslag gitt fra Statens vegvesen.
Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Moen, Espen R & Edgar, Preugschat (2014)
Productivity spillovers through labor mobility
[Report Research]. CEPR
Bjørnenak, Trond; Fehr, Nils-Henrik M. von der, Moen, Espen R & Riis, Christian (2013)
Plan eller marked? Om reguleringsregimet for markedet for videreforedling av melk
[Report Research]. Hovedorganisasjonen Virke
Moen, Espen R (2011)
Nobel prize in economics 2010
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R (2011)
On-the-job search and moral hazard
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R (2011)
On-the-job search and moral hazard
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Riis, Christian & Moen, Espen R (2011)
Moderne mikroøkonomi
[Textbook]. Gyldendal Akademisk
Moen, Espen R (2011)
Hvorfor faller ikkke lønningene mer i nedgangstider?
[Popular Science Article]. Samfunnsøkonomen, 125(11) , s. 30-31.
Riis, Christian & Moen, Espen R (2010)
Efficient Exclusion
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
In their influential paper, Aghion and Bolton (1987) argue that a buyer and a seller may agree on high liquidation damages in order to extract rents from future suppliers. As this may distort future trade, it may be socially wasteful. We argue that Aghion and Bolton's analysis of entry is ncomplete in some respects, as there is only one potential entrant in their model. We construct a model with many potential entrants. Entry is costly, so entering suppliers have to earn a quasi-rent in order to recoup their entry costs. Reducing the entrants' profits by the help of a breach penalty reduces the probability of entry, and this reduces the attractiveness of breach penalties for the contracting parties. We show that the initial buyer and seller only have incentives to include a positive breach penalty if there is excessive entry without it, in which case the breach penalty is welfare improving.
Dalen, Dag Morten & Moen, Espen R (2010)
Borgerlønn:en samfunnsøkonomisk analyse
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Moen, Espen R (2010)
Competitive on-the-job search
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R; Riis, Christian & Fjeldstad, Øystein D. (2010)
Competition with local network externalities
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Local network externalities are present when the utility of buying from a firm not only depends on the number of other customers (global network externalities), but also on their identity and / or characteristics. We explore the consequences of local network externalities within a framework where two firms compete offering differentiated products. We first show that local network externalities, in contrast to global network externalities, don't necessarily sharpen competition. Then we show that the equilibrium allocation is inefficient, in the sense that the allocation of consumers on firms does not maximize social surplus. Finally we show that local network externalities create a difference between the marginal and the average consumer, which gives rise to inefficiently high usage prices and too high level of compatibility between the networks.
We examine the origins and outcome of entrepreneurship on the basis of exceptionally comprehensive Norwegian matched worker-firm-owner data. In contrast to most existing studies, our notion of entrepreneurship not only comprises self-employment, but also employment in partly self-owned limited liability firms. Based on this extended entrepreneurship concept, we find that entrepreneurship tends to be profitable. It also raises income uncertainty, but the most successful quartile gains much more than the least successful quartile loses. Key determinants of the decision to become an entrepreneur are occupational qualifications, family resources, gender, and work environments. Individual unemployment encourages, while aggregate unemployment discourages entrepreneurship.
Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R & Riis, Christian (2010)
Regulering av fjernvarme
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
I denne rapporten vurderer vi reguleringer av fjernvarmesektoren i Norge. Utgangspunktet for analysen er hensynet til en samfunnsøkonomisk effektiv energiforsyning. Prinsippene for effektive investeringer i energiinfrastruktur identifiseres, og sentralt i rapporten står vurderinger av hvilke implikasjoner disse prinsippene har for en hensiktsmessig regulering av varmesektoren. Utredningen er utført på oppdrag for Olje- og energidepartementet. Prosjektleder har vært professor Dag Morten Dalen. I prosjektperioden har vi hatt nyttige samtaler med representanter for Norsk Fjernvarme, NoBio, NVE og Sintef Energi. Konklusjonene i rapporten er forfatternes egne, og reflekterer ikke nødvendigvis synspunkter som støttes av disse. I tillegg har utredningen trukket på innsikt fra prosjektet ”Regulering av parallell infrastrukturer: El, gass og fjernvarme” utført av ECON, Handelshøyskolen BI og Møreforskning for EBL Kompetanse.
Moen, Espen R (2010)
Hidden Markets
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Riis, Christian & Moen, Espen R. (2010)
Moderne mikroøkonomi - kompendieutgave
[Textbook]. Gyldendal Akademisk
Moen, Espen R (2010)
Worker Replacement
[Report Research]. National Bureau of Economic Research
Moen, Espen R & Menzio, Guido (2008)
Worker Replacement
[Report Research]. CEPR
Moen, Espen R (2008)
Industry dynamics and search in the labor market
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R (2008)
Industry dynamics and search in the labor market
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R (2008)
Industry dynamics and search in the labor market
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R (2008)
Industry dynamics and search in the labor market
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Moen, Espen R (2008)
Industry dynamics and search in the labor market
[Conference Lecture]. Event
Dalen, Dag Morten; Moen, Espen R. & Riis, Christian (2007)
Regulering av fjernvarme: Utredning for Olje- og energidepartementet
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
I denne rapporten vurderer vi reguleringer av fjernvarmesektoren i Norge. Utgangspunktet for analysen er hensynet til en samfunnsøkonomisk effektiv energiforsyning. Prinsippene for effektive investeringer i energiinfrastruktur identifiseres, og sentralt i rapporten står vurderinger av hvilke implikasjoner disse prinsippene har for en hensiktsmessig regulering av varmesektoren. Rapporten er organisert som følger: Kapittel 1 presenterer konklusjoner og anbefalinger. Kapittel 2 introduserer problemstillingen i rapporten. Kapittel 3 gir en generell beskrivelse av kostnadsstrukturen el- og varme¬distribusjonen, samt alternativene desentralisert oppvarming basert på olje og biomasse. Kapittel 4 beskriver utviklingen av fjernvarme i Norge. Vi dokumenterer kostnads- og prisnivået i fjernvarmebransjen. Kapittel 5 beskriver relevante reguleringer av fjernvarme i Norge. Kapittel 6 gir en generell fremstilling av kriteriene for effektiv utnyttelse av energi¬infrastruktur, og avslutter med en redegjørelse for kriteriet for effektive fjernvarmeinvesteringer. I kapittel 7 vurderes dagens regulering av fjern¬varme.
Moen, Espen R.; Dalen, Dag Morten & Riis, Christian (2003)
Privat arbeidsformidling
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
I denne rapporten diskuteres hvorvidt offentlig finansiert privat arbeidsformidling kan være et egnet virkemiddel i arbeidsmarkedspolitikken. Videre analyseres mulige effekter av å introdusere aktivitetsbasert finansiering av Aetat. Vi vektlegger spesielt tre forhold som tilsier at forholdene ligger godt til rette for offentlig finansiert privat arbeidsformidling: 1. Sluttproduktet ved arbeidsformidling, overgang til arbeid, er i utgangspunktet observerbart og kvantifiserbart. Dette muliggjør effektiv kontraktsstyring av private aktører. Riktignok kan det oppstå problemer som følge av at jobber har forskjellig kvalitet (for eksempel forskjellig varighet) og ikke minst som følge av at arbeidstakerne er heterogene. Sistnevnte forhold kan medføre at private arbeidsformidlere i for stor grad setter inn ressurser på de personene som er relativt lette å formidle, på bekostning av personer hvor formidling krever mer. Vi er likevel av den oppfatning at slike problemer i rimelig grad kan forebygges ved å benytte incentivkontrakter med differensierte satser og ved å la fornyelse av kontraktene betinges med hensyn på oppnådde resultater. 2. Det er grunn til å tro at en kan oppnå effektiv konkurranse, i hvert fall i tett befolkede områder. Elementene av stordriftsfordeler ved formidling tømmes relativt raskt ut. Det eneste viktige unntaket er oppbygging av dataregistre, men i henhold til vårt forslag skal denne oppgaven frem-deles utføres av Aetat. Det er videre et poeng at det i dag eksisterer en rekke aktører i markedet som har erfaring fra formidling eller formidlingsliknende virksomhet, som vikarbyråer, personalutvelgelses-firmaer, private arbeidsformidlere og arrangører av arbeidsmarkeds-tiltak. 3. Det kan være breddefordeler mellom arbeidsformidling og andre aktiviteter som vikarutleie. Breddefordelene oppstår som følge av at aktivitetene i stor utstrekning fordrer samme type kompetanse og samme type sosiale nettverk. Konkurranse kan bidra til at gevinstene ved slike breddefordeler blir realisert. Vi analyserer videre tre modeller for privat arbeidsformidling: 1. Arbeidsformidling hektes på allerede eksisterende tiltak, for eksempel jobbklubb. 2. Arbeidsformidling arrangeres som arbeidsmarkedstiltak (”job placement”). 3. Den private arbeidsformidleren overtar totalansvaret for arbeidsledige ved oppfølging. Rapporten diskuterer også spesielle utfordringer som privat arbeidsformidling stilles overfor på mindre tettbefolkede steder. Vi påpeker at potensialet for privat arbeidsformidling kan være mindre utenfor de sentrale områdene, ettersom matchingproblemer her kan være mindre uttalt enn i større byer. Videre kan mulighetene for å oppnå effektiv konkurranse være dårligere. I rapportens siste del diskuteres aktivitetsbasert finansiering av Aetat.
Moen, Espen R. & Riis, Christian (2002)
Matvaresektoren i et makroøkonomisk perspektiv
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Rapporten drøfter hvordan utviklingen i de makroøkonomiske forhold påvirker betingelsene for norsk matvareindustri. Etter vår vurdering er utviklingen i matvaresektoren i Norge mer beslektet med utviklingstrekk vi kjenner fra konkurranseutsatte sektorer enn fra skjermede sektorer, som matvaresektoren tradisjonelt er kategorisert innenfor. Dette har betydning for næringsøkonomiske studier av matvaresektoren, spesielt ved at de makroøkonomiske utviklingstrekk knyttet til Norge som oljeøkonomi slår ulikt ut på konkurranseutsatte og skjermede næringer. Som en følge av oljeinntektene er det grunnlag for å anta at Norge i årene framover vil ha en noe høyere kostnadsvekst enn våre handelspartnere og at kroneverdien over tid vil øke (appresiering). Disse utviklingstrekkene vil direkte svekke lønnsomheten i matvareindustrien og kommer i tillegg til de pressfaktorer som følger av internasjonal handelsliberalisering og av endringer i norsk landbrukspolitikk.
Golombek, Rolf & Moen, Espen R. (1999)
Do Voluntary Agreements Lead to Cost Efficiency?
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Moen, Espen R. (1999)
How the Invisible Hand Creates Excessive Wage Differentials
[Report Research]. Handelshøyskolen BI
Academic Degrees
Year
Academic Department
Degree
1995
London School of Economics
Ph.D Dr. Oecon.
1991
University of Oslo
Master Cand. Oecon
Work Experience
Year
Employer
Job Title
2003 - Present
BI Norwegian Business School
Professor
2011 - 2019
BI Norwegian Business School, Department of Economics
Head of Department
2008 - 2017
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Adjunct professor
2012 - 2016
Norges Bank
Non-voting board member
2014 - 2015
University of Oslo
Professor
2006 - 2014
Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREAM)
Director
1998 - 2003
BI Norwegian Business School
Associate professor
1996 - 1998
Institute for Mathematics, University of Oslo
Adjunct associate professor
1995 - 1998
SNF (Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration) -University of Oslo,
