Employee Profile

Ragnar Torvik

Adjunct Professor

Department of Economics

Room number B3I-042
Phone +4798824721
E-mail ragnar.torvik@bi.no

Publications

Shows 5 of 73 publication(s)

Article Halvor Mehlum, Gisle James Natvik, Ragnar Torvik (2024)

The impossible trinity: Competitive markets, free entry, and efficiency

Journal of Public Economics 239 p. 1-12 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105240

We present a model in which workers make occupational choices and vote over a tax rate which determines the level of government spending. Workers in occupations whose services are in high (low) demand by the government favor high (low) taxes. We show that the socially efficient size of the public sector cannot be supported in a political economic equilibrium. The reason is that equilibrium tax rates always reward excessive entry into the politically most powerful sector, and thus the equilibrium size of government is always either too big or too small. We show that this is an example of a more general political economy result that extends well beyond the baseline model and holds quite generally: the combination of (i) competitive markets and (ii) free entry is inconsistent with (iii) allocative efficiency.

Article Øistein Røisland, Tommy Sveen, Ragnar Torvik (2023)

Samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken i en liten, åpen økonomi

Samfunnsøkonomen 137(6) p. 41-52

Vi utvikler en teori for det optimale samspillet mellom penge- og finanspolitikken i konjunkturstyringen. Mens en i utgangspunktet kunne tro at penge- og finanspolitikken bør dra konjunkturene i samme retning, viser vi at dette ikke nødvendigvis er tilfelle. Dersom det ikke er store kostnader ved å bruke renten aktivt, skal penge- og finanspolitikken dra i hver sin retning ved inflasjonssjokk og valutakurssjokk. Grunnen er at pengepolitikken kan påvirke inflasjonen både gjennom etterspørselskanalen og gjennom valutakurskanalen, mens finanspolitikken bare kan benytte etterspørselskanalen. Pengepolitikken har derfor et komparativt fortrinn i å stabilisere inflasjonen, mens finanspolitikken har et komparativt fortrinn i å stabilisere produksjonen. Kun når det er tilstrekkelig store kostnader ved å endre renten, vil det være optimalt at penge- og finanspolitikken skal dra i samme retning ved inflasjonssjokk og valutakurssjokk. Kostnader ved bruk av finanspolitikk har ingen betydning for om penge- og finanspolitikk skal dra i samme retning eller ikke, men har implikasjoner for hvor sterk virkemiddelbruken bør være.

Article Drago Bergholt, Øistein Røisland, Tommy Sveen, Ragnar Torvik (2023)

Monetary policy when export revenues drop

Journal of International Money and Finance 137 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2023.102893

We study how monetary policy should respond to shocks that permanently alter the steady state structure of the economy. In such a case monetary policy affects not only the short run misallocations due to nominal rigidities, but also relative prices which stimulate reallocation of capital. We consider a permanent and negative shock to export revenues that requires a larger traded sector and a smaller non-traded sector in the new steady state. This reallocation calls for a change in relative prices during the transition, but may also lead to a period of high unemployment. We show how an appropriate monetary policy could mitigate the welfare costs of the transition by allowing the exchange rate to depreciate, and thereby allowing inflation to increase in the short run. Traditional monetary policy regimes, such as inflation targeting or a fixed exchange rate, would imply high unemployment and inefficiently slow transition. Stabilizing nominal wage growth, in contrast, would be close to the welfare-optimal monetary policy.

Article Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik (2021)

The macroeconomics of COVID-19: a two-sector interpretation

Review of Keynesian Economics 9(2) p. 165-174 Doi: https://doi.org/10.4337/roke.2021.02.01

Article Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik, Simone Valente (2020)

Growth with age-dependent preferences

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09638199.2020.1716834

We study the consequences of age-dependent preferences for economic growth and structural change in a two-sector model with overlapping generations and non-dimishing returns to capital. Savings and accumulation rates depend on the relative price of services consumed by old agents and on the intergenerational distribution of income. The feedback effects originating in preferences and income distribution yield three possible long-run growth outcomes: sustained endogenous growth, decumulation traps, and bounded accumulation. In the endogenous growth scenario, the transition features rising savings and accumulation rates accompanied by distributional shifts in favor of young workers, growing employment and rising prices in the service sector. Traps are triggered by initially low capital in manufacturing and low employment in services. Bounded accumulation yielding zero long-run growth in per capita incomes is induced by preferences, not by diminishing returns to capital.

Article Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik (2020)

Etterspørsel og tilbud i koronaens tid

Samfunnsøkonomen p. 24-34

For vestlige markedsøkonomier er koronakrisen en ny type krise, men denne krisen har paralleller til økonomier til andre tider, og til kriser på andre steder. Vi skal her drøfte noen mekanismer fra tidligere makrolitteratur, og fra litteratur om makroøkonomi for utviklingsland, som inneholder økonomiske sammenhenger som over natten er blitt relevante også for vår økonomi. Fenomener som flaskehalser, rasjonering, tvungen sparing, innsatsvarebegrenset produksjon, likviditetsbegrenset produksjon, lønnsomhetsbegrensning, sektorheterogenitet, og kostnader som løper selv om produksjonen stenger ned, er alle permanente fenomener i utviklingsland men de dukker også opp i rike land i krisetider. I denne artikkelen vil vi presentere noen av disse grundig utviklete, men delvis glemte, mekanismene innenfor enkle læreboksbeskrivelser og gi noen eksempler på hvordan virkningene av finans- og pengepolitikk blir modifisert i en krisetid.

Article Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2020)

The political agenda effect and state centralization

Journal of comparative economics 48 p. 749-778 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2020.03.004

We provide a potential explanation, based on the “political agenda effect”, for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision may be absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization.

Chapter Ragnar Torvik (2020)

Formal Institutions and Development in Low-Income Countries: Positive and Normative Theory

The Handbook of Economic Development and Institutions p. 103-136 Doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvm7bbxr.7

Article Hilde C Bjørnland, Leif Anders Thorsrud, Ragnar Torvik (2019)

Dutch disease dynamics reconsidered

European Economic Review 119 p. 411-433 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.07.016

In this paper we develop the first model to incorporate the dynamic productivity consequences of both the spending effect and the resource movement effect of oil abundance. We show that doing so dramatically alters the conclusions drawn from earlier models of learning by doing (LBD) and the Dutch disease. In particular, the resource movement effect suggests that the growth effects of natural resources are likely to be positive, turning previous growth results in the literature relying on the spending effect on their head. We motivate the relevance of our approach by the example of a major oil producer, Norway. Empirically we find that the effects of an increase in the price of oil may resemble results found in the earlier Dutch disease literature, while the effects of increased oil activity increases productivity in most industries. Therefore, models that only focus on windfall gains due to increased spending potential from higher oil prices, would conclude – incorrectly based on our analysis – that the resource sector cannot be an engine of growth.

Article Ragnar Torvik (2019)

Ny teknologi, produktivitetsvekst og renter

Samfunnsøkonomen 133(3) p. 40-48

Chapter Ragnar Torvik (2018)

Oil prices and the exchange rate: Optimal monetary policy for oil-exporting countries

Rethinking the Macroeconomics of Resource-Rich Countries p. 65-74

Article Ragnar Torvik (2018)

Should Developing Countries Establish Petroleum Funds?

Energy Journal 39(4) Doi: https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.39.4.rtor

Many natural-resource-abundant countries have established petroleum funds as part of their strategy to manage their resource wealth. This paper examines reasons that such funds may be established, discusses how these funds are organized, and draws some policy lessons. The paper then develops a theory of how petroleum funds may affect the economic and political equilibrium of an economy, and how this depends on the initial institutions. A challenge with petroleum funds is that they may produce economic and political incentives that undermine their potential benefits. An alternative to establishing petroleum funds is to use revenues to invest domestically in sectors such as infrastructure, education, and health. Such investments have the potential to produce a better economic, as well as institutional, development. This is particularly the case if the initial institutions are weak.

Article James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Thierry Verdier (2017)

The political economy of public income volatility: With an application to the resource curse

Journal of Public Economics 145 p. 243-252 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.014

In recent years many countries have witnessed a great deal of volatility in public budgets, be it due to volatility in the access to foreign loans in Greece, or to unstable oil prices in Venezuela. We study the political consequences of such public income volatility. As is standard, in our model political incentives create inefficient policies to increase re-election probabilities, but we show that making public income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy, such as patronage public employment, less costly. Our model highlights a new political economy connection between the volatility of the public budget and economic growth. In the case where volatility comes from natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself may be a source of inefficient resource extraction, jointly interacting with increased patronage employment.

Article Ragnar Torvik (2017)

Pengepolitikk eller finanspolitikk i konjunkturstyringen?

Samfunnsøkonomen 131(4) p. 21-27

Review article Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik, Simone Valente (2017)

Sparemultiplikatoren

Samfunnsøkonomen p. 51-53

Article James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2016)

Endogenous presidentialism

Journal of the European Economic Association 14(4) p. 907-942 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12162

Article Ragnar Torvik (2016)

Realvalutakurs og oljeprisfall

Samfunnsøkonomen 130(3) p. 41-49

Article Leopoldo Fergusson, James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Juan F Vargas (2016)

The Need for Enemies

Economic Journal 126(593) p. 1018-1054 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12174

Article Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik, Simone Valente (2016)

The Savings Multiplier

Journal of Monetary Economics 83 p. 90-105 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2016.08.009

Article Egil Matsen, Gisle James Natvik, Ragnar Torvik (2016)

Petro populism

Journal of Development Economics 118 p. 1-12 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.08.010

We aim to explain petro populism|the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income, politicians need to remain in o ce over time. Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in o ce. While this incentive bene ts citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it adversely motivates benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium, politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Moreover, overextraction might even be reinforced as voters become better informed.

Article Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Pengepolitikk i en oljeøkonomi

Samfunnsøkonomen 129(2) p. 34-45

Article Lars-Erik Borge, Pernille Parmer, Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Local natural resource curse?

Journal of Public Economics 131 p. 101-114 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.002

Article James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, T Verdier (2014)

Political foundations of the resource curse: A simplification and a comment

Journal of Development Economics 106 p. 194-198 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.09.004

Article Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2013)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Review of Economic Studies 80(3) p. 845-875 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdt007

Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence politicians through non-electoral means. In weakly institutionalized polities where such non-electoral influences, particularly by the better organized elite, are a major concern, voters may prefer a political system without checks and balances as a way of insulating politicians from these influences. When they do so, they are effectively accepting a certain amount of politician (presidential) rents in return for redistribution. We show that checks and balances are less likely to emerge when the elite is better organized and is more likely to be able to influence or bribe politicians, and when inequality and potential taxes are high (which makes redistribution more valuable to the majority). We also provide case study evidence from Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela consistent with the model.

Chapter James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2013)

Institutional comparative statics

Advances in Economics and Econometrics — Tenth World Congress, Volume II: Applied Economics p. 97-134 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139060028.003

Article Carl Andreas Claussen, Egil Matsen, Øistein Røisland, Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Overconfidence, monetary policy committees and chairman dominance

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 81(2) p. 699-711 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.12.003

Monetary policy decisions are typically characterized by three features: (i) decisions are made by a committee, (ii) the committee members often disagree, and (iii) the chairman is almost never on the losing side in the vote. We show that the combination of overconfident policymakers and a chairman with agenda-setting rights can explain all these features. The optimal agenda-setting power to the chairman is a strictly concave function of the degree of overconfidence. We also show that the quality of advice produced by the central bank staff is higher in a flat organization than in a hierarchical one.

Chapter Halvor Mehlum, Karl Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Mineral rents and social development in Norway

Mineral rents and the financing of social policy p. 155-184 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230370913.0013

Chapter Ragnar Torvik (2011)

The Political Economy of Reform in Resource-Rich Countries

Beyond the Curse. Policies to Harness the Power of Natural Resources p. 237-255

Article Mario Chacón, James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2011)

When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia

Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(3) p. 366-396 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002711401871

The conventional wisdom is that for a democracy to be consolidated, all groups must have a chance to attain power. If they do not, then they will subvert democracy and choose to fight for power. In this article, the authors show that this wisdom is seriously incomplete because it considers absolute, not relative payoffs. Although the probability of winning an election increases with the size of a group, so does the probability of winning an armed conflict. Thus, in a situation in which all groups have a high chance of winning an election, they may also have a high chance of winning a fight. Indeed, in a natural model, the authors show that democracy may never be consolidated in such a situation. Rather, democracy may only be stable when one group is dominant. The authors explore this key aspect of the theory using data from La Violencia, a political conflict in Colombia during the years 1946—1950 between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Consistent with their results, and contrary to conventional wisdom, the authors show that fighting between the parties was more intense in municipalities where the support of the parties was more evenly balanced.

Article James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2009)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

European Economic Review 53(7) p. 786-798 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.02.006

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.

Article James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2009)

The Real Swing Voter's Curse

The American Economic Review 99(2) p. 310-315 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.310

Article Ragnar Torvik (2009)

Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?

Oxford review of economic policy 25(2) p. 241-256 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grp015

On average, resource-abundant countries have experienced lower growth over the last four decades than their resource-poor counterparts. But the most interesting aspect of the paradox of plenty is not the average effect of natural resources, but its variation. For every Nigeria or Venezuela there is a Norway or a Botswana. Why do natural resources induce prosperity in some countries but stagnation in others? This paper gives an overview of the dimensions along which resource-abundant winners and losers differ. In light of this, it then discusses different theory models of the resource curse, with a particular emphasis on recent developments in political economy.

Chapter Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2008)

Institutions and the resource curse

40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2 p. 245-264

Article Egil Matsen, Tommy Sveen, Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics 7(1)

This paper extends the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to analyze fiscal policy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. It is first shown that tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange rate dynamics. We also show how ``rational" agents may magnify or dampen the responses of ``irrational" agents, and discuss how, unlike in previous contributions, this is in our model purely a result of the shape of rational agents' utility functions.

Article Ragnar Torvik, karl ove moene, Halvor Mehlum (2006)

Cursed by Resources or Institutions?

The World Economy p. 1117-1131

Article JA Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, T Verdier (2006)

Political foundations of the resource curse

Journal of Development Economics 79

Article H Mehlum, karl ove moene, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

Institutions and the resource curse

Economic Journal 116

Article Ragnar Torvik, Øistein Røisland, Kai Leitemo (2006)

Should Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Care about Traded and Non-Traded Sectors?

IUP Journal of Bank Management 1 p. 53-63

Article H Mehlum, E Miguel, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

Poverty and crime in 19th century Germany

Journal of Urban Economics 59

Article Ragnar Torvik, Silje Aslaksen (2006)

A Theory of Civil Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 108(4) p. 571-586

Chapter Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

Parasites

Poverty Traps p. 79-94

Chapter Ragnar Torvik, Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene (2006)

Parasites

Poverty Traps p. 79-94

Article JA Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

White elephants

Journal of Public Economics 89

Article Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Optimal Dutch disease

Journal of Development Economics 78(2) p. 494-515

Article Kai Leitemo, Øistein Røisland, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Monetary policy rules and the exchange rate channel

Applied Financial Economics 15 p. 1165-1170

Article H Mehlum, K Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Crime induced poverty traps

Journal of Development Economics 77

Article Kai Leitemo, Øistein Røisland, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Monetary Policy Rules and The Exchange Rate Channel

Applied Financial Economics 16(15) p. 1165-1170

Article Øistein Røisland, Ragnar Torvik (2004)

Exhange rate versus inflation targetin: a theory of output fluctuations in traded and no-traded sectors

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 13(3) p. 265-285

Article Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Predator or Prey? Parasitic enterprises in economic development

European Economic Review 47(2) p. 79-98

Article Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Finanspolitikk, inflasjon og valutakurs

Økonomisk forum 57(8) p. 10-14

Article Øistein Røisland, Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Optimum currency areas under inflation targeting

Open Economies Review 14(2) p. 99-118

Article Halvor Mehlum, karl ove moene, Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Destructive Creativity

Nordisk tidskrift för politisk ekonomi 29(1) p. 77-83

Article Halvor Mehlum, karl ove moene, Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Predator or Prey? Parasitic Enterprises in Economic Development

European Economic Review 47 p. 275-294

Article Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Destructive Creativity

Nordic Journal of Political Economy (NOPEC) 29(1) p. 77-83

Article Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Interactions between Agriculture and Industry: Theoretical Analysis of the Consequences of Discriminating Agriculture i

Review of Development Economics 7(1) p. 138-151

Article Ragnar Torvik, Kai Leitemo, Øistein Røisland (2002)

Time inconsistency and the exchange rate channel of monetary policy

? 104(3) p. 391-397

Chapter Ragnar Torvik, james a robinson, thierry verdier (2002)

Political Foundations of the Resource Curse

CEPR Discussion Paper 3422

Article Ragnar Torvik, Halvor Mehlum, karl ove moene (2002)

Plunder & Protection Inc

Journal of Peace Research 39(4) p. 447-459

Article Ragnar Torvik (2002)

Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare

Journal of Development Economics 67 p. 455-470

Chapter Ragnar Torvik, james a robinson (2002)

White Elephants

CEPR Discussion Paper 3459

Chapter Ragnar Torvik, Halvor Mehlum, Jørn Rattsø (2002)

Trade liberalization and investment response in Zimbabwe

Macroeconomic and structural adjustment policies in Zimbabwe p. 195-220

Article Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2002)

Plunder & Protection Inc

Journal of Peace Research 39(4) p. 447-459

When the state fails to supply basic security and protection of property, violent entrepreneurs not only seize the opportunity of plundering, but some also enter the protection business and provide protection against plunderers. This uncoordinated division of labor is advantageous for the entire group of violent entrepreneurs. Hence, in weak states a situation may arise where a large number of violent entrepreneurs can operate side by side as plunderers and protectors squeezing the producers from both sides. The problem reached new levels at the end of the cold war. As military forces were demobilized without civilian jobs to go to, many countries got an oversupply of qualified violent people for crime, warfare and private protection. In this market for extortion the entry of new violent entrepreneurs enhances the profitability of them all. The supply of violence creates its own demand; an externality of violence that is detrimental to the development in poor countries.

Article Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2002)

Market-based extortion

Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section in Comparative Politics APSA-CP 13(1)

Article Ragnar Torvik, Kai Leitemo, Øistein Røisland (2002)

Time inconsistency and the exchange rate channel of monetary policy

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 104(3) p. 391-397

Article Ragnar Torvik (2001)

Learning by doing and the Dutch disease

European Economic Review 45 p. 285-306

This paper develops a model of learning by doing and the Dutch disease that extends the earlier literature in two ways. First, it is assumed that both the traded and the non-traded sector can contribute to learing. Second, it is assumed that there are learning spillovers between the sectors. It is shown that within such a model a foreign exchange gift results in a real exchange rate depreciation in the long run, due to a shift in the contrast to standard models of the Dutch disease, production and productivity in both sectors may go up of down. The conditions for the different cases are worked out.

Chapter Ragnar Torvik, Øistein Røisland (2000)

Pengepolitisk regime og konkurranseutsatt sektor

Perspektiver på pengepolitikken p. 187-226

Article Ragnar Torvik (2000)

Kommentarer til Nasjonalbudsjettet 2001

Sosialøkonomen 54(7) p. 20-22

Chapter Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (1999)

The Macroeconomics of Foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa: Dutch Disease Effects Reconsidered

Foreign Aid: New Perspectives p. 255-274

Article Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (1998)

Zimbabwean trade liberalization : ex post evaluation (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 84(1998))

Cambridge Journal of Economics 22 p. 325-346

Article Rob Davies, Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (1998)

Short-run consequences of trade liberalization : a computable general equilibrium model of Zimbabwe (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 85(1998))

Journal of Policy Modeling 20(3) p. 305-333

Article Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (1998)

Economic openness, trade restrictions and external shocks : modelling short run effects in Sub-Saharan Africa (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 86(1998))

Economic Modelling 15 p. 257-286

Article Ragnar Torvik (1997)

Agricultural supply-led industrialization : a macromodel with sub-Saharan African characteristics (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 74(1997))

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 8 p. 351-370

Article Ragnar Torvik (1997)

Real exchange rate dynamics and trade liberalization : the case of mulitple tariffs and unemployment (Reprint series / NTNU ; nr 78(1997))

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development 6(3) p. 329-344

Shows 5 of 283 publication(s)

Feature article Ola Kvaløy, Jarle Møen, Ragnar Torvik (2023)

Unyansert om skatt

Feature article Linda Nøstbakken, Ragnar Torvik (2023)

Lakseskatt som på Færøyene er en dårlig idé

28.03.2023

Participation in media Silje Haus-Reve, Marianne Dahl, Ragnar Torvik, Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, Ola Kvaløy (2022)

WAR ECONOMY The war in Ukraine has dramatically changed the outlook for the world economy. In a war economy the public obligation is to do what is necessary: to support the military effort to be able to protect and defend the territory under attract – leaving their everyday economy behind.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the sweeping sanctions the US and Europe have imposed on Russia in response, have triggered economic disruptions at four levels: direct, blowback, spillover, and systemic. But what are the long-term consequences of this disruptions war economy? How does it effect trade and do sanctions work as sticks for the development of the war?

Interview Ragnar Torvik (2017)

25 prosent børsvekst med Trump: – Jeg er egentlig veldig bekymra

Feature article Espen Rasmus Moen, Ragnar Torvik (2017)

Oljefondet ut av oljeaksjer

Virker underlig

Interview Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Advarer mot «billige» lån

Interview Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Overflodens paradoks

Shows 5 of 132 publication(s)

Commentary Ola Kvaløy, Jarle Møen, Ragnar Torvik (2023)

Vi bør ikke tukle med skjermingsreglene

Dagens næringsliv

Lecture Ragnar Torvik, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad, Ingrid Hoem Sjursen (2023)

Findings and recommendations from the report of the Norwegian Expert Committee on Tax Reform

Tax for Development Seminar Series at CMI

Presentation by Ragnar Torvik. Organized and moderated by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Ingrid Hoem Sjursen

Report Halvor Mehlum, Gisle James Natvik, Ragnar Torvik (2021)

The Inefficient Combination: Competitive Markets, Free Entry, and Democracy

Centre for Applied Macroeconomics and Commodity Prices (CAMP)

We show that under fairly general conditions, the combination of (i) competitive markets, (ii) free entry, and (iii) democracy is inconsistent with allocative efficiency. This fundamental impossibility result, which has not been derived before, holds whenever not only prices, but also policy, responds to factor allocations. We develop a theory where agents enter an occupation (more generally, enter an economic activity) and thereafter make a policy decision. Thus, each voter's self interest becomes endogenous to the entry decision. In our baseline model, the policy instrument that citizens decide upon is simply taxation. Workers in occupations whose services are in high demand by the government have an incentive to vote for high taxes. Voters in occupations whose services are in low demand by the government have an incentive to vote for low taxes. We show that the socially efficient size of the public sector cannot be sustained in equilibrium, despite free entry into occupations. We generalize our theory, and show how our impossibility result extends well beyond the baseline model. We also discuss how departing from competitive markets may affect equilibrium outcomes. Our analysis implies that when assessing causes and consequences of factor allocations, it is key to acknowledge how allocations affect not only prices, but also policies.

Report Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik (2020)

Macroeconomics in the time of the Corona

Lave oljepriser?

Statkraft Konferanse

Master thesis Linda Stokke, Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Natural resource depletion and the resource curse

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

This thesis studies the relationship between natural resources and economic wealth, in two parts. Previous studies have found a negative relationship between natural resources and economic wealth, a phenomenon known as the curse of natural resources. Later studies reject the resource curse, in its simplest form, as their findings show a positive relationship when measuring economic wealth by GDP levels instead of growth. The argument is that the inclusion of initial GDP, when using GDP growth as measurement, will result in biased estimates due to the short time horizon. However, a third group of studies advocates the existence of a resource curse conditional upon institutional quality. In this case, resource endowment only affects the economic welfare negatively if the quality of institutions is sufficiently bad. In this thesis the measurement of economic wealth is further expanded. Taking into account that extraction of resources is a negative flow of the nation’s wealth gives a better understating of the change in welfare, and removes some of the positive bias of exploiting natural resources on economic wealth. An empirical analysis, utilizing data on a total of 263 countries in year 2000, is conducted to find whether the resource curse is still rejected when including depletion of natural resources to the analysis. None of the estimation methods or model specifications in this thesis are able to confirm the existence of a resource curse, and in its simplest form the rejection is supported. Also the conditional resource curse is rejected by the data material, meaning that countries with poor institutions do not seem to have a more negative, or less positive, impact of natural resources on GDP levels adjusted for depletion of natural resources than countries with good institutions. However, be aware of the limitations of the data, in particular the absence of a truly exogenous variable of resource endowment.

Master thesis Isabel Puente, Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Oljepris, arbeidsledighet og produktivitet

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson, thierry verdier (2015)

The political economy of public income volatility: with an application to the resource curse

Oxford OXCARRE Seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Natural Resources and Endogenous Institutions

6th INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON “ECONOMICS OF GLOBAL INTERACTIONS

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Natural Resources and Institutions

REPOA Conference 2015

Master thesis Erik Bredal Pryhn, Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Krasjer Kina? : en drøfting av Kinas situasjon og fremtidsutsikter med utgangspunkt i Lewis-modellen

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Prisfall, produktivitet, og perspektiver

Norskehavskonferansen 2015

Master thesis Ragnar Torvik, Caroline Charlotte Espegren (2015)

Pengepolitikk i råvareeksporterende land

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Master thesis David Marius Jones, Ragnar Torvik (2015)

Statlige pensjonsfond og offentlige realinvesteringer : hvordan bør store nasjonale finansformuer forvaltes?

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

I denne oppgaven ser jeg på optimal bruk av statlige finansformuer gjennom en teoretisk økonomisk modell med flere generasjoner. Fremtidig produktivitet påvirkes av learning by doing og offentlige investeringer, og en samfunnsplanlegger ønsker å maksimere dagens og fremtidige generasjoners nytte. Finansformuen kan brukes på pengeoverføringer og realinvesteringer. Modellen finner at optimal bruk av finansformue i periode 1 er større når myndighetene åpner for å gjøre realinvesteringer. Når realinvesteringer gjøres med varer/tjenester fra konkurranseutsatt sektor får vi det høyeste nivået av forbruk og nytte for dagens og fremtidige generasjoner.

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2014)

Oljeavhengighet

Norges Bank

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2014)

Natural resources and endogenous institutions

Natural Resources and Governancs

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2014)

Oljeprisfall: Pengepolitikk i en oljeøkonomi

Norges Bank

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, Lars-Erik Borge, pernille parmer (2014)

Local natural resource curse

Department Seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, Lars-Erik Borge, pernille parmer (2014)

Local natural resource curse?

Department Seminar

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2014)

Krasjer Kina?

Norges Bank

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2013)

Natural resources and institutions

DIAL Development Conference

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2013)

Chinas savings multiplier

Department seminar Uppsala University

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2013)

Chinas savings multiplier

department seminar University of Gothenburg

Master thesis Herman Westrum Thorsen, Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Ressurser og revolusjon: En økonomisk modellering av valget mellom demokrati og konflikt tilpasset den arabiske våren

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Utviklingstrekk i verdensøkonomien – implikasjoner for Norge

Julelunch

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Når bygger oljen landet? Og når gjør den det ikke?

Forkser til lunch

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Internasjonale erfaringer med håndtering av en stor oljeformue

Holdenutvalget

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson, daron acemoglu (2012)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

European Development Research Network conference

Master thesis Anders Rolid Hagen, Gunnar Bårdsen, Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Diversifiseringseffekten mellom eurosonens aksje- og obligasjonsmarked: En empirisk analyse av korrelasjon

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Når bygger oljen landet? Og når gjør den det ikke?

Forsker til lunch

Conference lecture James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, daron acemoglu (2012)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Department seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Transparency and accountability in resource rich countries

UNDERSTANDING AND AVOIDING THE OIL CURSE IN THE ARAB WORLD

Report Ragnar Torvik, Anders Vredin, Bjørn Roger Wilhelmsen (2012)

Norges Bank Watch 2012 An Independent Evaluation of Monetary Policy in Norway

Handelshøyskolen BI

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson, daron acemoglu (2012)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Instituttseminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, Egil Matsen, Gisle J. Natvik (2012)

Petro Populism

Department Seminar

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Utviklingstrekk i verdensøkonomien – implikasjoner for Norge

Julelunch

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Når bygger oljen landet? Og når gjør den det ikke?

Forsker til lunch

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2012)

Verdensøkonomien og trondheimsregionen på lang sikt

Manifestasjon 2012

Master thesis Randi Hals Hellevik, Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Olje og utvikling: En politisk og økonomisk analyse av Aserbajdsjan.

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Master thesis May June Johansen, Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Norsk eksportvekst. En analyse av komparative fortrinn

Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Master thesis Gry Aagaard, Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Betydningen av den "politiske avsettelseseffekten" for Kinas industrialiseringsprosess: Ny anvendelse av modellen til Acemoglu og Robinson (2006). "Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective"

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Tilburg conference on development economics

Master thesis Kristine Mygland Bakken, Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Det nordiske kraftmarkedet: Priseffekter ved en forsterkning av sentralnettet

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

OXCARRE conference 2011, Oxford University

Master thesis Eirik Nøren Stenersen, Ragnar Torvik (2011)

On the causes of the conditional resource curse

Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Petro Populism

LACEA 2011 Conference Santiago

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

Department seminar Universiity of Bern

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

BI department seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Endogenous Presidentialism

Universidad Los Andes department seminar

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Hvorfor sparer Kina så mye?

Høstkonferansen 2011

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2011)

Why do voters dismantle checks and balances?

ESOP seminar

Master thesis Line Furseth Bjørk, Ragnar Torvik (2010)

Kraftinntekter - ein trussel for den kommunale effektiviteten?

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Master thesis Rune Borgan Reiling, Ragnar Torvik (2010)

Hvorfor har Nigeria blitt rammet av ressursforbannelsen?

NTNU

Master thesis Anders Dalby, Ragnar Torvik (2010)

En empirisk analyse av passiv og aktiv forvaltning. Oppnår norske fondsforvalter meravkastning?

NTNU

Commentary Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik (2009)

Bankpakken er subsidiering

Dagens næringsliv

Lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik (2009)

Bankpakker på norsk

Verdipapirmarkedsforum

Lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik (2009)

Bankpakker- en sosialdemokratisk gavepakke til finanskapitalen?

Esop fabler

Master thesis Aleksander Tysseng, Ragnar Torvik (2009)

Determinants of Norwegian Outward FDI to Developing Countries

NTNU,

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Gisle J. Natvik (2009)

The strategy of campaign promises

Macrochair Conference

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Gisle J. Natvik (2009)

Petro-populism

Seminar

Report Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2008)

Endogenous Presidentialism

National Bureau of Economic Research, USA

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2008)

Hvorfor er skatteparadiser mer skadelig for utviklingsland?

Offentlig utvalg om skatteparadiser

Conference lecture James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2008)

When is democracy an equilibrium?

George Mason University

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2008)

Endogenous Presidentialism

Northwestern University

Master thesis Lars Ekern, Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Naturressurser, prisfluktuasjoner og finansiell åpenhet

Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Why do some resource rich countries succeed while others do not

Oxcarre launch conference

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Rikdommens paradoks - relevant for Norge?

29. nasjonale forskermøte for økonomer

Master thesis Marianne Lucie Legouy Kvaal, Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Naturressurseer og reformmotstand

Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Rikdommens Paradoks

Seminar Finansdepartementet

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2007)

Formuesforvaltning i oljeøkonomier - internasjonale erfaringer

Valutaseminar

Report Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2006)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

National Bureau of Economic Research.

Conference lecture James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Seminar

Conference lecture James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Seminar

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2006)

Utviklingstrekk i verdensøkonomien: Konsekvenser for Norge

Årsmøte Kommunale Pensjonskasser

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2006)

Globalization - Implications for Norway

Norges Banks Etterutdanningsseminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik (2006)

When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia

Instituttseminar

Conference lecture James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Seminar

Report James A. Robinson, Ragnar Torvik, Mario Chacón (2006)

When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"

National Bureau of Economic Research

Report Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson, Mario Chacón (2006)

When is Democracy an Equilibrium?: Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia

Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi, NTNU

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2006)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Public Economics Seminar

Report Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson, Mario Chacón (2006)

When is Democracy an Equilibrium? Theory and Evidence from Colombia's La Violencia

Centre for Economic Policy Research

Conference lecture James A. Robinson, Mario Chacón, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

When is democracy an equilibrium?: Theory and evidence from Colombia's "La Violencia"

Prio Seminar

Article Kai Leitemo, Øistein Røisland, Ragnar Torvik (2006)

Should Central Banks care about Traded and non-Traded Sectors?

IUP Journal of Bank Management 5(1)

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Tommy Sveen (2005)

Savers, spenders, and fiscal policy in a small open economy

Norwegian-German Seminar on Public Economics

Report Ragnar Torvik, Halvor Mehlum, karl ove moene (2005)

Cursed by resources or institutions?

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Natural resource abundant countries constitute both growth losers and growth winners, and the main difference between the success cases and the cases of failure lays in the quality of institutions. With grabber friendly institutions more natural resources push aggregate income down, while with producer friendly institutions more natural resources increase income. Such a theory finds strong support in data. A key question we also discuss is if resources in addition alter the quality of institutions. When that is the case, countries with bad institutions suffer a double resource curse - as the deterioration of institutions strenghtens the negative effect of more natural resources.

Report Silje Aslaksen, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

A theory of civil conflict and democracy in rentier states

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

The effects of resource rents on the political equilibrium have been studied in two main types of models. The first tradition employs models of conflict, and studies how resource rents affect the intensity and duration of civil conflict. The second tradition employs political economy models, where resource rents affect the political equilibrium because the costs and benefits of buying votes change. Although providing much insight, a primary disadvantage of these two model traditions is that they have little to say about when democracy emerges, and about when conflict emerges. This question is simply determined by the type of model one chooses to study. Yet an important empirical literature suggests that a main effect of resource rents may be exactly that it affects the political choice between democracy and civil conflict. In this paper, by integrating the earlier model traditions, we suggest the simplest possible framework we can think of to study this choice. The institutional outcome in our theory is consequently endogenous. We show how factors such as resource rents, the extent of electoral competition, and productivity affect economic and political equilibria, and discuss how our approach, mechanisms and results differ from the earlier theories.

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2005)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

European Economic Assiciation

Conference lecture Silje Aslaksen, Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Conflict and democracy in rentier states

Third ECPR General Conference

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Globale Ubalanser

KLP Fondsforvaltning seminar

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2005)

Utviklingstrekk i verdensøkonomien - konsekvenser for Norge

Kredittseminaret 2005

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2005)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Department seminar, Tilburg University

Report Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2005)

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop a political economy model where politicians cannot commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to vote for them. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the outcomes of elections. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future.

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2004)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

Department seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2004)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

Development Seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2004)

White Elephants

Nasjonalt Forskermøte for Økonomer

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2004)

A Political Economy Theory of the Soft Budget Constraint

Department Seminar

Lecture Ragnar Torvik (2004)

Kommentarer til Norges Banks årsrapport

Pengepolitikken i 2003

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, James A. Robinson (2004)

White Elephants

Macroeconomic effects of natural resources

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, Silje Aslaksen (2004)

Conflict and Democracy in Rentier States

CSCW Prio konferanse

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Tommy Sveen (2004)

Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy

Instituttseminar

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Tommy Sveen (2004)

Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy

Institute seminar

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene (2004)

Institutions and the resource curse

CSCW Prio

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik (2004)

Optimal Dutch disease

Workshop on resource curse

Conference lecture Ragnar Torvik, Halvor Mehlum, Karl Moene (2004)

Institutions and the resource curse

DEGIT IX

Report Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik, Ted Miguel (2004)

Rainfall, Poverty and Crime in 19th Century Germany, MEMORANDUM No 04/2004

Universitetet i Oslo

Report Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Tommy Sveen (2004)

Savers, Spenders and Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy

Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet

This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policy in an open economy. We extend the savers-spenders theory of Mankiw (2000) to a small open economy with endogenous labor supply. We first show how the Dornbusch (1983) consumption-based real interest rate for open economies is modified when labor supply is endogenous. We then turn to the effects of fiscal policy when there are both savers and spenders. With this heterogeneity taken into account, tax cuts have a short-run contractionary effect on domestic production, and increased public spending has a short-run expansionary effect. Although consistent with recent empirical work, this result contrasts with those of most other theoretical models. Transitory changes in demand have permanent real effects in our model, and we discuss the implications for real exchange-rate dynamics. We also show how "rational" savers may magnify or dampen the responses of "irrational" spenders, and show how this is related to features of the utility functions.

Conference lecture Egil Matsen, Ragnar Torvik, Tommy Sveen (2004)

Savers, spenders and fiscal policy in a small open economy

Seminar

Report Ragnar Torvik (2003)

Realvalutakurs og innfasing av oljeinntekter

Norges Bank

Report Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik, Karl-Ove Moene (2003)

Parasites; Memo 16/2003

Universitetet i Oslo

Report Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2002)

Plunder & Protections Inc

Økonomisk institutt

Report Halvor Mehlum, Karl-Ove Moene, Ragnar Torvik (2002)

Institutions and the resource curse

Økonomisk Institutt, Univ. i Oslo

Report Karl-Ove Moene, Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik (2000)

Predator or Prey? Parasitic enterprises in economic development

Department of Economics,

In many developing and transition economies Mafia-like activities are rampant. Extortion and other forms of predation lower profitability in private businesses and distort investment incentives. Incorporated in a model of industrialization, bimodal club convergence may result. Economies may get stuck in a Predators' Club characterized by a vicious circle of poverty and predation. Societies with a low flow of new entrepreneurs are especially vulnerable to predation and never get out of this club. Poor societies with high flow of new entrepreneurs, however, may grow out of the trap and join the rich Producers' Club.

Report Karl-Ove Moene, Halvor Mehlum, Ragnar Torvik (1999)

Crime induced poverty traps

Department of Economics, University of Oslo

A dynamic macroeconomic model is used to analyse the interaction between economic growth, unemployment and crime. The model exhibits increasing returns to aggregate capital due to endogenous crime. Capital investments increases the demand for labor and reduces the extent of criminal activity. Reduced criminal activity in turn increases the return on capital. As this linkage works via the aggregate labor demand the increasing return is external to the individual firm. Hence, the economy has possibly two equilibria: a) One where unemployment and crime rates are high and capital stock and income is low. and b) one where unemployment and crime rates are low and capital stock and income is high. Equilibrium a) has the characteristics of a poverty trap. The existence of a poverty trap has important implications for the speed of reform implementation. A too abrupt reform may throw the economy into a vicious circle of increasing crime and unempoyment

Working paper Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (1997)

Dynamic Interactions Between Agriculture and industry, Theoretical Analysis of the Consequences of Discriminating Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa

NTNU, Institutt for sosialøkonomi

Working paper Jørn Rattsø, Ragnar Torvik (1996)

Trade liberalization in Zimbabwe : ex post evaluation

Inst. f. sosialøkonomi

Academic Degrees
Year	Academic Department	Degree
1995	University of Oslo	Ph.D Dr. Polit.
1990	University of Oslo	Master Cand. Oecon

Work Experience
Year	Employer	Job Title
2003 - Present	BI Norwegian Business School	Adjunct Professor
1998 - Present	Norwegian University of Science and Technology	Professor
1995 - 1998	Central Bank of Norway	N/A
1990 - 1995	University of Oslo	N/A