Employee Profile

Leon Bogdan Stacescu

Associate Professor

Department of Finance

Room number B4Y-064
Phone +4746410519
E-mail bogdan.stacescu@bi.no

Area of Expertise

Banking
Corporate finance
Corporate Governance
ESG
Family Business
Financial economics

Publications

Shows 5 of 6 publication(s)

Article Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu, Line Almli, Kathrine Søndergaard (2019)

When Does the Family Govern the Family Firm?

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54(5) p. 2085-2117 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109018001102

We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.

Article Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2019)

Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts

Journal of Corporate Finance 58(October) p. 583-604 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.07.003

We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by dividend payout. We study a large and clean regulatory shock in Norway that increases the dividend tax rate for all individuals from 0% to 28%. We find that dividends drop less the higher the potential shareholder conflict, suggesting that dividend policy trades off tax and agency considerations. The average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points when the conflict potential is low, but by only 18 points when it is high. These lower dividends cannot be explained by higher salaries to shareholders or diverse liquidity needs. We also observe a strong increase in indirect ownership of high-conflict firms through tax-exempt holding companies and suggest policy implications for intercorporate dividend taxation.

Chapter Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)

The under-researched family firm: New insights from unique Norwegian data

At the Forefront, Looking Ahead: Research-Based Answers to Contemporary Uncertainties of Management p. 99-118 Doi: https://doi.org/10.18261/9788215031583-2018-08

Article Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)

Shareholder conflicts and dividends

Review of Finance 22(5) p. 1807-1840 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfx046

We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential). Such minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority shareholder investment. These results suggest that controlling shareholders voluntarily use dividends to reduce agency conflicts and build trust, rather than opportunistically preferring private benefits to dividends. We show that our results are unlikely to arise from liquidity or signaling motives.

Article Artashes Karapetyan, Bogdan Stacescu (2014)

Does information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device?

Journal of Banking & Finance 43(1) p. 48-57 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.02.010

Information sharing and collateral are both devices that help banks reduce the cost of adverse selection. We examine whether they are likely to be used as substitutes (information sharing reduces the need for collateral) or complements. We show that information sharing via a credit bureaus and registers may increase, rather than decrease, the role of collateral: it can be required in loans to high-risk borrowers in cases when it is not in the absence of information sharing. Higher adverse selection makes the use of collateral more likely both with and without information sharing. Our results are in line with recent empirical evidence.

Article Artashes Karapetyan, Bogdan Stacescu (2013)

Information Sharing and Information Acquisition in Credit Markets

Review of Finance 18(4) p. 1583-1615 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rft031

We examine the effect of information sharing via credit bureaus or credit registers on banks’ incentives to collect information about their borrowers. Information asymmetries have been identified as an important source of bank profits, and sharing knowledge about borrowers can reduce those rents. Despite that, we show that banks’ incentives to collect information actually increase in the presence of information sharing. The reason is that when hard, standardized information is shared, banks’ incentives to invest in soft, nonverifiable information increase. The result can be more accurate lending decisions and improved welfare

Shows 5 of 7 publication(s)

Feature article Janis Berzins, Marcus Ribe, Bogdan Stacescu, Kasper Sveistrup (2025)

Academic Degrees
Year	Academic Department	Degree
2008	University of Zurich	Ph.D.
2003	Central European University	M.A.
2000	Al. I. Cuza University	B.A.

Work Experience
Year	Employer	Job Title
2008 - Present	BI Norwegian Business School	Associate Professor

BI Business Review articles:

BI Business Review

Long-term banks are good

Does it matter if banks offer one-shot lending or if they are concerned with establishing long-term relationships? It does, according to a study conducted by BI Norwegian Business School.

Leon Bogdan Stacescu

Area of Expertise

Publications

When Does the Family Govern the Family Firm?

Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts

The under-researched family firm: New insights from unique Norwegian data

Shareholder conflicts and dividends

Does information sharing reduce the role of collateral as a screening device?

Information Sharing and Information Acquisition in Credit Markets

Oppdrett er blitt mindre attraktivt

Innlegg: Overselger studie om formuesskatt

Når er en familie aktiv eier?

Makt og styring i familiebedrifter

Majoritetseiere beskytter minoriteten

Høyt utbytte gir mindre konflikter

Høyt utbytte - lavt konfliktnivå

An Overview of Norwegian Firms

Illiquid Owners and Firm Behavior

Family firms and employment

Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms

Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms

Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms

Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms

Lending Technologies and Lending Relationships

The Family Firm Premium and Family Characteristics: Evidence from Population Data

Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts

The Performance Premium of Family Firms: New Evidence from Population Data

The Family Firm Premium

Illiquid Shareholders and Firm Cash Flows

Illiquid shareholders and real firm effects: The personal wealth tax and financial constraints

What Explains the Large Family Firm Premium?

Illiquid Shareholders and Firm Cash Flows

The Governance and Finance of Norwegian Family Firms: Main Characteristics of the Population

Shareholder Conflicts and Dividends

Dividends and Taxes: The Moderating Role of Agency Conflicts

Speech on corporate finance and governance in private Norwegian firms. Oslo, Norway

Lending Relationships and Lending Technologies

Dividends and Taxes: The Moderating Role of Agency Conflicts

Collateral and Informed Screening During Banking Relationships

Collateral and Informed Screening During Banking Relationships

The governance of family firms

Collateral and Informed Screening During Banking Relationships

Collateral and Informed Screening During Banking Relationships

Dividends, Taxes, and AgencyCosts

When does the family govern the family firm?

When does the family govern the family firm?

Housing Consumption Decisions: Household Assets and Liabilities

Dividends, taxes, and agency costs

Dividends, taxes and agency costs

Stockholder conflicts and dividends

Collateral and repeated lending

Dividends and Stockholder Conflicts: A Comprehensive Test for Private Firms

Ownership, Taxes and Dividends

Dividends and stockholder conflicts: A comprehensive test for private firms

Dividends and Stockholder Conflicts: A Comprehensive Test for Private Firms

Ownership, Taxes and Dividends

Illiquid stockholders and firm payout

Tax concerns and agency concerns in dividend policy: Holding companies as a separating device

BI Business Review articles:

Long-term banks are good