Anton Gollwitzer

Nature Human Behaviour 7 p. 484-501 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-022-01517-1

How well can social scientists predict societal change, and what processes underlie their predictions? To answer these questions, we ran two forecasting tournaments testing the accuracy of predictions of societal change in domains commonly studied in the social sciences: ideological preferences, political polarization, life satisfaction, sentiment on social media, and gender–career and racial bias. After we provided them with historical trend data on the relevant domain, social scientists submitted pre-registered monthly forecasts for a year (Tournament 1; N = 86 teams and 359 forecasts), with an opportunity to update forecasts on the basis of new data six months later (Tournament 2; N = 120 teams and 546 forecasts). Benchmarking forecasting accuracy revealed that social scientists’ forecasts were on average no more accurate than those of simple statistical models (historical means, random walks or linear regressions) or the aggregate forecasts of a sample from the general public (N = 802). However, scientists were more accurate if they had scientific expertise in a prediction domain, were interdisciplinary, used simpler models and based predictions on prior data.

Social & Personality Psychology Compass 17(8) Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12766

Preventive health practices have been crucial to mitigating viral spread during the COVID-19 pandemic. In two studies, we examined whether intellectual humility—openness to one's existing knowledge being inaccurate—related to greater engagement in preventive health practices (social distancing, handwashing, mask-wearing). In Study 1, we found that intellectually humble people were more likely to engage in COVID-19 preventive practices. Additionally, this link was driven by intellectually humble people's tendency to adopt information from data-driven sources (e.g., medical experts) and greater feelings of responsibility over the outcomes of COVID-19. In Study 2, we found support for these relationships over time (2 weeks). Additionally, Study 2 showed that the link between intellectual humility and preventive practices was driven by a greater tendency to adopt data-driven information when encountering it, rather than actively seeking out such information. These findings reveal the promising role of intellectual humility in making well-informed decisions during public health crises.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672221131378

We propose that deviancy aversion—people’s domain-general discomfort toward the distortion of patterns (repeated forms or models)—contributes to the strength and prevalence of social norms in society. Five studies (N = 2,390) supported this hypothesis. In Study 1, individuals’ deviancy aversion, for instance, their aversion toward broken patterns of simple geometric shapes, predicted negative affect toward norm violations (affect), greater self-reported norm following (behavior), and judging norms as more valuable (belief). Supporting generalizability, deviancy aversion additionally predicted greater conformity on accuracy-orientated estimation tasks (Study 2), adherence to physical distancing norms during COVID-19 (Study 3), and increased following of fairness norms (Study 4). Finally, experimentally heightening deviancy aversion increased participants’ negative affect toward norm violations and self-reported norm behavior, but did not convincingly heighten belief-based norm judgments (Study 5). We conclude that a human sensitivity to pattern distortion functions as a low-level affective process that promotes and maintains social norms in society.

Personality and Individual Differences Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2022.111606

Journal of experimental psychology. General Doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001136

Developmental Psychology Doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0001378

Developmental Science 25(4) Doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/desc.13240

Research investigating the early emergence of racial prejudice has been largely limited to contexts in which racial prejudice is most likely to emerge—multiracial societies that have pronounced racial inequality (e.g., United States, South Africa). The present study assessed whether pro-White racial bias is also early emerging in a homogenous Black community that has little exposure to modern media and where children presumably experience less overt discrimination than in past samples. Black African children (N = 214) between 5- and 12-years-old living in rural Uganda exhibited substantial pro-White racial bias, preferring White over Black children 78% of the time. Ugandan children also judged White children as higher status than Black children, and these status judgments predicted their degree of pro-White bias. Our results indicate that pro-White racial biases can emerge even in a homogenous Black community and that, in some contexts, minimal status cues can be sufficient for the early development of racial prejudice.

Journal of experimental psychology. General 151(11) p. 2846-2878 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001219

Examining the epistemic and social–cognitive structures underlying fanaticism, radicalization, and extremism should shed light on how these harmful phenomena develop and can be prevented. In nine studies (N = 3,277), we examined whether discordant knowing—felt knowledge about something that one perceives as opposed by most others—underlies fanaticism. Across multifaceted approaches, experimentally manipulating participants’ views to fall under this framework (e.g., “I am certain about X, but most other people think X is unknowable or wrong”) heightened indicators of fanaticism, including aggression, determined ignorance, and wanting to join extreme groups in the service of these views. Additional analyses found that this effect occurs via threat-based mechanisms (Studies 1–7), can be intervened on to prevent fanaticism (Study 2), is conditional on the potency of opposition (Study 3), differs from effects on extremism (Study 4), and extends to mental representations of the self (Study 5). Generalizing these findings to real-world contexts, inducing participants with discordant knowledge about the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and the morality of abortion heightened fanaticism regarding these topics (Studies 6 and 7). Additionally, antivaccine fanatics and followers of a real-world fanatical religious group exhibited greater discordant knowing than nonfanatical individuals (Studies 8 and 9). Collectively, the present studies suggest that a specific epistemic structure—discordant knowing—underlies fanaticism, and further, highlight the potential of investigating constructs like fanaticism from an epistemic social cognitive perspective.

Current Opinion in Psychology 46 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2022.101393

We examine conspiracy beliefs in the context of misplaced certainty—certainty that is unsubstantiated by one's own or others' skepticism. A conspiracy theory held with misplaced certainty may entail, for instance, “knowing” or feeling certain that secret actors are plotting against society yet acknowledging that this claim lacks evidence or is opposed by most other people. Recent work on misplaced certainty suggests that misplaced certainty predicts and results in antisocial outcomes, including fanatical behavior in terms of aggression, determined ignorance, and adherence to extreme groups. Introducing the concept of misplaced certainty to theory and research on conspiracy theories may help identify when and why conspiracy theories lead to deleterious behavioral outcomes.

Social Psychological and Personality Science Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506211018132

Nature Human Behaviour Doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-00977-7

Behavioral Science & Policy (BSP) Doi: https://doi.org/10.1353/bsp.2020.0022

Personality and Individual Differences Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109810

Journal of experimental psychology. General Doi: https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000682

Journal of Language and Social Psychology Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X19883898

PNAS Doi: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1911460116

Social Psychology Doi: https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000368

Cognition Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2019.04.029

PLOS ONE Doi: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194101

European Journal of Social Psychology Doi: https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2565

Social Psychology Doi: https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000332

Psychiatry Research Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2018.02.050

Nature Human Behaviour Doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0243-x

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2016.12.006

Cognitive Therapy and Research Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-016-9799-4

Psychology of Music Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0305735615626519

Social Psychological and Personality Science Doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613476307

Motivation and Emotion Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11031-011-9222-0