Erling Steigum
Professor emeritus
Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi
Professor emeritus
Institutt for samfunnsøkonomi
Kapittel Erling Steigum, Øystein Thøgersen (2015)
Kapittel Erling Steigum (2011)
Kapittel Erling Steigum (2009)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2008)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2006)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2006)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2005)
Kapittel Erling Steigum (2004)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2004)
Artikkel Erling Steigum, Erling Steigum, Øystein Thøgersen (2003)
Kapittel Hans Fehr, Erling Steigum, A. Fossati, W. Wiegard (2002)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2001)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (1999)
Kapittel Erling Steigum, Arne Jon Isachsen, Ole Bjørn Røste (1999)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (1999)
Kapittel Erling Steigum, Arne Jon Isachsen, Ole Bjørn Røste (1999)
Kapittel Erling Steigum, Carl Gjersem, Alan J. Auerbach (1999)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (1999)
Lærebok Erling Steigum, Hans-Martin Straume (2022)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2022)
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2020)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2019)
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2019)
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2018)
Lærebok Erling Steigum (2018)
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2017)
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2016)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2015)
Artikkel Erling Steigum, Lars-Erik Borge, Siri Pettersen, Strandenes (2015)
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2014)
Rapport Erling Steigum, Øystein Thøgersen (2013)
This paper draws the line between the Norwegian boom-bust cycle and crises in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the succeeding institutional and structural reforms and the strong macroeconomic performance and stability of the last two decades. The systemic banking crisis and speculative attack on the Norwegian krone in the early 1990s were the last in a series of blows to Norway’s macroeconomic policy regime. In addition to the recession after 1988, the underlying growth potential of the Mainland economy was also weak, despite financial deregulation and the gains in competitiveness. The large oil price fall in the mid-1980s had demonstrated the risk of uncertain oil revenues as an important source of income to the government. The political awareness of an economic crisis paved the way for a series of structural reforms and changes in the macroeconomic policy regime. Some of these reforms were implemented quickly, such as a tax reform, an energy market reform and a new incomes policy framework. In 2001 a new framework for monetary and fiscal policy was put in place, involving a flexible exchange rate and inflation targeting, as well as a new fiscal policy rule designed to facilitate consumption smoothing and a build-up of a sovereign wealth fund. We discuss possible reasons why Norway’s political system has been able to learn from previous policy failures and reach the necessary consensus, and determination, to implement institutional and structural reforms in economic policy.
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri Pettersen Strandenes (2013)
Rapport Erling Steigum (2013)
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have become more numerous after the turn of the century, but the largest ones have been set up by non-democratic countries in the Middle East and Asia. Norway´s large SWF is an exception. In democratic societies, SWFs have been established in Australia, New Zealand and Ireland to pre-fund pensions in response to expected population ageing. The management of Norway’s Fund has been index-based, with only a very small role played by active management. In most other SWFs around the world, active management is much more important, and the cost of management is much higher than in Norway. The academic literature suggests that although active management could be worthwhile, many empirical studies do not support the belief that external active management generates excess after-fee returns. An empirical study of active management in Norges Bank finds that 70 percent of the (small) active management results from equity can be explained by other systematic risk factors than market risk. There is no strong consensus about how a global fund should diversify its assets among asset classes and currencies. We argue that SWFs could have positive macroeconomic effects in democratic welfare states if the government runs pension programs financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and future population ageing is significant. Still, a SWF is hardly politically feasible if there is no broad agreement in the electorate and among political parties that fiscal surpluses and a SWF is worthwhile.
Artikkel Lars-Erik Borge, Erling Steigum, Siri P. Strandenes (2012)
Rapport Erling Steigum (2011)
Konferanseforedrag Erling Steigum (2011)
Artikkel Erling Steigum (2010)
Rapport Erling Steigum (2010)
Norsk økonomi anno 2010 fremstår som en stor suksess. Det er bare Luxemburg som nå har en høyere kjøpekraftskorrigert brutto nasjonalinntekt per innbygger enn Norge blant OECDlandene. Det er illustrerende at norsk økonomi er blitt påført betydelig mindre realøkonomisk tap av den internasjonale finanskrisen i 2008-2009 enn andre OECD-land. Det er usannsynlig at Norges suksess utelukkende skyldes flaks. Vi skal ikke gå lenger tilbake enn på 1980-tallet og frem til begynnelsen av 1990-tallet da norsk økonomi hadde store problemer, både i form av lav produktivitetsvekst, høy inflasjon og til slutt mye arbeidsledighet. I denne artikkelen skal vi se nærmere på utviklingen i norsk økonomi og makroøkonomisk politikk etter 1980, samt drøfte mulige årsaker til suksessen.
Rapport Hilde C Bjørnland, Richard Clarida, Elisabeth Holvik, Erling Steigum (2010)
Rapport Erling Steigum, Hilde C Bjørnland, Richard Clarida, Elisabeth Holvik (2010)
Rapport Michael Bergman, Steinar Juel, Erling Steigum (2009)
Rapport Erling Steigum (2008)
I de siste 15−20 årene har en rekke industriland reformert sine pensjonssystemer. En viktig årsak til denne bølgen av pensjonsreformer er at andelen pensjonister i befolkningen er på vei opp, og forventes å øke ytterligere i fremtiden. Også den fallende fruktbarheten fra 1970-årene og utover, samt en tendens til nedgang i den yrkesaktive perioden av livsløpet bidrar til at antallet pensjonister per arbeider vil øke betydelig i fremtiden. Det gis en kort oversikt over pensjonsreformer i Europa etter 1990. Notatet går nærmere inn på den norske pensjonsreformen.
Lærebok Erling Steigum (2004)
Lærebok Erling Steigum (2004)
Fagbok Stefan Lundgren, Martin Flodén, Erling Steigum, Hans Wijkander (2004)
Rapport Alex Bowen, Mark O'Brian, Erling Steigum (2003)
Rapport Egil Matsen, Erling Steigum, Erling Steigum, Øystein Thøgersen (2003)
Lærebok Erling Steigum (2003)
Rapport Lars E. O. Svensson, Kjetil Houg, Haakon Solheim, Erling Steigum (2002)
The Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at the Norwegian School of Management BI has for the third time invited a committee of economists for Norges Bank Watch, with the objective to evaluate the monetary-policy regime in Norway and Norges Bank’s conduct of monetary policy. The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2002 consists of Professor Lars E.O. Svensson (chair), Princeton University, Chief Economist Kjetil Houg, Alfred Berg, Doctorate Student Haakon O.Aa. Solheim, Norwegian School of Management BI, and Professor Erling Steigum, Norwegian School of Management BI. The committee met in Oslo in June 2002, had discussions with key officials at Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance, and has worked on its report until September 2002.
Rapport Erling Steigum (2002)
Rapport Erling Steigum (2001)
This paper looks at intergenerational welfare effects of increased public debt when union power in pay bargaing generates structural unemployment. Under a reasonable condition, the debt burden on future generations from postponement of the labor tax is larger than in the case of no union power.
Rapport Erling Steigum, Erling Steigum, Øystein Thøgersen (2001)
The paper considers normative fiscal policy implications of sectoral adjustment consts in a two-sector model with overlapping generations. We show that despite no nominal rigidities, temporary fiscal deficits increase social welfare if adjustment costs prevent immediate sectoral reallocation of inputs. If there are no adjustment costs, the case for fiscal deficits vanishes.
Artikkel Erling Steigum (1999)
BI Business Review
Makromodellene i Statistisk sentralbyrå var aldri ment for lange prognoser slik Finansdepartementet har bestilt de siste 15 årene. Prognosene blir svært usikre, selv på to-tre års sikt.
BI Business Review
Finansdepartementets prognoser er ubrukelige. Statens mulige underskudd i 2030 til 2060 bør ikke styre dagens politikk, skriver Erling Steigum.