In this paper, we use a novel natural experiment and Norwegian tax data to quantify the causal impact of unemployment risk on individual savings. By comparing individuals who live in the same area but face different increases in risk, we show that a one-percentage-point increase in unemployment rates increases safe assets by 1.3%. Reas- suringly, this effect is driven by low-tenured workers, who face the highest increase in risk. Savings in risky financial assets remain unaffected, implying a decrease in the overall risky share of individual portfolios. We use two independent approaches, relying either on cross-sectional variation or time series variation, to quantify the importance of job loss risk in accounting for higher savings during recessions. Our results suggest that unemploy- ment risk can explain 60%–80% of the recession-induced increase in safe assets
Fjære-Lindkjenn, Jeanette; Aastveit, Knut Are, Karlman, Markus Johan, Kinnerud, Karin, Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger & Wold, Ella Getz (2024)
Hvordan virker utlånsforskriften? En oppsummering av forskningslitteraturen
Samfunnsøkonomen
I denne artikkelen forsøker vi å svare på om utlånsforskriften har virket etter hensikten og hvilke kostnader den påfører husholdningene. Forskningslitteraturen indikerer at boliglånsregulering bidrar til noe lavere gjelds- og boligprisvekst, men at det er mer usikkert om den reduserer husholdningenes sårbarhet for uforutsette hendelser som renteøkninger og arbeidsledighet. Utlånsforskriften påfører samtidig mange husholdninger kostnader ved at den begrenser muligheten for konsumglatting og kan gjøre det vanskeligere for unge å kjøpe sin første bolig. Reguleringen kan også forsterke viktigheten av formuende foreldre for muligheten til boligkjøp. Høy inflasjon og rente kan redusere behovet for forskriften og øke kostnadene.
Holm, Martin B.; Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger, Riiser, Mikkel Irving Fiksdal, König, Tobias, Hegna, Torje Meyer & Cao, Jin (2023)
The Investment Channel of Monetary Policy: Evidence from Norway
Working Paper, Norges Bank
Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger & Larsen, Vegard Høghaug (2023)
We investigate the impact of macro-related uncertainty on bank lending in Norway. We show that an increase in general macroeconomic uncertainty reduces bank lending. Importantly, however, we show that this effect is largely driven by monetary policy uncertainty, suggesting that uncertainty about the monetary policy stance is key for understanding why macro-related uncertainty impacts bank lending.
Eggertsson, Gauti; Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger, Summers, Lawrence H. & Wold, Ella Getz (2023)
Negative Nominal Interest Rates and the Bank Lending Channel
We investigate the bank lending channel of negative nominal policy rates from an empirical and theoretical perspective. For the empirical results we rely on Swedish data, including daily banklevel lending rates. We find that retail household deposit rates are subject to a lower bound (DLB). Empirically, once the DLB is met, the pass-through to mortgage lending rates and credit volumes is substantially lower and bank equity values decline in response to further policy rate cuts. We construct a banking sector model and use our estimate of the pass-through of negative policy rates to lending rates as an identified moment to parameterize the model and assess the impact of negative policy rates in general equilibrium. Using the theoretical framework, we derive a sufficient statistic for when negative policy rates are expansionary and when they are not.
Helland, Leif; Iachan, Felipe S., Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger & Nenov, Plamen (2021)
Information Quality and Regime Change: Evidence from the Lab
We experimentally test the effects of information quality in a global game of regime change. The game features a payoff structure such that more dispersed private information induces agents to attack more often and reduces regime stability in the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. We show that subjects in the lab do not play as predicted by equilibrium theory. Instead, more dispersed information makes subjects more cautious, increasing regime stability. We show that this finding is consistent with a modified global game model in which agents engage in level- thinking. In the level- model, information quality affects agents’ actions through a novel channel, that enables a strategic attenuation effect. As information quality worsens, strategic complementarities between different level- types weaken, generating a force that is capable of reversing the comparative statics from the equilibrium model.
Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger & Wold, Ella Getz (2020)
Risk-weighted capital requirements and portfolio rebalancing
We study dividend payouts when banks face coordination-based rollover crises. Banks in the model can use dividends to both risk shift and signal their available liquidity to short-term lenders, thus, influencing the lenders’ actions. In the unique equilibrium both channels induce banks to pay higher dividends than in the absence of a rollover crisis. In our model banks exert an informational externality on other banks via the inferences and actions of lenders. Optimal dividend regulation that corrects this externality and promote financial stability includes a binding cap on dividends. We also discuss testable implications of our theory.
Juelsrud, Ragnar Enger & Getz Wold, Ella (2018)
Risk-weighted capital requirements and portfolio rebalancing
