Institutt for regnskap, revisjon og foretaks­økonomi

Prosjekter

• Prosjekt 2013 - 2016 John Christian Langli (prosjektleder), Marleen Willekens, Tobias Svanstrøm, Erlend Kvaal Evaluering av unntak for revisjonsplikt i små aksjeselskaper.

  Prosjektets skal evaluere konsekvensene av regelendringen som fra og med regnskapsåret 2011 gir små aksjeselskaper i hovedsak adgang til å fravelge revisor. Prosjektets formål er å kartlegge positive og negative konsekvenser for selskapene som fravelger revisor og andre økonomiske aktører, for skattemyndighetene og for samfunnet.

• Prosjekt 2011 - 2016 John Christian Langli (prosjektleder), Erlend Kvaal Lederavlønning i unoterte selskaper

  Hvordan lederlønninger fastsettes i børsnoterte foretak har vært fokus for forskere i lang tid, og mye er kjent om hvordan lederlønningene fastsettes. Mye mindre er kjent om hvordan unoterte selskaper fastsetter lederlønninger.

  I dette prosjektet vil vi analysere hvordan lederlønninger blir fastsatt i unoterte selskaper, og vi vil særlig fokusere på forskjellen mellom ikke-familie og familie selskaper med og uten familiemedlemmer som daglige ledere. Det er grunn til å tro at lederlønninger kan variere mellom familie og ikke-familie selskaper siden det vanligvis er færre agentkonflikter i familieselskaper, særlig hvis daglig leder kommer fra den dominerende eierfamilien.

• Prosjekt 2011 - 2013 Janicke Rasmussen (prosjektleder), Eythor Ivar Jonsson Board evaluation - Exploring the concept in a corporate governance context

  The main goal of this project is to develop a framework for board evaluation to be used by Norwegian companies, both listed and unlisted. The project build on findings in PhD thesis of Janicke Rasmussen (2010) concluding that the board evaluation process implemented in Norwegian listed companies does not contribute to enhanced corporate governance (through increased board effectiveness). The main reason is that the implemented process is not designed to meet the overall purpose of board evaluation, i.e., to assess actual performance against expected performance. I.e. there is no fit between the system and purpose of board evaluation.

  The research will be developed through three sub-projects. The goal of the first research paper is to further develop the concept of board evaluation by exploring the different purposes of board evaluation from an external and internal perspective, and linking it to corporate governance theories. From this, testable hypothesis will be developed which will be used in sub-project two and three. The findings of these projects will be used to develop a framework of board evaluation which, if implemented, may contribute to increased board effectiveness.

• Prosjekt 2009 - 2013 John Christian Langli (prosjektleder), Ole-Kristian Hope, Wayne B. Thomas Agency costs and audit fees in private companies

  To what extent does auditor remuneration reflect agency conflicts in closely-held private firms in Norway? In other words, for which firms and which agency settings are auditors more likely to increase their effort to mitigate moral hazard and adverse selection?

  We intend to investigate various settings in which agency conflicts are potentially high. To the extent that we find auditor remuneration positively correlated with expected agency conflicts, we conclude audit serves an important role in reducing agency conflicts. However, if auditor remuneration is “low” in “high” agency cost settings, we conclude that audits may not be as effective, potentially leading to agency problems such as reduced profitability, lower growth and innovation, decreased investment efficiency, reduced employment, higher wealth transfers from various stakeholders (e.g., minority shareholders and lenders) to controlling shareholders, etc.

  Private firms tend to have much more highly concentrated ownership than do public firms. This means the potential for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders (which are typically families) and other owners could be relatively more important than the typical conflict between managers and shareholders. Because of the detailed data on family relations for a large number of private companies in the CCGR database, we will be able to provide many tests along these lines that have not been previously employed in the literature.