Johan Vorland Wibye

Lov og Rett 64(8) s. 574-598 Doi: https://doi.org/10.18261/lor.64.8.5

Artikkelen undersøker implikasjonene av kunstig intelligens for norsk metodelære. Påstanden som forsvares, er at en vellykket metodisk kritikk av kunstig rettsanvendelse krever et oppgjør med metodelærens uttrykte forestilling om en normstyrt rettsanvendelse basert på empirisk tilgjengelige styringsrammer. Dette styringsperspektivet omfatter reelle hensyn, som er subjektivt formulert, men må være intersubjektivt forsvarlige for å regnes som juridisk akseptabel argumentasjon. Påstanden konkretiseres og utdypes gjennom en drøftelse av mulig kritikk vinklet mot at en kunstig intelligens mangler juridisk intuisjon, originalitet, evne til å håndtere rettslig usikkerhet eller begrunnelsesevne.

Research Methods for Contract Law and Scholarship s. 90-114 Doi: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781035316472.00010

This chapter provides an overview of contract theories and their methodological commitments. It distinguishes conceptual contract theory—analytical engagement with the rights and obligations that make up contracts—from normative theories that posit an organising moral principle at the core of contract law. The major fault-line within normative theories runs between intrinsic theories of contract, anchored in the morality of promise, harm-avoidance, autonomy, contractual relationships, or consent, and instrumental theories, where the law and practice of contract are structured around welfare maximization. The chapter examines the interplay of conceptual and normative analyses and potential benefits of joint approaches. It argues, furthermore, that normative contract theories do not have to be treated as mutually exclusive. Nor should they be judged exclusively on the basis of their coverage. The relative strengths and weaknesses of available theories can instead be used to shed light on different facets of legal doctrines and practices.

Human Rights Law Review 25(4) s. 1-18 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngaf034

The article mediates between doctrinal and analytical scholarship by framing conflict between duties enshrined in the European Convention of Human Rights using the impossibility-of-joint-compliance test, and examining how the resulting account diverges from human rights literature. Analysis of conflict management at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been hampered, in part, by a conflation of legal conflict and logical contradiction. Court precedent is used as support for a revised stance, highlighting the specificity, plurality and contingency of conflict resolution rules. This stance leads to a more charitable interpretation of case law, a rejection of absolute rights as an explanatory mechanism, and a rebuttal to calls for the ECtHR to adopt an explicit moral framework for conflict resolution.

Nordic Journal of Human Rights 43(2) s. 216-218 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/18918131.2025.2462475

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 43(3) s. 497-519 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/ojls/gqad006