Sjur Swensen Ellingsæter

European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) s. 1-27 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-026-00362-3

Abstract Recent EU efforts to harmonize national restructuring and insolvency law seek to reduce uncertainty regarding the content of the laws of other Member States. At first blush, it therefore seems lamentable that the directives adopted or currently discussed contain optionality ‒ i.e., leaving it to Member States to choose between two or more rules. This article develops two theories for when harmonization efforts in this area are worthwhile even if the resulting directives contain optionality: first, that a limited number of clearly defined options may contribute to reducing uncertainty; second, that the mere fact that Member States must transpose directives may spur convergence beyond what is strictly necessary for compliance. The article then uses as a case study the Preventive Restructuring Directive’s options between different priority rules and the choices made in five Member States when transposing the Directive.

Corporate Restructuring Law in Flux s. 59-98

Scandinavian Studies in Law 71 s. 197-216

Journal of Financial Regulation 10(2) s. 194-212 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/jfr/fjae003

In March 2023, the Swiss bank Credit Suisse’s so-called Additional Tier 1 (AT1) bonds were written down to facilitate the bank being taken over by UBS, its national rival. Ensuing discussion and market reactions went well beyond Swiss borders, as the write-down was completed without Credit Suisse’s shareholders first being wiped out, thereby deviating from the principle that shareholders bear losses ahead of all other investors. This article asks whether such an outcome is possible under EU law. A comprehensive analysis demonstrates how this question is governed by the combined operation of contractual clauses and the resolution authority’s statutory powers. Combining applicable EU law with empirical analysis of contractual terms employed by EU banks issuing AT1 bonds and their capital requirements, the article argues that an outcome akin to that of the Credit Suisse write-down is unlikely for EU banks. Building on this analysis, it is shown what reform is needed if EU policymakers consider it desirable to have AT1 bonds absorb losses outside of cases requiring intervention by the resolution authority.

Kritisk juss Doi: https://doi.org/10.18261/kj.50.2-4.7

Rammeverket for fastsettelse av bankers kapitalkrav utgjør en viktig del av EUs bankregulering. Etter det någjeldende rammeverket følger summen av det samlede kapitalkravet en bank må overholde, av både kapitalkravsforordningen (CRR) og beslutninger fattet av forvaltningsmyndigheter (som oftest nasjonale) i medhold av lovgivning som gjennomfører det fjerde kapitalkravsdirektivet (CRD IV). Når fastsettelsen av en enkelt banks kapitalkrav delvis avhenger av beslutningene til nasjonale myndigheter, oppstår risikoen for ulik praksis i forskjellige medlemsstater. Et slikt utfall vil passe dårlig med EUs uttalte ambisjoner om felles krav på bankreguleringens område. Artikkelen analyserer hvordan EU ved utformingen av regelverket for fastsettelsen av bankenes kapitalkrav har søkt å løse spenningen mellom hensynet til lik regulering og hensynet til å sikre at kravene er tilpasset særegne forhold ved individuelle banker eller medlemsstatenes finanssektorer. Analysen avdekker at det er stor variasjon mellom ulike bestemmelser i CRD IV med hensyn til hvor klare føringer EU-retten legger for nasjonale myndighetsbeslutninger. Det er derfor risiko for at nasjonale myndigheter praktiserer deler av kapitalkravsrammeverket på en uensartet måte.