Institutt for samfunns­økonomi

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (JPART) Doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muag027

Abstract Political efforts to weaken democratic institutions place civil servants in a dilemma between political responsiveness and protecting democratic values. As civil servants are embedded in the political-administrative hierarchy, we argue that signals from their direct hierarchical superiors are critical to understand how civil servants address this dilemma. Using a randomized survey experiment among Norwegian national-level civil servants (N = 1,446) and ordered logistic regression models, we find that democratic backsliding increases opposition to government wishes, internal and external voice, and consideration of exit from the organization. Managerial signals moderate these effects: civil servants are more inclined to voice concerns or consider exit when managers signal responsiveness to government wishes. In a conceptual replication and extension among US federal, state and local civil servants (N = 504) using ordered logistic regression models, we likewise find a greater inclination to exit if the manager signals responsiveness to government wishes, but also that respondents are less inclined to voice concerns to the manager. Overall, our findings imply that managerial signals within the political-administrative hierarchy are shaping civil servants’ immediate reactions to democratic backsliding.

Local Government Studies s. 21-21 Doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2026.2717092

Intermunicipal collaboration is commonly viewed as a way for small municipalities to obtain economies of scale. Empirical research, however, indicates that large municipalities participate in such arrangements just as often as small ones. This is puzzling, as large municipalities probably have exhausted existing scale benefits and may even incur extra costs associated with collaboration. Using a panel dataset on collaboration on child protection services in Norway covering 13 years (2003–2019), we study whether costs and benefits associated with intermunicipal collaboration are asymmetrically distributed among municipalities of different sizes. Results indicate that smaller municipalities increase their capacity through collaboration but also experience cost increases. The largest municipalities experience no significant change in costs, but as they share existing resources with member municipalities, they also dilute their capacity to deliver services to citizens in their own jurisdiction.

Mathematics and Financial Economics Doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11579-026-00418-5

American Political Science Review Doi: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055426101634

International Journal of Forecasting Doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2026.06.003