Øyvind Bøhren
Professor emeritus
Institutt for finans
Ansattprofil
- Romnummer B4I-005
- Telefon +4746410503
- E-post oyvind.bohren@bi.no
Biografi
For the most recent updates please see my private homepage.
Before joining BI in 1982, I served on the faculty of the Norwegian School of Economics. I spent one year as visiting faculty at the University of Washington, one year at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and several shorter periods at the Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid, and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I have worked with a consulting firm in corporate strategy, with an investment bank, and as an expert witness. Over the period 2004-2009, I held the Stein Erik Hagen chair in private ownership. I held a 50% position at BI since September 1, 2016, retired in August 2019, and I have been professor emeritus since then.
Research areas
My primary academic interests are corporate finance. The major research efforts have been in capital budgeting, valuation effects of taxation, equity offerings, dividend policy, board composition, shareholder conflicts, ownerless firms, and the governance of family firms. My research is published in outlets like the Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Decision Sciences, Journal of Business Ethics, European Financial Management, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Journal of Economic Psychology, and Energy Economics. Currently, my research focus is on corporate governance. Most of my ongoing projects are linked to the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR), where I served as a founding director until I retired in 2019.
Teaching areas
I usually teach corporate finance, corporate governance, and valuation at the graduate and executive program levels. I find it challenging and rewarding to present my research to regulators and the business community. I have written two textbooks in corporate finance (current editions are from 2017 and 2024, respectively) and one textbook in corporate governance (2012).
Before joining BI in 1982, I served on the faculty of the Norwegian School of Economics. I spent one year as visiting faculty at the University of Washington, one year at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and several shorter periods at the Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona, the Instituto de Empresa in Madrid, and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. I have worked with a consulting firm in corporate strategy, with an investment bank, and as an expert witness. Over the period 2004-2009, I held the Stein Erik Hagen chair in private ownership. I held a 50% position at BI since September 1, 2016, retired in August 2019, and I have been professor emeritus since then.
Research areas
My primary academic interests are corporate finance. The major research efforts have been in capital budgeting, valuation effects of taxation, equity offerings, dividend policy, board composition, shareholder conflicts, ownerless firms, and the governance of family firms. My research is published in outlets like the Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Review of Finance, Journal of Corporate Finance, International Review of Law and Economics, Journal of Banking and Finance, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Economics Letters, Decision Sciences, Journal of Business Ethics, European Financial Management, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, Journal of Economic Psychology, and Energy Economics. Currently, my research focus is on corporate governance. Most of my ongoing projects are linked to the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR), where I served as a founding director until I retired in 2019.
Teaching areas
I usually teach corporate finance, corporate governance, and valuation at the graduate and executive program levels. I find it challenging and rewarding to present my research to regulators and the business community. I have written two textbooks in corporate finance (current editions are from 2017 and 2024, respectively) and one textbook in corporate governance (2012).
Ekspertområder
Publikasjoner
Viser
5
av 63 publikasjon(er)
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum, Torkel Hasle (2021)
Solstrøm fra boligtak er ofte godt for både klima og økonomi, men ikke i dagens Norge
Vi bruker kvantitativ livsløpsanalyse (vugge-til-grav) og finner at solceller på private boligtak har stor, positiv effekt på klima og økonomi når de lages med ren, billig strøm og erstatter skitten, dyr strøm. Beliggenhet er derfor den grunnleggende forklaringen på solcellers verdiskaping. Selv om et solcelleanlegg på 60 m2 av et norsk boligtak produserer mye strøm, reduserer det likevel ikke klimautslippet med mer enn utslippet i Kina øker når anlegget lages. Derfor skapes det ingen global klimagevinst under våre forutsetninger. Brukes derimot anlegget i land der alternativ strøm er skitten, reduseres årlig CO2-utslipp med mer enn EUs samlede årsutslipp pr. innbygger. I Norge, hvor alternativ strøm både er ren og forholdsvis billig, finner vi at solstrøm er ulønnsomt samfunnsøkonomisk og ofte også privatøkonomisk. Norge er trolig blant de få land der både klimaeffekten og økonomieffekten av solceller på boligtak er negativ. Bedre solcelleteknologi, mer elektrifisering, høyere strømpris og mer strømeksport kan lett forbedre denne situasjonen.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu, Line Almli, Kathrine Søndergaard (2019)
When Does the Family Govern the Family Firm?
We find that the controlling family holds both the chief executive officer and chair positions in 79% of Norwegian family firms. The family holds more governance positions when it owns large stakes in small, profitable, low-risk firms. This result suggests that the family trades off expected costs and benefits by conditioning participation intensity on observable firm characteristics. We find that the positive effect of performance on participation is twice as strong as the positive effect of participation on performance. The endogeneity of participation, therefore, should be carefully accounted for when analyzing the effect of family governance on the family firm’s behavior.
Artikkel Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2019)
Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts
We find that potential conflicts between majority and minority shareholders strongly influence how dividends respond to taxes. When the controlling shareholder has a smaller stake, the incentives to extract private benefits are stronger – a shareholder conflict that can be mitigated by dividend payout. We study a large and clean regulatory shock in Norway that increases the dividend tax rate for all individuals from 0% to 28%. We find that dividends drop less the higher the potential shareholder conflict, suggesting that dividend policy trades off tax and agency considerations. The average payout ratio falls by 30 percentage points when the conflict potential is low, but by only 18 points when it is high. These lower dividends cannot be explained by higher salaries to shareholders or diverse liquidity needs. We also observe a strong increase in indirect ownership of high-conflict firms through tax-exempt holding companies and suggest policy implications for intercorporate dividend taxation.
Kapittel Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
The under-researched family firm: New insights from unique Norwegian data
Artikkel Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
Shareholder conflicts and dividends
We examine how dividend policy is used to mitigate potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders in private Norwegian firms. The average payout is 50% higher if the majority shareholder’s equity stake is 55% (high conflict potential) rather than 95% (low conflict potential). Such minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority shareholder investment. These results suggest that controlling shareholders voluntarily use dividends to reduce agency conflicts and build trust, rather than opportunistically preferring private benefits to dividends. We show that our results are unlikely to arise from liquidity or signaling motives.
Artikkel Magnus Berg, Øyvind Bøhren, Erik Vassnes (2018)
Modeling the response to exogenous shocks: The capital uplift rate in petroleum taxation
We show how a recent drop in the Norwegian capital uplift rate by two percentage points changes optimal field design and reduces field value for shareholders. Although optimal design changes considerably and value drops by 12%, the ability to reoptimize design after the shock is worth only 1.5% of field value. This evidence suggests that large behavioral effects of a shock do not necessarily imply large value effects, making it less important to always account for the taxpayers' response. The valuation error in such cases may be moderate if one instead uses the simplifying and widespread assumption of unresponsive taxpayers.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2016)
Mandatory Gender Balance and Board Independence
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Fredrik Hoseth, Håvard Remøy (2014)
Lønnsomhet i næringsklynger
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Økonomiske særtrekk ved stiftelser
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2014)
Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval
Norway is the first, and so far the only, country to mandate a minimum fraction of female and male directors on corporate boards. We find that after a new gender balance law surprisingly stipulated that the firm must be liquidated unless at least 40% of its directors are of each gender, half the firms exit to an organizational form not exposed to the law. This response suggests that forced gender balance is costly. The costs are also firm-specific, because exit is more common when the firm is non-listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few female directors. These characteristics reflect high costs of involuntary board restructuring and low costs of abandoning the exposed organizational form. Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms hesitate to become exposed. Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with inefficient organizational forms or inefficient boards.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Morten Josefsen (2013)
Stakeholder rights and economic performance: The profitability of nonprofits
This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by comparing the performance of stockholder-owned firms with the much less analyzed nonprofit firms. No stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by customers, employees, and community citizens. Accounting for differences in size and risk and comparing only firms in the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned firms do not outperform nonprofit firms. This result is consistent with the notin that the monitoring function of stockholders may be successfully replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence that product market competition may play this role as a substitute monitoring mechanism.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Nils Erik Krosvik (2013)
The economics of minority freezeouts: Evidence from the courtroom
We analyze minority freezeout offers in a legal environment where minority stockholders can reject the offer and ask the court to value their nontendered stock. This regulatory setting allows us to observe the disciplining effect of legal enforcement on stockholder behavior. We find that minority stockholders reject about one out of ten freezeout offers, and that rejection is more likely when the bidder has controlled the firm for quite some time before the offer. Rejected offers take on average around three years to be settled in court, and litigation costs are almost never paid by minority stockholders. The court mostly prices rejected offers above the offer price, particularly when the firm is private, when the bidder has controlled the firm for an extensive period before the offer, and when the case is large. These findings suggest that minority stockholders consider most freezeout offers commensurate with the level of legal stockholder protection as enforced by the courts. The majority stockholder tends to underestimate the legal protection of minority rights in settings where these rights are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Nevertheless, minority stockholders who take their case to court often face years of waiting, and for a highly unpredictable litigation return.
Artikkel Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Norske familiebedrifter - Omfang, eierstyring og lønnsomhet
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Morten Josefsen, Pål Erik Steen (2012)
Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy
This paper compares the dividend policy of owner-controlled firms with that of firms where the owners are a minority relative to non-owner employees, customers, and community citizens. We find that regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong stakeholder uses the dividend payout decision to mitigate rather than to intensify the conflict of interest with the weak stakeholder. Hence, the higher the potential agency cost as reflected in the firm’s stakeholder structure, the more the actual agency cost is reduced by the strong stakeholder’s dividend payout decision. These findings are consistent with a dividend policy in which opportunistic power abuse in stakeholder conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences for the abuser at a later stage. Indirect evidence supports this interpretation.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (2012)
Bok og nettside som integrert læreverk
Denne artikkelen bruker et konkret pedagogisk prosjekt i finans til å vise hvordan ønsket om undervisning med relevans og mangfold kan avleire seg i et læreverk. Vår nøkkel er å utvikle bok og nettside i tidsmessig parallell snarere enn i sekvens, ha klar arbeidsdeling og sømløs overgang mellom de to komponentene, og å gjøre nettsiden spesielt bred og dyp. I artikkelen konsentrerer vi oss om nettsiden og beskriver hvordan hensynet til relevans og mangfold ivaretas gjennom aktiv bruk av medieoppslag, skreddersydde regneark, integrert stikkordliste, spillbaserte øvingsoppgaver, kalkulator- og regnearkhjelp, lydfiler for MP3-spiller og tilbud om forelesermateriale. Vår erfaring tyder på at integrerte læreverk er krevende å utvikle og på kort sikt ulønnsomme for både forfatter og forlag. I et lengre perspektiv tror vi teknologidrevet konkurransepress vil favorisere dem som utnytter at teknologi med høyt pedagogisk potensial nå er lett tilgjengelig for forfatter, forlag, foreleser og student. Uansett står produsenter og brukere av læremidler overfor store utfordringer.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Kompakt og intens. Erfaringer fra en skriveprosess
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, R. Øystein Strøm (2010)
Governance and Politics: Regulating Independence and Diversity in the Board Room
This paper analyzes the economic rationale for board regulation in place and for introducing new regulation in the future. We relate the value of the firm to the use of employee directors, board independence, directors with multiple seats, and to gender diversity. Our evidence shows that the firm creates more value for its owners when the board has no employee directors, when its directors have strong links to other boards, and when gender diversity is low. We find no relationship between firm performance and board independence. These characteristics of value-creating boards support neither popular opinion nor the current politics of corporate governance.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Artikkel Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2009)
Unoterte aksjeselskaper selskaper er viktige, uutforskede og spesielle
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Jørgen Haug (2006)
Managing earnings with intercorporate investments
We explore to what extent firms deliberately manage their financial reports by exploiting the flexibility of generally accepted accounting principles. Using a sample of Oslo Stock Exchange-listed firms with 20–50% equity holdings in other firms, we find that firms with high financial leverage tend to maximize reported earnings from these investments through their choice between the cost method and the equity method, possibly in an attempt to reduce debt renegotiation costs or to avoid regulatory attention. In contrast, managers do not systematically bias reported earnings to extract private benefits or to signal revised expectations about future cash flows. Firms use different earnings management tools in a consistent way, as the earnings effect of the cost/equity choice is not offset by discretionary accruals.
Kapittel Øyvind Bøhren, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2006)
Governance and performance revisited
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (2005)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Nils Erik Krosvik (2005)
Tvangsinnløsning av minoritetseiere: Rettsøkonomien i norske skjønnssaker gjennom 25 år" (Minority buyouts: Law and economics in Norwegian courts over 25 years)
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Jørgen Haug, Dag Michalsen (2004)
Compliance with flexible accounting standards
We examine to what extent firms adhere to the stated intent of noncompulsory accounting standards when reporting for intercorporate investments. The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in Norway strongly recommend that a 20–50% intercorporate investment is accounted for by the equity method rather than the cost method, if the investment is long-term, of strategic importance, and involves significant influence. Even so, we find that the actual use of the equity method is independent of the duration of the investment period, the fraction of equity held, its recent growth, and the investor's voting power. This lack of compliance suggests that one cannot use the observed choice between the cost method and the equity method to infer the underlying characteristics of the investment as specified by the accounting standard. Flexible GAAP may therefore not induce firms to disclose the information that the GAAP were designed to produce.
Kapittel Øyvind Bøhren, Samir Sharma, Tonje Vegarud (2004)
Eierstyring i store norske selskaper: Oppsigelse av toppleder
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2003)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Kapittel Øyvind Bøhren, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2002)
Norsk eierskap: Særtrekk og sære trekk
Kapittel Øyvind Bøhren (2002)
Finansparadigmet
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2001)
Patterns of corporate ownership: insights from a unique data set
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1998)
The agent's ethics in the principal-agent model
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Øyvind Norli (1997)
Determinants of intercorporate shareholdings
Antologi Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (1997)
Prosjektanalyse
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1997)
Risk components and the market model: A pedagogical note
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Espen B. Eckbo, Dag Michalsen (1997)
Why underwrite rights offerings? Some new evidence
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Arne Thorsland, Pål Tollefsen (1996)
Gjeldsstrukturen i norske aksjeselskaper
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Espen B. Eckbo, Dag Michalsen (1996)
Norske aksjeemisjoner
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen (1994)
Corporate cross-ownership and market aggregates: Oslo Stock Exchange 1980-1990
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1993)
På leting etter god pristeori: Historien om kapitalverdimodellen
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Knut Larsen, Dag Michalsen, Hans Robert Schwencke (1991)
Egenkapitalrentabilitet og skatt: En kritisk analyse
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen (1990)
Merton Miller, norsk beskatning og finansiell verdiskapning
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1990)
Theory development processes in the social sciences: The case of stochastic choice theory
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen (1990)
Skattebaserte finansieringsinsentiver i norske aksjeselskaper fra 1970 til 1990
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
Leder Øyvind Bøhren (1987)
Bedriftsøkonomi og PC-verktøy
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern (1987)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1987)
PC-integrert undervisning i bedriftsøkonomi: Pedagogiske hensyn
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1984)
The validity of conventional valuation models under multiperiod uncertainty
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1983)
Sparing med skattefradrag: en privatøkonomisk analyse
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1983)
Skattefradrag for realrenter
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1983)
Bounding certainty equivalent factors and risk-adjusted discount rates
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1982)
Effektiv rente på boliglån: en empirisk undersøkelse
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1982)
Norsk oljepolitikk i beslutningsanalytisk perspektiv
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1982)
Å løse investeringsproblemer
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Geir Fuglaas (1981)
Yrkesvalg og lønnsomhet: NHH kontra næringsliv og forvaltning
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern (1981)
Probabilities proportional to time-state prices
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Cornelius M. Schilbred (1980)
North Sea oil taxes and sharing of risk: a comparative case study
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1980)
Informasjonsøkonomi - en selektiv oversikt
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Terje Rein Hansen (1980)
Capital Budgeting with Unspecified Discount Rates
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Terje Hansen (1979)
Akseptable gjeldsrenter i inflasjonstider
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern (1979)
Consistent rankings based on total and differential amounts under uncertainty
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1978)
Kostnadsoverskridelser og skatteregler i Nordsjøen
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1978)
Investeringsplanlegging under budsjettrestriksjoner - en kommentar
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1976)
Om vurdering av teori: Anvendelse av vurderingskriterier med Howard-Sheth modellen som eksempel
Viser
5
av 88 publikasjon(er)
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (2022)
Kabler, klima og Glasgow
Media Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum, Torkel Hasle (2021)
Solstrøm, skuffelse og realisme
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum, Torkel Hasle (2021)
Norsk boligsolstrøm er dessverre ingen solskinnshistorie
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Bogdan Stacescu (2020)
Innlegg: Overselger studie om formuesskatt
Kronikk Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2020)
Innlegg fra BI-forskere: Økt formuesskatt på bolig i 2006–2010 svekket familiebedrifter
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2018)
Er Norge avhengig av arverekken i familiebedrifter?
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu, Line Almli, Kathrine Søndergaard (2018)
Når er en familie aktiv eier?
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2018)
Fylkeskommunal eierutøvelse
Kronikk Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
Makt og styring i familiebedrifter
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
El secreto de Noruega para tener a los tres multimillonarios más jóvenes del mundo
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
SSB-styret kritiseres for å ha sviktet Meyer
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Tilstrekkelig makt til å passe på pengene
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Aker får stryk for regnestykke
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Røkke kan tjene to milliarder – uten å betale én krone i skatt
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Ombudstvedt får kritikk fra de usikrede kreditorene
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Eierne i Hafslund på vei mot rettslokalet
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Styrene burde bare få betalt i aksjer de ikke kan selge
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Dette er gullgruvene i norsk næringsliv
Deltakelse i media Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Når mor er sjefen din på jobb
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Dette vil Christoffer overta, hvis pappa sier ja
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Flere gjør som Thon og Mohn
Kronikk Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2017)
Majoritetseiere beskytter minoriteten
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2016)
Professorer: Enten Brekke eller Wærsted er ferdig i Telenor
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2016)
Hva er den beste formen for eierskap?
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2016)
Gir råd med CAPS LOCK
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2016)
The youngest billionaire in the world is a Norwegian teenager
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Telenor striden - Full krise
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Ukjent med fryktkultur
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Børsen ser på saken
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Styr Norges Bank bedre
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Styr Norges Bank bedre
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Jobben som vaktbikkje blir illusorisk
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Johan H. Andresen: Vil gi døtrene større valgfrihet
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Sier noe om hennes integritet
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Helnorsk tradisjon, unorsk eier
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2015)
Strammer inn på ledergoder
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Kontroll, ikke verdiskapning
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Småsparerne hamstret
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Ekstremt vanskelig jobb foran seg
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Vil markere at de gjør noe konkret
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Dette mister staten kontroll på
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
KrF-misnøye med hastekutt
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren, Håvard Remøy (2014)
Klyngje ikkje gull for eigarane
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Unoterte aksjer skaper splittelse
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Hagens utvalgte
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Familieeffekten
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Denne familien har drevet brusfabrikk i snart 100 år
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Fredrik Hoseth, Håvard Remøy (2014)
Er næringsklynger spesielt lønnsomme?
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Fredrik Hoseth, Håvard Remøy (2014)
Klynger skjerper konkurransen
Deltakelse i media Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Generasjonsskifte i familiebedrifter
Deltakelse i media Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Arvefølge i familiebedrifter
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Lover skikkelig svar
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Flere fallgruver med sponset forskning
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Surt sukker i REC
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Mener Røkke "skrur" Staten
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Akademisk finansteori
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Svak styringspraksis i REC
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Spetalen hyller seg selv
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Bommer om REC
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Styreleder Berdal vs. professor Bøhren
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Ny kraftig REC-kritikk
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Redningsmann på overtid
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Ber aksjonærene skjerpe seg
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Spetalen bommer om governance
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Mener Kavlifond skaper vinnerkultur
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Agastistriden
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Beholder makten
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Uvitende om flykjøp
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Sandpåstrøer og dinosaur
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
To politikerfeil om bankrenter
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Ingen idealverden
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Styreuavhengighet
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Styrekvotering er et bomskudd
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Kvotering er et bomskudd
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Bogdan Stacescu, Morten Josefsen, Pål Erik Steen (2013)
Høyt utbytte gir mindre konflikter
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Bogdan Stacescu, Morten Josefsen, Pål Erik Steen (2013)
Høyt utbytte - lavt konfliktnivå
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Det er mye å vinne
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Familieselskaper er mest lønnsomme
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Tror kvinner kan havne på B-laget
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Ikke sikkert kundene tjener på bankfusjon
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Giskes styretrøbbel: Slaktes for Entra-håndtering
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Gidder ikke å gjøre som Giske sier
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2012)
Medaljens bakside
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Mener nordmenn taper på defensivt oljefond - Professor: Blant de beste i klassen
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Norge er en klar nummer en
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Tilrår å selge alt - eller ingenting
Intervju Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Ulønnsom kvinnekvote
Kronikk Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins (2008)
Eierstyring og bedriftsøkonomi utenfor Oslo Børs
Viser
5
av 108 publikasjon(er)
Konferanseforedrag Leon Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2024)
Illiquid Owners and Firm Behavior
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2019)
Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2019)
Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2019)
Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2019)
Shareholder illiquidity and firm behavior: Financial and real effects of the personal wealth tax in private firms
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
The Family Firm Premium and Family Characteristics: Evidence from Population Data
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
Dividends and taxes: The moderating role of agency conflicts
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
The Family Firm Premium
Konferanseforedrag Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2018)
Illiquid Shareholders and Firm Cash Flows
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
Illiquid shareholders and real firm effects: The personal wealth tax and financial constraints
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2018)
Family matters: Et dypdykk i norske familiebedrifter
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
What Explains the Large Family Firm Premium?
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
Illiquid Shareholders and Firm Cash Flows
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2018)
The Governance and Finance of Norwegian Family Firms: Main Characteristics of the Population
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2018)
Glede og smerte i forskningskommunikasjon og samfunnspåvirkning
Konferanseforedrag Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2018)
The Performance Premium of Family Firms: New Evidence from Population Data
Artikkel Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2017)
Shareholder Conflicts and Dividends
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2017)
Dividends and Taxes: The Moderating Role of Agency Conflicts
Foredrag Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2017)
Speech on corporate finance and governance in private Norwegian firms. Oslo, Norway
Konferanseforedrag Bogdan Stacescu, Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins (2017)
Dividends and Taxes: The Moderating Role of Agency Conflicts
Konferanseforedrag Magnus Berg, Øyvind Bøhren, Erik Vassnes (2017)
Modelling the response to tax shocks: The capital uplift rate in petroleum taxation
Artikkel Audun Farbrot, Øyvind Bøhren (2017)
Majoritetseiere beskytter minoriteten
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen, Øyvind Norli (2017)
Finans: Teori og praksis
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Sebastian Christophersen, Simen Lerfaldet (2017)
Shareholder turnout
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (2016)
Finans: Innføring i investering og finansiering
Konferanseforedrag Bogdan Stacescu, Øyvind Bøhren (2016)
The governance of family firms
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Magnus Berg, Erik Vassnes (2016)
Tax shocks and firm behavior
Rapport Line Almli, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu, Kathrine Søndergaard (2015)
When does the family govern the family firm?
Konferanseforedrag Line Almli, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu, Kathrine Søndergaard (2015)
When does the family govern the family firm?
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Diana Iancu, Georgiana Radulescu, R. Øystein Strøm (2015)
The ownership structure of private firms
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2014)
Stockholder conflicts and dividends
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2014)
Dividends, taxes, and agency costs
Foredrag Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2014)
Dividends, taxes and agency costs
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Eierstyring: Teori og praksis
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Eierstyring
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2013)
Gender quotas: The Norwegian experience
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Family management of family firms
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2013)
Gender quotas and board independence
Konferanseforedrag Siv Jønland Staubo, Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Gender balance and board independence
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, R. Øystein Strøm, Georgiana Radulescu, Diana Iancu (2013)
Ownership determinants
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Godt eierskap
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Familiebedrifter
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, R. Øystein Strøm, Georgiana Radulescu, Diana Iancu (2013)
Ownership determinants
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Eiers rapportering om eierstyring
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2013)
Utbytte som eierstyringsmekanisme
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Uavhengige styrer: Oppskrytt og overforbrukt?
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Styrekvotering: Medaljens bakside
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2012)
Changing organizational form to avoid regulatory constraints: The effect of mandatory gender balance in the boardroom
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Eierstyring utenfor Oslo Børs: Viktig, uutforsket og annerledes
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2012)
The effect on organizational form of mandating gender balance in corporate boards
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2012)
Mandatory gender balance in corporate boards: Effects on organizational form
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2012)
Eierstyring i Norge
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2012)
Changing organizational form to avoid regulatory constraints: The effect od mandatory gender balance in the boardroom
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Siv Jønland Staubo (2012)
Female directors and board independence: Evidence from boards with mandatory gender balance
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen (2012)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Eierstyring utenfor Oslo Børs
Konferanseforedrag Leon Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Dividends and Stockholder Conflicts: A Comprehensive Test for Private Firms
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Bogdan Stacescu (2011)
Stockholder Conflicts and Dividend Payout
This paper examines how dividend policy influences conflicts of interest between majority and minority stockholders in a large sample of private firms with controlling blockholders. We find that a higher potential for stockholder conflicts is associated with higher payout. This tendency is stronger when the minority stockholder structure is diffuse and when the minority is not on the firm’s board. Minority-friendly payout is also associated with higher subsequent minority investment in the firm. These findings are consistent with the notion that dividend policy is used to mitigate agency costs, particularly when this benefits the majority in the longer run.
Konferanseforedrag Annette Alstadsæter, Øyvind Bøhren, Leon Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins (2011)
Ownership, Taxes and Dividends
Fagbok Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Eierne, styret og ledelsen: Corporate governance i Norge
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Private firms
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Eierstyring i norske unoterte selskaper
Konferanseforedrag Annette Alstadsæter, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Leon Bogdan Stacescu (2011)
Illiquid stockholders and firm payout
Konferanseforedrag Janis Berzins, Leon Bogdan Stacescu, Annette Alstadsæter, Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Tax concerns and agency concerns in dividend policy: Holding companies as a separating device
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Unoterte bedrifter og familiebedrifter
Konferanseforedrag Annette Alstadsæter, Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Leon Bogdan Stacescu (2011)
Ownership, Taxes and Dividends
Foredrag Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Corporate Governance
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Morten Josefsen, Pål Erik Steen (2011)
Dividends and stakeholder conflicts: A cleaner test
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Nils Erik Krosvik (2011)
The economics of minority freezeouts: Evidence from the courtroom
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Leon Bogdan Stacescu (2011)
Dividends and stockholder conflicts: A comprehensive test for private firms
Konferanseforedrag Leon Bogdan Stacescu, Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren (2011)
Dividends and Stockholder Conflicts: A Comprehensive Test for Private Firms
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Morten Josefsen (2010)
Dividends and stakeholder conflicts: A cleaner test
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Richard Priestley, Ilan Cooper (2009)
Real investment, economic efficiency, and managerial entrenchment
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins (2009)
Private firms are significant and different
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Richard Priestley, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2009)
Investor short-termism and firm value
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (2009)
Prosjektanalyse. Investering og finansiering
Rapport Janis Berzins, Øyvind Bøhren, Pål Rydland (2008)
Corporate finance and governance in firms with limited liability: Basic characteristics
We analyze a wide range of corporate finance and governance characteristics in all active Norwegian firms with limited liability over the period 1994-2005. This sample includes about 77,000 nonlisted (private) firms and 135 listed (public) firms per year. Nonlisted firms have barely been addressed in the finance literature, despite our finding that they employ four times more people than listed firms, have about four times higher revenues, hold twice as much assets, and constitute over 99% of the enterprises. Indirect evidence suggests that this is also the typical situation worldwide. The unexplored nature of nonlisted firms makes us address a large set of characteristics, and to focus more on describing overall patterns in the data rather than making elaborate tests of behavioral hypotheses. We find that the size distribution of firms in the economy is close to lognormal, which is consistent with independence between size and growth for the individual firm.
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Janis Berzins, Pål Rydland (2008)
The corporate finance and governance of limited liability firms: Basic characteristics
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Øystein Strøm (2007)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Morten Josefsen (2007)
Do stakeholders matter for corporate governance? Behavior and performance of Norwegian banks 1985-2002
The distribution of formal control rights among the firm’s stakeholders (such as stockholders, creditors, employees, politicians, and customers) attracts considerable public attention in many countries. For instance, a common view in the UK and the US is that firms should have profit maximization as their only objective, and that stockholders should be the dominant stakeholder in corporate governance. In contrast, conventional wisdom in Continental Europe and Japan is that firms should have multiple objectives and allocate formal power to more stakeholder types than just stockholders. The politics of corporate governance addresses this issue by regulating the owners’ ability to control the corporation. This report addresses this issue empirically by trying to answer two questions. First, what relationship do we actually observe between stakeholder structure and corporate behavior? For instance, do firms take less risk when stockholders share control rights with employees, customers, and politicians? Second, what is the real-world link between stakeholder structure and economic performance? For instance, do ownerless firms have lower returns to capital invested than firms owned by stockholders?
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Richard Priestley, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2006)
The duration of equity ownership at the Oslo Stock Exchange 1989-1999
To date little is known about how long equity ownership lasts, what determines its length, and whether ownership duration is related to rm performance. Using a unique time series of equity holdings over eleven years, we nd that on average the rm's largest owner stays less than three years and stays longer than owners with smaller stakes. The duration of nancial institutions and foreigners is shorter than that of individuals and industrial rms. We show that ownership duration is duration dependent as the probability of closing an equity position is a function of how long the owner has held the stake. Ownership duration appears to match the duration of the rm's investment projects. We nd no evidence that large owners vote by foot in the sense that bad news about earnings leads to duration ending. There is a negative relationship between ownership duration and a rm's performance in general, but the sign and strength of this relationship di ers across owner types. Long duration by nancial institutions and industrial corporations is negatively related to performance, whereas the opposite is true for individuals. This suggests that long term ownership may improve rm performance if the monitoring is direct as opposed to delegated.
Konferanseforedrag Øyvind Bøhren, Øystein Strøm (2006)
Aligned, informed, and decisive: Characteristics of value-creating boards
This paper explores how board composition influences the conflict of interest between principals and agents, the production of information for monitoring and advice, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. Paying particular attention to the board's independence, information production, and diversity, we exploit unusually rich data from an unexplored institutional environment to estimate models that account for potential endogeneity. We find that performance improves when the directors own equity in the firm, have wide information networks to other firms, and when the board has low gender diversity, no employee directors, and small size. No systematic association is found between performance and independence. We find that board mechanisms are endogenous, both relative to each other and to performance. These characteristics of value-creating boards are consistent with theoretical predictions and the limited existing evidence, but lend no support to popular opinion and the current politics of corporate governance.
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (2006)
Eierskap og lønnsomhet
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Øystein Strøm (2005)
The value-creating board: Theory and evidence
This paper explores empirically how board composition influences the conflict of interest between agents and principals, the production of information for monitoring and support, and the board's effectiveness as a decision-maker. We find that potential agency costs in our sample firms are high because the ownership-driven monitoring incentives are low. The average board has only six members, gender diversity is low, roughly half the firms have employee directors, and most CEOs are neither directors in their firm nor elsewhere. Using a wide set of such board characteristics and new measures of board independence and director networking, static and dynamic fixed effects panel data models show that value-creating boards are aligned with their shareholders, but dependent on the CEO. Multiple directorships create valuable information networks, whereas diversity in terms of gender, board size, and employee directors reduces value. Models accounting for endogeneity and reverse causation support these conclusions.
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2001)
Corporate governance and economic performance in Norwegian listed firms
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen (2001)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Bernt Arne Ødegaard (2000)
The ownership structure of Norwegian firms: Characteristics of an outlier
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (1999)
Prosjektanalyse
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Jørgen Haug, Dag Michalsen (1997)
Consolidation policy and managerial discretion: Accounting for intercorporate shareholdings
Fagbok Per Ivar Gjærum, Øyvind Bøhren (1997)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring. 3.utgave (Project analysis. 3rd ed.)
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Bjørn Espen Eckbo, Dag Michalsen, David C, Smith (1997)
Corporate dividend policy in Norway
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Dag Michalsen (1994)
Finansiell økonomi. Teori og praksis
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Arne Jon Isachsen (1991)
Forsker og forretningsmann: En verdiskapende allianse
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (1991)
Prosjektanalyse med PC-verktøy
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (1991)
Prosjektanalyse: En innføring
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1987)
Økonomisk risiko i oljeprosjekter
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1987)
Erfaringer fra produktutvikling: Finansiell programvare for PC
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (1987)
Budsjettering, investering og finansiering
Bokanmeldelse Øyvind Bøhren (1987)
Jan Mossin: "Markedseffisiens. Finansmarkedslære for nøkterne investors"
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern (1985)
Usikkerhet i oljeprosjekter: Relevante og irrelevante risikohensyn
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern (1985)
Risiko og lønnsomhet i oljeprosjekter: Eksempler på modellbruk ved større feltanalyser
Bokkapittel Øyvind Bøhren (1984)
Foretaksstrategi og økonomisk teori
Rapport Øyvind Bøhren, Steinar Ekern, Thore Johnsen, Pål E. Korsvold (1984)
Lønnsomhet av oljeprosjekter: En systematisk gjennomgang av alternative modeller for prosjektvurdering under usikkerhet
Lærebok Øyvind Bøhren, Per Ivar Gjærum (1984)
Oppgaver og løsningsforslag i budsjettering, investering og finansiering
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren (1982)
Er effektiv rente bryet verd?
Artikkel Øyvind Bøhren, Cornelius M. Schilbred (1982)
Evaluating North Sea petroleum fields
Doktoravhandling Øyvind Bøhren (1978)
Choice of models and data in capital budgeting
Masteroppgave Øyvind Bøhren (1976)
Analyse av petroleumsinvesteringer
| År | Akademisk institusjon | Grad |
|---|---|---|
| 1978 | Norwegian School of Economics, NHH | Ph.D. |
| 1976 | Norwegian School of Economics, NHH | Master of Science |
| 1973 | Norwegian School of Economics, NHH | B.A. |
| År | Arbeidsgiver | Tittel |
|---|---|---|
| 2019 - Present | BI Norwegian Business School | Professor Emeritus |
| 2006 - 2019 | BI Norwegian Business School | Founding director, Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) |
| 1985 - 2019 | BI Norwegian Business School | Professor of financial economics |
| 2004 - 2009 | BI Norwegian Business School | Holder of the Stein Erik Hagen Chair for private ownership |
| 1993 - 1996 | BI Norwegian Business School | Dean of Graduate Programs |
| 1992 - 1993 | University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill | Visiting scholar |
| 1983 - 1985 | BI Norwegian Business School | Associate professor, finance |
| 1982 - 1983 | BI Norwegian Business School | Assistant professor, finance |
| 1980 - 1982 | Norwegian School of Economics | Assistant professor, management |
| 1979 - 1980 | University of Washington | Visiting scholar |
| 1977 - 1980 | Norwegian School of Economics | Research associate, finance |
| 1974 - 1976 | Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) | Research assistant, management |
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